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I THE SUBJECT - CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This work deals with aspects of constitutional development in 
South Africa from Union in 1910 until 1983. 1 More specifically, 
it examines the important role played by constitutional 
conventions in this country, drawing extensively upon local, 
British and other Commonwealth materials for this purpose. 
Reference to British and other Commonwealth experience of 
conventions is justified, because South Africa enjoys a consti-
tutional heritage richly endowed from the United Kingdom2 and 
from the other former Dominions of the British Crown. The ccmmon 
bond between South Africa and many of these countries is a system 
of government often referred to as the 'Westminster System 1 • 3 
A brief description of this common constitutional heritage or 
'Westminster System' is required before a proper analysis of 
constitutional conventions can be undertaken. 
(1) Westminster System 
The term 'Westminster System' has no precise constitu-
tional or political meaning, although in its widest sense it 
may be understood to comprise all the main features of the 
British constitution. 4 In this context, the term describes 
a system of government which has evolved slowly over the 
centuries, 5 bearing certain constitutional features which 
are unique to the United Kingdom. 
In another sense however, the term 'Westminster System' 
-2-
has a much narrower meaning. 7 While the constitutions of 
the various Commonwealth countries differ in many respects 
from each other, most of them contain specific hallmarks 
which are designed to capture the spirit and practice of 
government in the United Kingdom. 8 These hallmarks normally 
consist of the following four constitutional 
characteristics: 9 
(a) The Head of State is not the effective head of 
government. 
(b) The effective head of government is a Prime Minister, 
who presides over a Cabinet composed of Ministers 
over whose appointment and removal he has a 
substantial measure of control. 
(c) The effective branch of government is 
parliamentary inasmuch as Ministers must be members 
of the legislature. 
(d) Ministers are collectively and individually 
responsible to a freely elected and representative 
legislature. 
(2) Westminster principles in the United Kingdom 
So far as these principles concern the system of 
government in'the United Kingdom, they have not been 
transmuted into rules of law. In many instances this has 
been the case because there has been a desire to avoid the 
formality, explicitness and publicity associated with 
changes in the law. 10 The constitutional behaviour of the 
Sovereign has changed remarkably in the last two hundred 
-3-
years, but this has occurred without the intervention of new 
Acts of Parliament or the intervention of courts of law. 11 
In place of Kings who used to govern by the prerogative 
there is now a constitutional monarchy. 12 The Queen is Head 
of State and government is carried on in her name, but it is 
government by an Executive answerable to, and dependent for 
its office upon, Parliament. 13 After the revolution 
settlement of 1688, it gradually came to be appreciated that 
the King could only govern through Ministers who had the 
confidence of Parliament. 14 Executive powers came to be 
exercised not by the Sovereign, but by a Prime Minister and 
other Ministers who became responsible to Parliament for the 
exercise of their powers. 15 All these changes have occurred 
notwithstanding the retention of forms and organs of 
16 government left over from the era of royal, personal rule. 
Consequently, although at common law, the Sovereign has 
unlimited power to appoint whom she pleases as Ministers of 
the Crown, 17 such appointments are now made by the Sovereign 
on the advice of the Prime Minister. 18 Her choice is 
additionally fettered because the Sovereign is obliged to 
appoint as Prime Minister the person who is in the best 
position to receive the support of a majority in the House 
of Commons. 19 No rule of law prevent~ the Sovereign 
appointing to Ministerial office a person who is outside 
Parliament, but the principle of Ministerial responsibility 
requires that a Minister should belong to one or other House 
of Parliament. 20 Through the exercise of the prerogative 
-4-
the Sovereign may dissolve Parliament at any time, and thus 
cause a general election to be held. 21 Normally however, 
the Sovereign accepts the advice of the Prime Minister and 
22 grants a dissolution when this is requested. In certain 
circumstances, the Sovereign may consider it prudent to 
dismiss Ministers of the Crown, 23 but events of recent years 
in Australia show the inherent dangers of exercising a 
prerogat.ive power of this nature. 24 
The British example shows that while the outward legal 
form may be left intact, other means can be employed for 
discreetly managing the internal relationships of 
25 government. In other words, the four basic hallmarks of 
the Westminster system are not to be found in the legal 
rules of the United Kingdom constitution, 26 but in a 
collection of non-legal rules. 27 These non-legal rules are 
usually referred to as 'Constitutional Conventions 1 , 28 
although such 'habits', 'usages' and 'practices' 29 are 
occasionally referred to as 'the positive morality of the 
constitution' or as the 'unwritten maxims of the 
constitution 1 • 30 
It can be argued that these constitutional conventions 
clotqe the 'dry bones' of the law, making the legal 
constitution work, and keeping it in touch with the growth 
31 32 of ideas. As MacIntosh has observed: 
'The essentially pragmatic nature of the British 
Constitution is that development comes not from 
departures of theory but from a gradual change in 
political feeling and practice which becomes accepted 
and is then registered in conventions ••.•• which in 
turn confirm and perhaps advance the original 
development. ' 
-5-
The analyst must turn to convention in order to understand 
how the constitution works in practice. 33 It is through 
convention that the four basic hallmarks of Westminster 
government will be uncovered. 
(3) Westminster principles in the Dominions34 
Considering that the Westminster principles of the British 
system of government are expressed largely through non-
legal, conventional rules, the difficulties of constructing 
a similar system in any of the former Dominions of the 
British Crown can be readily appreciated. Dominion 
constitution-makers could either establish fixed legal rules 
to govern the executive branch and its relationship with the 
legislature, or they could leave many important rules to be 
b 
. . 34 captured y convention. In the colonies, the legal 
approach was favoured. 35 It was felt that the change from 
Imperial control to virtual self-government ought to have 
its counterpart in law, and, if the constitutions of the 
colonies had been framed entirely to meet their wishes, 
there would have been some effort to embody in them the 
rules of constitutional 'practice' as law. 36 The British 
government objected to the legal approach. 37 Keith has 
asserted that they were reluctant to transmute into law the 
constitutional practices of the United Kingdom, because they 
were worried that this would hamper the growth of Dominion 
autonomy. 38 Without doubt, the process of turning 
constitutional conventions into exact and fixed legal rules 
would be a very complex one. 39 There are great practical 
-6-
difficulties in codifying conventions such as the rules 
relating to the dissolution of Parliament and the dismissal 
of Ministers. 4° Furthermore, would such .'legalised' 
conventional rules be justiciable in courts of law? 41 
At the end of the day, the non-legal approach of the 
British prevailed. 42 De Smith has observed that a few 
modest concessions were made to the demands of clarity and 
practical convenience. 43 The concept of a parliamentary 
executive was acknowledged, coyly, in a legal rule which 
required Ministers to become members of Parliament within a 
prescribed period of time after appointment. 44 Annual 
sessions of Parliament were required, money resolutions 
needed the recommendation of the Crown, and Money Bills were 
to be introduced in the lower House of Parliament only. 45 
On the whole however, the dichotomy of law and convention 
was preserved, and most of the really important 
constitutional conventions were left to the interpolator. 46 
De Smith goes on to say: 47 
'To bring strict law into accord with political 
reality, to make it plain that the Governor-General, 
like the Queen, has only a narrow range of limited 
discretions, to mention the Cabinet, the Prime Minister 
and other conventional institutions, would be 
unconventional, indecorous, unacceptable. In such a 
climate of opinion were the constitutions of the older 
Dominions and the 19~~ Constitution of Southern 
Rhodesia fashioned.' 
II ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONS: A STRUCTURE 
The next chapter will examine important legal rules of the 
South African constitution in the form that these originally took 
at Union in 1910. It will be shown that some of these legal 
-7-
rules enhanced the Westminster system, while others appeared to 
undermine it. The South Africa Act of 1909 presented a truly 
confusing legal picture to those who were unfamiliar with its 
practical workings. Accordingly, the purpose of Chapter II is to 
highlight the fact that legal rules alone are insufficient to 
explain the workings of a constitution. Something more than a 
purely legal analysis of Statute or Common Law is needed in order 
to obtain a proper understanding of constitutional law. 49 
Chapter III will analyse the constitutional conventions of the 
Union during the period between 1910 and 1939. Unfortunately, 
space does not allow for a complete historical review of 
conventions in South Africa. Consequently, the writer has had to 
draw a particularly narrow and somewhat sketchy outline of these 
non-legal rules. 5° Chapter III nevertheless will illustrate the 
importance of constitutional conventions in South African 
constitutional law. It will be shown that many of the 
characteristics of the Westminster system find expression 
exclusively through non-legal rules. More significantly perhaps, 
it will be shown that many of the legal and non-legal rules of 
the constitution are in direct conflict with each other. In any 
competition between the two types of rule constitutional 
conventions may often be more important. 51 Chapter III will also 
attempt to find some preliminary answers to one of the major 
questions which will be posed in this work. Accordingly, it is 
anticipated that initial conclusions will be drawn about the 
extent to which conventions in South Africa can be regarded as 
purely 'home grown'. 
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Chapter IV will explore the general scope of conventions. A 
definition of the terms 'Constitutional law' and 'Constitutional 
Convention' will be sought, and an attempt will be made to 
discover the boundaries within which the latter operates. 
Foundations will thus be laid for an analysis of the dichotomy 
between law and convention. This analysis will be developed 
further in subsequent chapters of this work. Chapter V will deal 
with the general character of conventions. Emphasis will be 
placed on the obligatory nature of these rules, and on the 
differences which exist between convention and other types of 
non-legal rule. The creation of convention will also be 
examined, because this can indicate a great deal about the true 
character of conventional rules. Chapter VI will analyse the 
relationship between law and convention; a subject over which 
leading writers have sharply disagreed in the past. Special 
attention will be devoted to the debate between Dicey and 
Jennings - two writers who have remained major contestants in 
this particular field. At the heart of the dispute between these 
two writers is a fundamental disagreement about the nature of the 
sanctions which give binding force to conventions. The different 
views of both writers will be explored in detail, and reference 
to subsequent writers and authorities will be made before any 
conclusions are drawn. 
The arguments which were used respectively by Dicey and 
Jennings were developed within the strict confines of British 
constitutional law. The South African perspective has been 
rather neglected however, and it is the intention of Chapter VII 
to end this long-standing oversight. The sanctions which give 
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force to the conventions of the constitution will be examined 
within the framework of South African constitutional law. 
Conclusions will be drawn which are based on local circumstances 
and experiences within the context of the Westminster system 
between 1910 and 1984. 
The Westminster system of government came to an end in South 
Africa with the introduction of a new constitutional dispensation 
in September 1984. 52 The behaviour of conventional rules under 
the new dispensation, however, remains a matter for speculation. 
No pointers to the future will bear the stamp of authority, 
unless there is a full appreciation of how conventions have 
behaved in the past. As far as the study of a constitution is 
concerned, it may be said that 'the past is always with us.' 
Chapter VIII will attempt to emphasize and summarize the main 
themes of this work. The conclusions which are drawn about the 
basic character of conventions under South Africa's Westminister 
system represent the foundations on which a future study of the 
1983 tri-cameral constitution may be based. 
The writer is aware of the fact that there may be alternative 
means of structuring the work which is to be presented in the 
following chapters. It is to be hoped, however, that the 
structure which has been suggested here will be easy to follow. 
It is designed to place due emphasis on the importance of general 
principle in relation to South Africa's rich conventional 
heritage. 
-10-
III CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: A REAPPRAISAL 
Booysen and Van Wyk have said of constitutional conventions: 53 
'Hulle is gebruike wat met verloop van tyd onstaan om 
regering soepel en kragtig te hou. Hulle reflekteer ook die 
politieke moraliteit van die stetsel waarbinne hulle 
opereer. Vandaar dat konvensies in die Britse staatsreg nie 
noodwendig in die Suid-Afrikaanse staatsreg aangetref word 
nie en omgekeerd; of dat konvensies wat wel in albei 
stelsels figureer in een met groter bejeen word as in die 
ander.' 
It is tempting to assume that because South Africa and the 
United Kingdom each bear evidence of a Westminster system of 
government, they share a common body of constitutional 
conventions as well. 54 While local distortions or adaptations of 
convention have been noted in the past, 55 these have not been 
regarded as evidence of any fundamental rift between the two 
countries. 56 It is questionable whether this remains an adequate 
approach to the study of constitutional conventions in South 
Africa. This problem has become more apparent in recent years, 
especially as the non-Westminster characteristics of the South 
African constitution have been increasingly highlighted. 57 
Boulle has placed great emphasis upon the absence of universal 
adult suffrage in the Republic, 58 although he has pointed out a 
. number of other respects in which the constitution of South 
Africa has long stood apart. 59 The ethnic orientation of party 
politics, 60 the absence of the classic two-party system in the 
.. · 61 
legislature, and the long history of separate political 
62 representation for Black and other groups, lends credence to 
the notion that in many respects, the political culture of South 
Africa is markedly different from that of other Westminster 
soci~ties. 63 The idiosyncratic development of the Republic's 
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constitutional system was further highlighted by the 'tri-cameral 
Constitution' which was introduced in 1984. 64 Now, more than 
ever before, it can be said that the 'politieke moraliteit' of 
South Africa, and the 'spirit and practice' of government in the 
United Kingdom, have become increasingly at odds with each other. 
A fresh approach has been needed for a long time vis-a-vis the 
study of conventions in the Republic. It is to be hoped that the 
work which is being presented here will satisfy this requirement. 
The aim of the research is to uncover the indigenous character of 
South Africa's conventional rules. It is no longer tenable to 
assume that they are derived from the equivalent rules which are 
to be found in the United Kingdom. 
CHAPTER II 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA AT UNION 
I RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: THE WESTMINSTER EXPORT 
Responsible government was granted to the South African 
colonies prior to Union in 1910. It was introduced at the Cape 
in 1872, 1 was transmitted to Natal in 1893, 2 and finally reached 
the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony in 1906 and 1907 
respectively. 3 In essence, responsible government means that 
Ministers must have the support of the elected House of 
Parliament, 4 although Keith would go much further and ascribe to 
it all the basic hallmarks of the Westminster system of 
government. 5 In relation to British colonies generally he has 
remarked: 6 
'The vital step in the creation of responsible government was 
the decision of the British government to transfer executive 
authority from the Governor, chosen by it and irresponsible 
to the colonial legislature to ministers who should on the 
British system represent the will of the majority of the 
lower house of the legislature.' 
In the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange River Colony, the 
legal basis of responsible government was extremely limited. The 
vesting of executive authority in Ministers who enjoyed the 
support of a majority in the lower House of Parliament was not 
contained in a legal rule in any of these colonies. 7 Although 
the forms and trappings of government were based on the 
Westminster constitutional system, much remained governed by 
t . 8 conven ion. 
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To this situation, the Union of 1910 made almost no difference, 
because there was no radical departure from constitutional form. 9 
The Union constitution was basically a replica on a larger scale, 
of the pre-existing constitutions of the four South African 
1 . 10 co onies. The only major change effected was the substitution 
of one responsible government system in place of four such 
systems, and the consequent concentration of power in one central 
11 government. 
II RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
IN 1910 
Although the legal foundation of responsible government was 
comparatively obscure, both immediately before and after 1910, 
the content of the relevant legal rules should not be overlooked. 
A vague and incomplete outline of the principles of responsible 
or 'Westminster' government can be traced in several of the 
provisions to be found in the South Africa Act of 1909. One 
example which may be cited is s 14, which used to acknowledge, 
coyly, the Westminster concept of a Parliamentary Executive. 12 
The section said: 13 
' •.• After the first general election of members of the House 
of Assembly •.. no minister shall hold office for a longer 
period than three months unless he is or becomes a member of 
either House of Parliament.' 
Another example is to be found ins 13 of the Act, which in 
many instances used to restrict the Governor-General's capacity 
to act without advice. The section established that: 
'The provisions of this Act refirrirtg to the Governor-
General-in-Council shall be construed as referring to the 
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· Governor-General acting with the advice of the Executive 
Council.' 
The purpose of this section was to ensure that whenever the 
Governor-General acted under powers vested in the Governor-
General-in-Council, 14 he would follow the advice of his Executive 
Council. Furthermore, as all the Ministers of State for the 
Union were members of the Executive Counci1, 15 the effect of the 
section was to oblige the Governor-General to follow ministerial 
d 
. 16 a vice. 
The importance of s 13 lies in the fact that the control and 
administration of 'native affairs and of matters specially or 
differentially affecting Asiatics' was vested in the Governor-
General-in-Council. 17 In other words, in relation to the vast 
bulk of the Union's population, 18 government policy was not in 
any way subject to the individual influence or personal judgement 
of the Governor-General acting alone. 
It has been said that one of the fundamental principles of a 
Westminster system of government is to ensure that the Head of 
State is not the effective head of government. 19 To a certain, 
but limited extent, 20 s 13 of the 1909 Act secured this principle 
. th U. 21 in e nion. 
Finally, there were three statutory provisions of the South 
Africa Act which emphasised the importance of the principle of 
Ministerial responsibility to Parliament. The first of these was 
s 22, which required Parliament to meet in session at least once 
a year: 
'There shall be a session of Parliament once at least in 
every year, so that a period of twelve months shall not 
-16-
created. Furthermore, as the following examples will show, major 
conflict existed between the terms of the South Africa Act and 
some of the basic hallmarks of a Westminster system. 
III RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND THE SOUTH AFRICA ACT 
INCONSISTENCIES 
(1) The Governor-General-in-Council and the Governor-
General: a legal distinction. 
A crucial distinction in the South Africa Act as originally 
enacted, 27 lay in the slight differences of wording between 
ss 12 and 13. 
It has already been shown that many powers were vested in 
the Governor-General-in-Counci128 and that in accordance with 
s 13, such powers could be used only upon Ministerial 
advice. 29 The significant words in that section were: 
'acting with the advice of the Executive Council'. Other 
powers were not vested in the Governor-General-in-Council 
however, and consequently, they were not regulated by the 
terms of s 13. The exclusion from the ambit of s 13 is 
highly significant, because it concerns major powers such as 
the power to choose and summon members of the Executive 
Co~ncil; 30 the power to appoint and dismiss Ministers; 31 the 
power to refuse the assent to legislation; 32 and the power to 
summon, prorogue or dissolve Parliament. 33 These important 
powers were vested in the Governor-General rather than the 
Gove;nor-General-in-Council, 34 and powers vested in the 
former were regulated by the terms of s 12 rather than s 13. 
The crucial words ins 12 are: 
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'There shall be an Executive Council to advise the 
Governor-General in the government of the Union ••• ' 
The above formula is different from the one contained in 
s 1335 . The words; 'acting with the advice of ••• ', are 
noticeably absent. 
The presence of two different formulae immediately next to 
each other in the same piece of legislation would suggest 
that the two different sets of powers were to be regulated in 
two different ways. Although case law established that 
powers regulated under s 13 had to be exercised upon 
Ministerial advice, 36 no such interpretation has been placed 
upon the wording of s 12. An inference can be drawn that 
insofar as the powers to choose and summon members of the 
Executive Council, to appoint and dismiss Ministers, to 
refuse the assent to legislation, or to summon, prorogue or 
dissolve Parliament were concerned, the Governor-General was 
entitled to act without following any advice. 37 In other 
words, he could use any of these powers in accordance with 
his own, personal judgement. 38 
(2) Further inconsistencies: Reservation of Bills 
Further inconsistencies between the South Africa Act and 
the concept of responsible government could be detected in 
those provisions of the Union Constitution which dealt with 
reservation and disallowance. In relation to reservation, 
s 64 laid down: 
fWhen a Bill is presented to the Governor-General for 
the King's Assent, he shall declare according to his 
discretion, but subject to the provisions of this Act, and 
to such instructions as may from time to time be given in 
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that behalf by the King •.• that he reserves the Bill for 
the signification of the King's pleasure .•. ' 
Whenever a Bill was reserved by the Governor-General of the 
Union, the authority to grant the assent no longer vested in 
him. 39 Whether assent should have been granted or not became 
a question for the King himself to determine on the advice of 
his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 40 Whenever it was 
desired to give the Bill the force of law, assent had to be 
granted within one year of the Bill originally being 
I 41 presented to the Governor-General. Reservation could take 
place in any one of the following ways: 
(a) at the instigation of the Governor-General, acting 
personally and independently; 42 
(b) at the instigation of the Governor-General, acting 
under specific instructions from the King and the 
Imperial government; 43 
(c) at the instigation of the Governor-General, whenever 
compulsory reservation was required in terms of the 
South Africa Act; 44 
(d) at the instigation of the Governor-General, whenever 
compulsory reservation was required in terms of ( 
other Imperial statutes which applied to the 
Union. 45 
It is easy to conclude that an opportunity existed, for the 
government of the United Kingdom to interfere quite 
extensively in the legislative affairs of the Union. This 
was hardly in keeping with the notion of fully-fledged 
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responsible or 'Westminster' government. 46 
(3) Disallowance of Acts 
Disallowance of legislation by the King was another feature 
of the Union constitution which conflicted with responsible 
government. The power to disallow or annul legislation was 
regulated bys 65 of the South Africa Act, which in the 
following terms provided: 
'The King may disallow any law within one year after it 
has been assented to by the Governor-General, and such 
disallowance, on being made known by the Governor-General 
by speech or message to each of the Houses of Parliament 
or by proclamation, shall annul the law from the day when 
the disallowance is so made known.' 
In these circumstances, the King always acted on the advice 
of his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 47 In practice 
48 however, the power of disallowance was never used, and the 
advice tendered to the King concerning its exercise was 
always in accordance with the wishes of the relevant Dominion 
Minist~y. 49 Nevertheless, an opportunity always remained for 
the Imperial government50 to interfere in the legislative 
affairs of the Union; a prospect hardly in keeping with the 
basic characteristics of Westminster government. 
IV THE SUBORDINATE NATURE OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IMPERIAL 
CONTROL 
The discrepancy between responsible government on the one hand, 
and the constitutional system established at Union on the other, 
went beyond the provisions of the South Africa Act already 
referred to. 51 At the establishment of the Union in 1910, South 
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Africa was a subordinate colony_ of the United Kingdom, and 
responsible government was subject to restrictions other than 
those already enumerated. These may be considered under the 
following headings; the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament; 
the dual nature of the Governor-General's functions; the 
territorial limitation upon the powers of the Union Parliament; 
and Ministerial access to the King. None of these restrictions 
are readily apparent in the South Africa Act of 1909. 
(1) The Sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament 
The Parliament of the United Kingdom could be described as 
'Imperial' because it had full authority to legislate in all 
colonies of the British Crown. 52 Although originally 
governed by the common law of England, 53 this legal doctrine 
was subsequently regulated in terms of s 1 of the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act of 186554 as follows: 
' ... An Act of Parliament or any Provision thereof, shall, 
in construing this Act, be said to extend to any Colony 
when it is made applicable to such Colony by the express 
words or necessary Intendment of any Act of Parliament .•• ' 
The Parliament of the United Kingdom could also be described 
as 'sovere~gn 1 , 55 because in the words of the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act 1865, s 2: 
'Any Colonial Law which is or shall be in any respect 
repugnant to the Provisions of any Act of Parliament 
extending to the Colony to which such Law may relate, or 
repugnant to any Order or Regulation made under Authority 
of such Act of Parliament or having in the Colony the 
Force and Effect of such Act, shall be read subject to 
such Act, Order or Regulation, and shall to the Extent of 
such Repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and remain 
absolutely void and inoperative.' 
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Accordingly, neither past nor future Acts of a colonial 
legislature could conflict with any legislation of the 
Imperial Parliament which had been extended to the colony in 
question. 56 Prior to the 1865 Act, the legislative capacity 
I 
of colonial legi;latures was even more limited. 57 
Nevertheless, although the Colonial Laws Validity Act may 
have represented an advance for self-government in the 
colonies, it left potentially large amounts of control in the 
hands of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster. In local 
terms this meant that a statute of the Union could be over-
ridden at any time, through direct legislative action from 
London. 
(2) The dual role of the Governor-General 
The Governor-General of the Union was another major 
instrument of imperial control. Keith has observed in 
relation to the Dominions generally: 58 
'The position of the Governor-General of the Dominions 
served originally as the essential means of control of the 
local executive by the Crown. When responsible government 
was accorded, his functions assumed a clear dualism. In 
the main he acted as the constitutional head of the 
Government advised by ministers as is the Crown in the 
United Kingdom. But he had also to play the part of 
intermediary between the local and the Imperial 
authorities, and he owed his appointment to the Imperial 
Government by whose advise he could be removed from 
office.' 
The position of the Governor-General of South Africa was 
much the same. 59 On the one hand he was the head of the 
executive government in the Union, 60 and in this capacity he 
acted as if he was a constitutional monarch. The British 
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Colonial Secretary argued as early as 1914, that the position 
of the Governor-General of the Union was, 'in the main 
largely analagous to that of the constitutional sovereign of 
this country' . 61 On the other hand, the Governor-General was 
an Imperial officer, appointed by the King on the advice of 
his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 62 This was not readily 
apparent ins 9 of the South Africa Act, which simply stated 
that the Governor-General 'shall be appointed by the King 163 
The more accurate situation could only be found by reference 
to the long-standing rules of British constitutional 
convention. 64 These rules required the King to exercise his 
powers in accordance with British Ministerial advice. 65 
Consequently, the King only sanctioned the appointment of a 
particular individual as Governor-General when he was 
recommended to do so by his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 
In other words, the Governor-General was a British government 
appointee, an Imperial officer whose primary responsibility 
t th I . 1 t. L d 66 U. th was o e mperia governmen in on on. sing e 
Governor-General as an instrument of control, the Imperial 
government had substantial opportunities to interfere in the 
political life of the Union. Imperial interference through 
the reservation of Bills has already been examined in an 
earlier part of this chapter. 67 The Governor-General could 
also be used in many other instances however, as an 
instrument of Imperial control. 
Potentially the most important method of control was 
highlighted by Kennedy and Schlosberg, who in the following 
terms noted: 68 
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'In addition t89the formal instructions accompanying the letters patent the governor-general was, ••• required to 
obey such other instructions as he might from time to time 
have received from the secretary of state for the colonies 
on behalf of the King.' 
Provision for this form of control was not to be found 
within the ambit of the South Africa Act of 1909. It could 
be found, only after careful examination of the Governor-
General's Letters Patent of 29th December 1909. 70 Hidden in 
paragraph I of the Letters Patent it is established: 
'And We do hereby authorise and command Our said Governor-
General •.. to do and execute •.• all things that shall 
belong to his said office ..• according to such 
Instructions as may from time to time be given to him 
by Us through one of Our Principal Secretaries of 
State ... ' 
The implications of such instructions were potentially very 
far reaching. The Imperial government could direct the 
Governor-General to reserve Union legislation of which it 
disapproved. 71 The Governor-General's power to choose and 
summon members of the Executive Council; to appoint and 
dismiss Ministers; to refuse the assent to legislation; or to 
summon, prorogue or disolve Parliament, could all be subject 
to direction by Ministers in~the United Kingdom. 72 In 
practice therefore, all those powers which the Governor-
General could exercise, without reference to the advice of 
his Ministers in the Union, 73 were subject to the potential 
direction of Ministers of the Imperial government at 
Westminster. 
(3) Territorial limitation upon legislative power 
No specific provision of the South Africa Act made it clear 
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that Union legislation had no extra-territorial effect. 74 In 
relation to colonial legislatures generally however, colonial 
legislation was denied any extra-territorial character. 75 In 
this regard, VerLoren Van Themaat has noted: 76 
'Volgens artikel 59 kon die Unieparlement wette m11k for the peace, order and good government of the Union. Dit 
was die vorm dat altyd gebruik is om aan 'n koloniale 
wetgewer taarnlik algemene wetgewende bevoegdhede binne die 
kolonie se gebied te verleen, maar nie ekstraterritoriale 
bevoegdhede nie. Ons kan aanneem dat in die geval van die 
Unie dieselfde bedoeling bestaan het.' 
One of the problems which faced Union legislators was that 
the nature of this limitation was sometimes difficult to 
determine. 78 It is entering the realm of speculation 
however, to wonder to what extent this technical limitation 
affected the conduct of responsible government in the Union. 
(4) Ministerial Access to the King 
Notwithstanding his separate and distinct role as an 
officer of the Imperial government, it has been noted in this 
chapter that the Governor-General was head of the executive 
government in the Union. 79 It would be more accurate to 
assert however, that he was merely the local representative 
of the King. 80 In strictly legal terms it was the King who 
was the ultimate source of executive authority in the Union, 
because ass 8 of the South Africa Act established: 
'The Executive Government of the Union is vested in the 
·King, and shall be administered by His Majesty in person 
or by a Governor-General as his representative.' 
One difficulty with this formula was that it failed to 
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demarcate areas of authority between the King and his local 
representative in the Union. Both seemed able to exercise 
the same sort of executive powers. To all intents and 
purposes it seemed that the boundaries of their respective 
powers were conterminous. This difficulty was dealt with in 
s 9 of the Act, which provided: 
'The Governor-General shall be appointed by the King, and 
shall and may exercise in the Union during the King's 
pleasure, but subject to this Act, such powers and 
functions of the King as His Majesty may be pleased to 
assign to him.' 
The effect of s 9 was to reserve all executive powers to 
the King himself, except to the extent that the South Africa 
Act had made alternative provision. Accordingly, most 
executive powers remained with the King, with only two main 
exceptions. Firstly, there was a group of powers which the 
Act had vested in the Governor-General-in-Council. These 
powers could no longer be exercised by the King or his 
Governor-General without South African Ministerial advice. 81 
Secondly, the Act permitted the exercise of several important 
powers by the Governor-General in an individual, distinct 
capacity. 82 In practice this represented the delegation of 
power from the King to the Governor-General on a permanent 
basis. The wording of s 9 was extremely flexible however. 
It gave room for the King to delegate remaining powers to the 
Governor-General, whenever he wished to do so. 
Certain powers were delegated by the King to the Governor-
General in the Royal Instructions of 1909. 83 Consequently, 
the Governor-General was permitted to pardon criminal 
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offenders or their accomplices, to grant remission of 
sentence, and (in capital cases) to exercise the prerogative 
of mercy, in accordance with these instructions. 84 
It remains a matter of some difficulty however, to 
establish which other powers were delegated by the King to 
his representative in the Union. It would be tempting to 
assert that no other powers were delegated to the Governor-
General in South Africa, but an element of doubt renders this 
a somewhat uncertain proposition. Doubt is caused by certain 
key words in paragraph I of the Letters Patent. The 
paragraph laid down: 
And We do hereby authorise and command Our said 
Governor-General ... to do and execute in due manner, all 
things that shall belong to his said office •.• according 
to the several powers and authorities granted or appointed 
him by virtue ••. of these present Letters Patent .•. ' 
The key words are: 'all things that shall belong to his 
said office'. These words are extremely vague, and could 
encompass many executive powers. Coertze believed however, 
that the words were largely insignificant, 85 and that many 
executive or prerogative powers of the Crown remained 
86 undelegated. Whatever the arguments, it is clear that the 
Governor-General was entitled to appoint new King's 
Counse1. 87 He was also entitled to promulgate subordinate 
1 . 1 t· 88 egis a ion. 
An element of certainty can be assured nonetheless, to the 
extent that the following executive powers were retained by 
the King. According to Coertze and VerLoren Van Themaat, 
these included: 89 
-27-
(a) the appointment of the Governor-General; 
(b) the appointment of the Officer Administering the 
Government; 
(c) the grant of leave to appeal to the Privy Council. 
These three powers were not delegated to the Governor-
General, because they were specifically 'reserved' in the 
provisions of the South Africa Act. 90 On this point the two 
writers are in full agreement. 91 These were not the only 
powers however, which were clearly retained by the King. The 
only persons who could issue 'instructions' to the Governor-
General of the Union for example, were the King, the Privy 
Council or one of the British Secretaries of State. 92 To 
permit the Governor-General to issue instructions to himself 
would have been a total nonsense, something which the Letters 
Patent of 1909 guarded against. 93 
Finally, the two writers are agreed that the following 
common law powers of the King, often referred to as the 
prerogative, 94 were not delegated to the Governor-General of 
the Union: 95 
(a) authority to create legal personality in royal charters 
and patents; 
(b) authority to grant honours and titles; 
(c) authority to enter into and to ratify treaties; 
(d) authority to issue exequaturs to Consuls; 
(e) authority to receive and despatch envoys; 
(f) authority to declare war and to make peace; 
(g) authority to regulate legal currency. 
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In addition, VerLoren Van Themaat asserts that the 
following prerogatives were not delegated by the King: 96 
(a) 
(b) 
Annexation and 'acts of state' 97 ' 
sending or receiving ambassadors, diplomatic 
representatives and consular officials; 
(c) issuing royal warrants. 98 
The non-delegation of the above listed executive or 
prerogative powers resulted in difficulties for the Union 
government. The King was required to act personally as head 
of the executive government in South Africa, 99 but he was 
inaccessible to his Ministers of State for the Union. They 
were separated by the length of a continent. Exercise of 
these prerogatives required the King's sign manua1100 and 
confirmation with the public seals which only Ministers in 
the United Kingdom possessed. 101 The co-signature of a 
Minister of the United Kingdom government was also 
102 necessary. The whole problem was encapsulated by Coertze 
as follows: 103 
'Formeel het die Koning op advies van 'n·Engelse minister 
gehandel, aangesien die stukke wat hy moes teken nog 
altyd deur die Engelse minister voorberei en geteken was. 
Trouens die hele stuk waarin die uitvoeringshandeling 
beliggarn was, het alle tekens van 'n uitvoeringshandeling 
van die Koning as uitvoeringsorgaan van die Verenigde 
Koninkryk gedra. Die stuk was deur die Koning geteken, 
deur 'n Britse minister mede-onderteken en (waar dit 
gebruiklik was) geseel met of die Grootseel of Kleinseel 
van Groot-Brittanje.' 
The non-delegation of prerogative powers therefore 
contained inherent dangers for responsible government in 
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South Africa. Union Ministers were completely dependent upon 
the co-operation and goodwill of the United Kingdom 
government, especially the latter's Minister of Colonial 
Aff . 104 airs. This has been graphically illustrated by 
VerLoren Van Themaat in the following comment: 105 
'Die Britse ministers kon dus elke uitvoerende handeling 
van die Unieministers laat verongeluk, eenvoudig deur die 
koning geen advies daaromtrent te gee nie. Hulle sou ook 
die koning kon adviseer om deur die Unie ministers 
voorgestelde uitveorende handelinge te wysig, of selfs om 
die uitvoerende gesag in die Unie uitsluitend op advies 
van die Britse ministers, en sander om die Unieministers 
te ken, uit te oefen.' 
Access to the King was also a potential problem in relation 
to the reservation of Bills or the disallowance of Acts. 106 
Bills and Acts of the South African Parliament would be 
presnted to the King by a Minister of the Imperial government 
in London. 107 Whether or not the King would assent to a 
reserved Bill, and whether or not he would exercise the power 
of disallowance, were matters which were determined on the 
advice of his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 108 
Consequently, the Ministers of State for the Union had little 
direct opportunity to influence the actions of the Sovereign 
in matters which were intimately concerned with the 
legislative affairs of South Africa. 
V THE SOUTH AFRICA ACT AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT SOME 
CONCLUSIONS 
An intricate combination of legal rules formed the basis of 
South Africa's constitutional system at Union in 1910. These 
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legal rules could often be contradictory, and they came from a 
variety of legal sources. A substantial part of the legal 
framework of government was contained in the numerous provisions 
of the South Africa Act of 1909. Another part was to be found in 
the royal warrants issued under the prerogative, such as the 
Governor-General's Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions of 
1909. A third part of the framework could be traced to the rules 
of English Constitutional law. This dealt with matters such as 
the scope and content of the royal prerogative, 109 and the extra-
territorial limitation upon colonial legislation. A fourth part 
of the framework was to be found in the provisions of those 
Imperial Statutes which had been applied to the Union. An 
example of such a statute was the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 
1865. 110 
An analysis of the legal rules from all these sources presented 
a very confusing picture. Some rules obliged the Governor-
General to follow the advice of his Executive Council. Other 
i 
rules allowed him in certain circumstances to ignore that advice. 
In some ways the Governor-General was a local representative of 
the King, while in others he was an instrument of imperial 
control. Some rules encouraged parliamentary control over the 
executive, others countered this with executive control over 
parliament. It would be natural to conclude that this mass of 
conflicting legal provisions would have led to chaos and 
confusion. Such a conclusion fails to take account, however, of 
the crucial role played by constitutional conventions. 
In the chapter which follows, the impact of conventions on the 
legal framework of the constitution will be explored. The 
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combination of law and convention will be examined, to give an 
accurate impression of the Westminster system in South Africa. 
CHAPTER III 
SOUTH AFRICA'S WESTMINSTER HERITAGE. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
1910-1939 - A CASE STUDY 
I CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 1910-1926 
In the early years of the Union constitution, very little was 
written about local constitutional conventions. No writer 
appears to have given much thought to the matter. Notwith-
standing the fact that South Africa was a subordinate colony of 
the United Kingdom, 1 with a diverse cultural heritage and a small 
parliamentary electorate, 2 it was assumed that the Union had 
inherited the obligatory political rules or conventions of the 
United Kingdom 'en masse'. Kennedy and Schlosberg, who were among 
the earliest writers on the South African constitution remarkect: 3 
'Generally, the cabinet system in South Africa follows 
British precedents in every respect; and every detail 
relating to dismissal, collective resijonsibility, the 
relation of the house to the cabinet, and the dissolution of 
the house itself, as well as the relation in internal affairs 
between the cabinet and the head of state in South Africa, 
may be found in the well-known manuals of English 
constitutional law.' 
VerLoren Van Themaat has come to a similar conclusion. 5 No 
thorough analysis of these conventions or 'precedents' was made 
by Kennedy and Schlosberg or by any other writer. It remains 
possible, nonetheless, to make some preliminary comments or 
observations about constitutional conventions in the years up to 
1926. 
(1) Cabinet Government and the Executive Counci16 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Executive Council 
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included all currently serving Ministers of State for the 
Union, this large, formal body never tendered advice to the 
Governor-General of South Africa. 7 Two reasons may be 
proferred for the apparent redundancy of the Executive 
Council. Firstly, it included numerous members from diverse 
political backgrounds, who could outvote the existing 
Ministers of State whenever they wished to do so. 8 Secondly, 
the views of the majority on the Council could be out of 
touch with majority feeling in Parliament or among the 
electorate as a whole. 9 The concept of government by a 
Cabinet responsible to an elected assembly is one of the 
10 hallmarks of the Westminster system. It was also one of 
the hallmarks of the system of government in the Union, 11 
although this is not readily apparent in the provisions of 
the South Africa Act. 12 A constitutional convention 
therefore developed, which demanded that only existing 
Ministers of State were summoned to advise the Governor-
General of the Union. 13 They formed a body known as the 
'Cabinet', 14 which acted as the vital link between Parliament 
and the executive authority which had been vested in the 
Governor-General. 15 The existence of a formal link between 
Parliament and the Executive is indicated ins 14 of the 
South Africa Act. This section, as it has already been 
noted, 16 required Ministers of State to be or become members 
of the legislature within three months of their appointment. 
On the whole however, the link between Parliament and the 
Executive was regulated by constitutional convention. This 
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will become apparent in the following paragraphs. 
(2) The appointment and dismissal of Ministers 
According to s 14 of the South Africa Act 1909, the power 
to appoint and dismiss Ministers of State was vested in the 
Governor-General of the Union. 17 Neither power had to be 
exercised in accordance with the advice of the Executive 
Council. 18 Still less did the Act require their exercise in 
accordance with advice tendered by the Cabinet. 19 
The legal position however, bore little resemblance to 
reality. The appointment and dismissal of Ministers was 
governed almost entirely by constitutional conventions. 
One of the major constitutional conventions demanded that 
the Cabinet establish working control over the lower House of 
the legislature. 20 In South African terms this meant that 
the Ministers of State, who together formed the Cabinet of 
the Union, had to enjoy a working majority in the House of 
21 Assembly. This constitutional convention drastically 
reduced the Governor-General's room for manoeuvre, whenever 
the question of ministerial appointments or dismissals arose. 
The Cabinet appointed by the Governor-General had to enjoy 
a working majority in the lower House, but how was he to 
ensure that this came about? When he appointed new Ministers 
of State, how was he to determine if they enjoyed majority 
support in the directly elected House? This problem was 
dealt with by other constitutional conventions, which 
regulated the procedure for appointments and dismissals in 
the following manner: 
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(a) The leader of the majority party and Ministerial 
appointments 
The Governor-General did not personally undertake the task 
of forming a Cabinet for the Union. Instead, he summoned the 
person who he considered most fitted for the purpose, and 
requested him to undertake the task of constructing a team of 
M .. t 22 inis ers. In practice, the choice of candidates available 
to the Governor-General was extremely limited. Kennedy and 
Schlosberg commented in this respect: 23 
'Broadly stated, the person to be summoned is the one most 
likely to be able to form a stable government. The choice 
is in practice limited to one or other of the persons 
recognised by parliament as the leaders of the party which 
commands a majority in the house of assembly.' 
On the whole, constitutional convention required that 
Ministers be drawn from the ranks of the House of Assembly 
24 rather than from the Senate. Consequently, the leader of 
the majority party in the House of Assembly would draw most 
of his future Cabinet colleagues from the ranks of his 
supporters in the directly elected House. 25 
Once the majority leader had completed the construction of 
his Ministerial team, he submitted the names of his proposed 
Ministers to the Governor-Gene~a1. 26 The latter would then 
'appoint' Ministers of State for the Union, 27 in accordance 
with the powers vested in him bys 14 of the South Africa 
Act. 28 The procedure adopted for the appointment of 
Ministers was thereby completed. 
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(b) The Prime Minister of the Union appointment and 
dismissal of Ministers 
The pivot of the newly appointed Cabinet was the Prime 
Minister, 29 who was the person who had been invited by the 
Governor-General to form a new administration. 30 The 
existence of the Prime Minister, and the nature of his rights 
and obligations were denied any legal recognition in the 
provisions of the South Africa Act. The only references to 
the Prime Minister, and the only references to his rights and 
obligations were to be found in the Schedule to the South 
Africa Act. 31 The Schedule to the Act was of limited 
importance however, because it was only concerned with future 
possible South African administration of the High Commission 
territories. 
In relation to the appointment and dismissal of Ministers 
nevertheless, the conventional powers of the Prime Minister 
were quite considerable. In conventional terms he continued 
to enjoy the power to appoint Ministers of State. 32 In other 
words, the Prime Minister succeeded to the powers he had 
previously exercised as leader of the majority party in the 
lower House. 
In certain respects however, an encumbent Prime Minister 
enjoyed wider power to nominate his colleagues to Ministerial 
office. This was due to the existence of one major advantage 
which he was able to maintain against all his opponents. By 
convention a Prime Minister could remain in office after the 
loss of his majority, on condition that no alternative leader 
in the House of Assembly was able to muster majority 
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support. 33 This constitutional convention was followed in 
1915, when General Botha clung to the premiership after the 
elections of that year. 34 Although the Prime Minister's 
party had lost control of the lower House, none of the other 
parties were in any better position to dominate the life of 
the directly elected House. 35 The convention was even more 
clearly used after the general elections of 1920, when 
General Smuts was able to cling to his position. 36 His 
supporters were outnumbered in the House of Assembly by 
members of the opposition National Party. 37 The latter 
failed to win 68 seats however, and therefore neither of the 
parties could gain overall contro1. 38 In these circumstances, 
a Prime Minister could still wield a considerable amount of 
power, because he was still able to make all Ministerial 
appointments. 39 What is more, this conventional power could 
be used by the Prime Minister to his considerable political 
advantage. In 1920 for example, General Smuts was able to 
engineer the merger of the Unionist and South African 
Parties, after first promising representation in the Cabinet 
to the Unionist leader and his colleagues. 40 In this way, 
the Prime Minister was able to construct a new majority in 
the House of Assembly, and secure working control of the 
House for his embattled administration. 41 
A Prime Minister, once appointed, could also dismiss his 
Ministers of State. 42 According to legal theory, Ministers 
held office at the pleasure of the Governor-Genera1. 43 In 
practice however, Ministers held office at the pleasure of 
the Prime Minister. 44 Normally, a Minister who had incurred 
-38-
the displeasure of the Prime Minister would resign first 
rather than face the humiliation of dismissa1. 45 By 
convention however, a reluctant Minister could be dealt with 
in either of the two following ways. 
Firstly, the Prime Minister could give advice to the 
Governor-General, requesting the latter to exercise his legal 
power of dismissal under s 14 of the South Africa Act. 46 
This method of dismissal was never used in the Union 
however. 47 Secondly, and as an alternative, the Prime 
Minister could himself resign. 48 According to Keith, this 
second course of action was more elegant and courteous than 
the first method of remova1. 49 As soon as the Prime Minister 
had resigned, he would be commissioned again by the Governor-
General to form a new administration. 50 In his subsequent 
selection of a new team of Cabinet colleagues, the Prime 
Minister would then exclude the Minister who had incurred his 
displeasure. 51 The recalcitrant Minister was thereby 
effectively dismissed. 
This second form of dismissal was twice resorted to in the 
Union. It was used by Prime Minister Botha against General 
Hertzog in 1912, when the latter embarassed the government 
with his strongly nationalistic views. 52 In 1928 it was used 
by Hertzog himself, when, as Prime Minister, he removed W B 
Madeley after a conflict over 'Native' policy. 53 
It is apparent that the Governor-General had little control 
over Ministerial appointments. It is also clear that he had 
little control over Ministerial dismissals. He was unable to 
fill the Cabinet with rubber-stamp nominees, because 
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constitutional convention demanded that he secure a Cabinet 
with majority support in the House of Assembly. It can be 
said that the legal powers of the Governor-General were 
curtailed by political reality. He had to act on advice. 
Normally that advice was given by the Prime Minister of the 
Union. Occasionally, if the latter had lost control of the 
lower House, advice would be given by an alternative politcal 
leader who enjoyed majority support in the House of 
Assembly. 54 
The fact that the Governor-General had little control over 
the composition of the Cabinet was of crucial importance to 
the Union constitution. It has already been noted that the 
Cabinet acted as a vital link between Parliament, and the 
executive authority which had been vested in the Governor-
General by the South Africa Act. 55 At this stage, the nature 
of that link should have become clearer. The Governor-
General was advised by a Cabinet. The Cabinet was filled by 
members of the legislature, and these were largely drawn from 
the ranks of the House of Assembly. Appointments to the 
Cabinet were effectively mad~ by the individual who commanded 
majority support in the House of Assembly. Consequently, the 
Governor-General was advised by a body of Ministers who 
reflected majority feeling in the directly elected House. 56 
Therefore, to some extent at least, when the Governor-General 
acted on advice, he acted with a considerable degree of 
popular support. Executive action was based upon the 
continuing confidence of Parliament, without which, no 
government could continue to maintain itself in office. 57 
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(3) The Relationship between the Governor-General and the 
Cabinet 
Although the Cabinet acted as a vital link in the 
constitutional system,- the Governor-General was not legally 
obliged to follow its advice. This has already been 
explained in Chapter II. 58 S 13 of the South Africa Act, and 
the meaning of the term 'Governor-General' in the 
Interpretation of Laws Act, did attempt to restrict the 
ability of the Governor-General to act without advice. 59 In 
respect of certain powers however, the Governor-General could 
act in conflict with Ministerial advice. A strict reading of 
the South Africa Act would suggest that the Governor-General 
could choose and summon members of the Executive Council, 
appoint and dismiss Ministers, refuse the assent to 
legislation, and summon, prorogue or dissolve Parliament, 
without having to follow Cabinet advice. 60 
The intervention of constitutional convention however, has 
meant that legal theory did not accord with political 
reality. This has already been highlighted in relation to 
the selection and summoning of members of the Executive 
Counci1. 61 It has also been highlighted in relation to the 
appointment and dismissal of Ministers. 62 There are two 
powers of the Governor-General which are left outstanding 
however, and these will need to be looked at under the 
following headings: 
(a) The Royal Assent 
A literal interpretation of the South Africa Act gave the 
Governor-General a veto over Union legislation. 63 The veto 
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64 was never used however, and the idea of using it was never 
seriously entertained. The apparent redundancy of the royal 
veto was graphically illustrated as early as 1914. 
In January of that year, General Smuts illegally deported 
ten labour leaders from the province of Nata1. 65 When the 
South African Parliament passed an Indemnity Bill to 
safeguard the actions of the government, the Governor-General 
t d t th 1 · 1 t' 66 A tt t t . th assen e o e egis a ion. ny a emp o exercise e 
veto would have placed the Governor-General in considerable 
difficulties. Keith has remarked, in comments which could 
have applied to the Union: 67 
'The Governor-General had no doubt the power to refuse 
assent, but such a refusal was obviously a drastic measure 
which would be gravely resented, and would render 
relations between the ministry and the Governor-General 
difficult. ' 
During the 1914 crisis, the British Colonial Secretary 
described the position of the Governor-General as being 'in 
the main largely analagous to that of the constitutional 
sovereign of this country. 168 Whether or not that analogy 
was strictly accurate, 69 it influenced the attitude of the 
Imperial government, to whom the Governor-General was 
ultimately accountable. 70 The Sovereign of the United 
Kingdom has not exercised the royal veto since Queen Anne 
refused the assent to the Scottish Militia Bill in 1707. 71 
In view of this fact, an equivalent exercise of the Governor-
General's veto would have been all the more difficult to 
explain and justify. 
Other assertions of the British Colonial Secretary were 
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quite revealing. He argued that reservation or disallowance 
of the Indemnity Bill was unthinkable, describing such 
Imperial intervention as 'unprecedented and wholly 
unjustifiable' because 'such legislation is essentially one 
of the attributes and prerogatives of the responsible and 
popularly elected Parliament of South Africa. 172 In these 
circumstances, it is hardly suprising that a royal veto by 
the Governor-General would have been considered 
inappropriate. 
Resort to the veto power could never be completely ruled 
out however. Assent could not be assumed for legislation 
designed to extend the life of an existing Parliament. 73 
Such extensions represented a grave intrusion on the rights 
of electors, 74 and in the words of Keith: 75 
'It seems clear, therefore, that in these circumstances a 
Governor is bound to weigh beside the advice of the 
ministry the welfare of the territory and their probable 
wishes.' 
In the Union however, as it has already been noted, the 
veto power of the Governor-General was never used. 
(b) Power to summon, prorogue or dissolve Parliament 
Authority to summon or prorogue the Parliament of the Union 
was exercised by the Governor-General on Ministerial 
advice. 76 The existence of this rule was entirely 
conventional however. No indication of its presence could be 
found in the South Africa Act. 77 
Generally speaking, almost all the powers of the Governor-
General were exercised o~ Ministerial advice. 78 In relation 
-43-
to the dissolution of Parliament however, the constitutional 
conventions of the United Kingdom and the Dominions were 
divergent. The differences in convention were explained by 
Keith in the following manner: 79 
'That a Governor should act on ministerial advice has been 
admitted in the Dominions, but with an important proviso: 
a Governor may reject advice if he can secure, in the 
event of the resignation of the ministry in consequence of 
his.action, a new ministry which will accept responsi-
bility ex post facto for his rejection of advice ... While 
in England this view has almost died out, it was regularly 
in use in the Dominions ••. as regards dissolutions of 
Parliament.' 
In the United Kingdom, the King was normally expected to 
grant a
1
Ministerial request for the dissolution of 
Parliament. 80 In the Dominions, the position of the 
Governor-General was different. After receiving a request 
for dissolution, Keith has noted: 81 
'It was deemed to be the duty of the Governor to 
determine, after careful investigation of the position, 
whether he could not find a new ministry which would carry 
on the government without a dissolution.' 
In part, the reason why the older convention survived in 
the Dominions was due to the fact that the hereditary monarch 
82 was removed from the daily afairs of government. In his 
place there was a Governor-General, a local representative 
who normally held office for only five or six years. 83 With 
a limited term of office, the Governor-General had far less 
need to avoid political controversy than the Sovereign. 84 A 
politically partisan Governor-General could be unpopular, 85 
but a politically partisan Sovereign could lose his throne. 86 
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In South Africa between 1910 and 1926, it was unnecessary 
for the Governor-General to get involved with political 
controversy about the dissolution of Parliament. The general 
elections of 1915 and 1920 were more or less unavoidable, 
, 
because the five year life-span of the existing Parliament 
was coming to a close. 87 Elections were a necessity, whether 
or not a new majority could have been constructed in the 
House of Assembly. 
In 1921, it would have been possible for the Governor-
General to refuse a dissolution to General Smuts, if an 
alternative Ministry could have been established which 
commanded the support of the House of Assembly. 88 
Realistically however, this would have required Unionist 
support for a National Party-led government. 89 The prospects 
for such an alliance of die-hard political enemies could not 
h b 
. 90 ave een a serious one. Consequently, the Governor-
General took the only course of action which was properly 
open to him when he granted the dissolution. 
Again, in 1924, the Governor-General could have refused a 
dissolution
1 
to General Smuts. 91 Realistically however, it 
would have been almost impossible for the Governor-General to 
find an alternative Ministry, which would have accepted 
responsibility for his refusal of advice. The party headed 
by General Smuts had enjoyed such a large majority in the 
House of Assembly, that it would have taken a split in the 
party and substantial defections to the opposition, before an 
alternative Ministry could have assumed power without 
elections. 92 
In practice therefore, the analogy between the Governor-
General and the Sovereign was not completely wide of the 
mark. The Governor-General, like the Sovereign, acted on 
advice, dissolving Parliament in accordance with the wishes 
of an existing Ministry. 93 
(c) The Governor-General and the Cabinet an exceptional 
precedent 
Through a combination of both law and convention, the 
Governor-General was expected to act on the advice of his 
Ministers of State. Only a few exceptions to this norm 
existed. In law, the Governor-General could be obliged to 
act in accordance with the wishes of the Imperial authorities 
in London. 94 By convention, he could refuse a request for 
dissolution from his Ministers, and he could veto legislation 
which was designed to extend the life of an existing 
Parliament. 95 On the whole however, the Governor-General 
acted on Ministerial advice. 
One example may be cited nevertheless, of an instance when 
there was a refusal to follow Ministerial advice. This 
occurred in 1914, when the Acting Governor-General, Lord De 
Villiers, refused to proclaim Martial Law. 96 He refused to 
participate in activities which went beyond what was strictly 
lawfu1. 97 Lord De Villiers established a precedent which 
does not appear to have been followed in later 
circumstances. 98 No other examples can be cited of a 
Governor-General refusing to follow the advice of his 
Ministers. 99 Lord De Villiers' actions should perhaps be 
seen in isolation. As Chief Justice of South Africa as well 
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as Acting Governor-Genera1 100 any proclamation of Martial Law 
could have placed him in an invidious position. Without a 
retrospective Act of Indemnity, many actions which would have 
been perpetrated under Martial Law would have been totally 
illegal. After the return of peace these could have become 
the subject of proceedings in Courts of Law. 101 Naturally, 
such potentially embarassing developments were something 
which the Chief Justice and Acting Governor-General of the 
Union would have preferred to avoid. It is doubtful if any 
general principle or rule can be drawn from such an isolated 
departure from the established norm. 
(4) The resignation of the Cabinet 
According to constitutional convention, if the Cabinet lost 
control of the House of Assembly through internal dissension, 
or through the coalition of opposition party elements, or 
because of other grounds, it could choose between resignation 
or dissolutiion: 102 Normally, rather than admit failure, and 
in an attempt to regain the confidence of Parliament, the 
Cabinet would seek the dissolution of the legislature. 103 
During the early years of the Union constitution, no clear-
cut example of this convention could be found. The Smuts 
government of 1920-1921 struggled at times to keep control of 
the lower House, but it avoided defeat and sought new 
1 t . t . t h . 104 e ec ions a is own c oosing. 
The constitutional conventions governing the resignation of 
the government were further amplified by Keith. He 
commented, with reference to the Dominions generally: 105 
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'The position of ministers on defeat at an election is not 
more clearly defined than in the United Kingdom. In the 
Dominions, as in the United Kingdom, the old.practice of 
holding office until ejected by a vote of no confidence 
has given way normally in favour of resignation. All 
depends, of course, on what is not always easy to decide, 
whether the Opposition parties can form an effective 
Government. If there is doubt it is quite legitimate to 
wait and see.' 
In the 1915 general elections, General Botha's government 
lost its House of Assembly majority. 106 The Prime Minister 
did not immediately resign, because it was not clear that the 
opposition parties could combine to form an effective 
government. 107 · It subsequently transpired that he could 
retain the confidence of Parliament with Unionist support, 
enabling his Cabinet to retain its hold on power until the 
next general elections in 1920. 108 General Smuts behaved in 
a similar fashion after the indecisive elections of 1920. 109 
His decision not to resign was an equally legitimate one, 
because the opposition parties would have been unable to 
combine to form an effective government. 110 
After the 1924 elections however, General Smuts adopted the 
alternative course. He resigned immediately, and did not 
wait to meet Parliament, 111 because it was clear that the 
opposition could form an effective government. Prior to the 
elections, a compact had been concluded between the leaders 
of the National Party and the Labour Party. 112 Their common 
electoral strategy paid dividends. Out of 135 members 
elected to the House of Assembly, 63 were from the National 
Party and 18 from the Labour Party. 113 The 'Pact' alliance 
had secured a clear majority in the lower House, where they 
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could easily outvote the 53 South African Party and one 
114 Independent members. The Governor-General called upon the 
leader of the National Party, General Hertzog, to form a 
Ministry. 115 The new Prime Minister went on to consolidate 
the election pact with the Labour Party, bringing three of 
its leaders into the National Party dominated Cabinet. 116 
After an election defeat therefore, it can be said that the 
Cabinet would be expected to resign, unless there was a 
strong possibility of retaining the confidence of the lower 
House. 
(5) Collective responsibility of Ministers 
There are three basic strands to the convention of 
collective responsibility: 117 
(a) Ministers of State must account to Parliament, 
especially the lower House, for decisions which have 
been taken by the Cabinet. 118 
(b) A Minister who remains a member of the Cabinet may not 
publicly criticise or dissociate himself from 
government policy. 119 
(c) The process by which policy decisions are reached by 
Ministers should be kept secret. 120 
A Minister who feels unable to obey these basic 
requirements of collective responsibility would be expected 
t . 121 o resign. 
In South Africa, almost from the inception of the Union, 
General Botha had difficulties applying the convention of 
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collective responsibility to his Ministers. 122 Kruger blames 
a lack of political cohesion within the Cabinet for the Prime 
Minister's considerable problems. 123 He has commented, with 
reference to that first Cabinet of the Union of South 
Af . 124 rica: 
'There was little solidarity in a Cabinet formed during 
moments of enthusiasm for Union. It was based too much on 
a mere desire for union and on Botha's endeavour to please 
the provinces. This accounted also for the regional 
representative character it bore. The Government moreover 
included various elements from Conservatives to Liberals, 
from pro-British to anti-British and nationalist-minded 
Free Staters. It was the mouthpiece of a political party 
which was not in existence when the Government was formed, 
and in many respects that party did not yet know its own 
mind. Apart from the vague ideal of national unity all 
members of the South African Party were certainly not 
united on major principles.' 
The first public strains appeared in June 1912. 125 H C 
Hull, who was the Minister of Finance, openly criticised his 
ministerial colleague at the Department of Railways and 
126 Harbours. Hull felt that J W Sauer was acting far too 
independently as Minister of Railways and Harbours, and that 
this would be to the ultimate detriment of the Treasury. 127 
Such public bickering created an impossible situation for the 
P . M' . t 128 rime 1n1s er. He had to remove one of the contesting 
Ministers if he wished to restore the public semblance of 
cohesion in his administration. In the end, the Minister of 
Finance was compelled to resign, 129 and a further breakdown 
in constitutional convention was temporarily averted. 
Shortly after Union in 1910, General Hertzog reluctantly 
I 
bowed to the feelings of his colleagues, and he agreed to 
accept amendments to the language policy governing schools in 
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the Orange Free State. 130 In 1911-1912 however, the 
incompatability of his views with continued membership of the 
Cabinet resulted in major political upheaval. In various 
public speeches throughout the country, Hertzog began to 
expound his 'South Africa First' philosophy. 131 This 
threatened a storm of opposition which even alarmed the Prime 
Minister. 132 Hertzog was unabashed however, and in key 
speeches at Smithfield and De Wildt in October and December 
1912, he repeated his view that the Imperial connection was 
good only as far as it served the interests of South 
Africa. 133 Colonel Leuchars, who represented Natal in the 
Cabinet, threatened to resign if the Prime Minister did not 
dismiss Hertzog. 134 When General Botha did not act 
immediately, Colonel Leuchars carried his threat into 
effect. 135 In order to retain an element of political 
balance in his administration, the Prime Minister asked 
General Hertzog to resign as well. 136 Hertzog's refusal to 
do so was followed by the Prime Minister's own 
resignation. 137 General Botha accepted the premiership for a 
second time, although in his new administration he 
deliberately excluded Hertzog from the Cabinet. 138 
The failure of that first Botha Cabinet to contain its 
policy differences had enormous consequences. It led to the 
foundation of the National Party in January 1914, 139 and to 
the eventual accession of Hertzog to the premiership in 
1924. 140 
Matters did not necessarily improve, once the split between 
the South African Party and the National Party had been 
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formalised. The Nationalist-dominated Cabinet headed by 
141 General Hertzog also suffered from a breakdown of 
collective responsibility. In 1925 for example, Tielman 
Roos, then Minister of Justice in the Hertzog Cabinet, 
publicly expressed himself against the 'Native' policy 
enunciated by the Prime Minister. 142 Kruger's 
observations143 cannot account for such a public disagreement 
between the leader of the National Party in the Transvaal 144 
and the Nationalist Prime Minister of the Union. Malan, on 
the other hand, has accounted for the weakness of collective 
responsibility in South Africa in the following terms: 145 
'From 1910 till 1924 the first three Prime Ministers of 
the Union and some of their most influential colleagues 
' came from the late republics with a much longer and more 
intimate experience of the working of the republican than 
of the responsible gov14gment system, which they were now called upon to apply.' 
A lack of political cohesiveness also plagued General 
Hertzog's first administration. His coalition partners in 
the Labour Party split into two opposing factions, both of 
which had representatives in the Cabinet. 147 The Cabinet was 
therefore composed of a National Party contingent and two 
different versions of the Labour Party. The Prime Minister 
was unable to maintain control over such a diverse group. 
His Minister of Posts and Telegraphs refused to obey Cabinet 
policy relating to Black trade unions. 148 To make matters 
worse, the Minister received a delegation from the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers Union in defiance of the Prime 
Minister's express wishes. 149 The Minister, who was the sole 
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representative of one of the warring Labour Party factions in 
the Cabinet, 150 refused to resign when asked to do so. 151 
Hertzog reacted to this challenge by handing his own 
resignation to the Officer Administering the Government. 152 
Consequently, it was a breakdown of the convention of 
collective responsibility which brought the first Hertzog 
administration to an end in 1928. 
II CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 1926-1939 
(1) The Imperial Conference of 1926 
The year 1926 represented a watershed in the constitutional 
development of South Africa and of the other self-governing 
colonies of the British Crown. The Imperial Conference of 
1926 overshadowed Colonial or Imperial Conferences of other 
years, because it represented a turning point. 153 A new 
status for the self-governing colonies was accepted which 
replaced notions of 'Empire' with the 'British Commonwealth 
of Nations'. 154 The key decision of the Conference was the 
adoption of the following resolution: 155 
'··· we refer to the group of self-governing1g~mmunities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions. Their 
position and mutual relation may be readily defined. They 
are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal 
in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any 
aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though 
united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely 
associated as members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations.' 
One of the many consequences of this decision was that the 
position of the Governor-General had to be re-examined in 
relation to all the Dominions. 157 The dual nature of his 
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functions, which forced him to be a representative of the 
King and a representative of the Imperial government, had to 
b b ht to an end. 158 Th . t· t e roug e exis ing arrangemen s were 
incompatible with the concept of equality of status. 
Accordingly, the Imperial Conference of 1926 adopted the 
following resolution: 159 
'In our opinion it is an essential consequence of the 
equality of status existing among the members of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations that the Governor-General 
of a Dominion is the representative of the Crown, holding 
in all essential respects the, same position in relation to 
the administration of public affairs in the Dominion as is 
held by His Majesty the King in Great Britain, and that he 
is not the representative or agent of His Majesty's 
Government in Great Britain or of any Department of the 
Government.' 
These words would appear to have two, inter-related 
intentions. Firstly, a Dominion Governor-General was no 
longer expected to act on behalf of the Imperial authorities 
in London. Secondly, the relationship between a Governor-
General and his Cabinet was to be the same as the 
relationship between the King and the United Kingdom Cabinet. 
In respect of the second intention however, Wheare has argued 
that the resolution is ambiguous. 160 It would seem to have 
caused problems in two particular areas, both of which relate 
to the dissolution of Parliament. 
(a) Dissolution: the Governor-General's discretion and the 
King's discretion 
Prior to 1926, Governors-General had a discretion to refuse 
any Ministerial request for the dissolution of Parliament. 
This is a proposition which Wheare and Keith have both been 
161 willing to accept. Difficulties arise however, because 
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the conventional rules which governed the relationship 
between the King and his Ministers in the United Kingdom were 
not clearly defined. 162 Keith argued that while a Governor-
General was entitled to refuse a dissolution prior to 1926, 
the King was not. 163 Wheare, on the other hand has pointed 
out that many authorities have recognized the King's power to 
refuse advice. 164 Consequently, before the Imperial 
Conference of 1926, controversy about whether the 
discretionary power of the King was the same as the 
discretionary power of the Governor-General had not been 
authoritatively settled. 165 
In Keith's opinion, the intention of the 1926 resolution 
was to assimilate Dominion with British usage vis-a-vis the 
power of dissolution. 166 According to Keith, the Conference 
was reacting to recent events in Canada, where the Governor-
General had refused a dissolution to one Prime Minister, 
while granting it to another who did not even command the 
confidence of the lower House. 167 As far as Keith was 
concerned, placing a Governor-General in the same position as 
the King would mean that the former's discretion to refuse a 
dissolution had come to an end. 168 In other words, 
•, 
controversies such as the one which had overwhelmed Lord Byng 
in Canada during 1926 would not happen again. Wheare 
however, was unconvinced by these assertions. He has 
accepted that one of the intentions of the 1926 resolution 
was to assimilate Dominion with British usage. 169 In the 
following comment he noted however, that because British 
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usage or convention was unclear in 1926, the effect of the 
resolution was ambiguous: 170 
the Governor-General must act in accordance with the 
same rules as the King recognizes in his relations with 
his ministers. No attempt was made to indicate what these 
rules were. The problems of discretion still remain 
unsolved.' 
In relation to the dissolution of the United Kingdom 
Parliament, the King's discretion to act without Ministerial 
advice has been the subject of endless debate. Wheare has 
made reference to analyses of the issue which were prominent 
during the Irish Home Rule crisis in 1912-1914. 171 He refers 
for example, to a letter written by Sir William Anson to 'The 
Times' in 1913. 172 This letter was regarded as an 
authoritative assertion of the King's inherent constitutional 
right to act without advice. 173 Among other things, Sir 
William Anson commented as follows: 
'For every public act of the King his Ministers must 
accept responsibility. If, therefore, the King should 
desire to dissolve Parliament .•• and if the Government 
are of the same opinion, the prerogative of dissolution 
would be exercised in the ordinary course. If not, it 
would be necessary to ascertain beforehand whether an 
alternative Ministry was prepared to accept the 
responsibility of a dissolution •.• 
It really comes to this, that if the King should 
determine, in the interests of the people, to take a 
course which his Ministers disapprove, he must either 
convert his Ministers to his point of view, or, before 
taking action, must find other Ministers who agree with 
him.' 
This point of view was further enhanced by a letter which 
174 Lord Hugh Cecil wrote to 'The Times': 
'It is certainly an undisputed rule of our Constitution 
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that the Sovereign must never act upon his own responsi-
bility - that is, he must always have advisers who will 
bear the responsibility of his acts. But this does not 
mean that he must always automatically accept the advice 
of those who are his Ministers at a given moment ••. The 
doctrine - sustained, I believe, both by precedent and 
authority - is that the Sovereign may refuse the advice of 
his Ministers, though that refusal should involve their 
resignation, and may even (in an extreme case) dismiss his 
Ministers; but that these powers are in practice closely 
restricted by the condition that he must find advisers to 
bear the responsibility of his action who have the 
confidence of the House of Commons; or can obtain that 
confidence after a general election.' 
The opinions which were propagated in Anson's letter were 
also adopted by Dicey. 175 
'The Times' however, in a leading article dated 8th 
September, 1913, adopted a totally different approach. The 
article made a distinction between the legal and the 
176 conventional powers of the King in the following terms: 
'Legally there is no question that under the Constitution 
there are certain reserved right179f the Crown, but they are atrophied by long disuse... It is, however, in 
our judgment, inconceivable that the Sovereign should 
contemplate a step which might lead to an apparent 
disagreement between the occupant of the Throne and the 
majority of his people ... A dissolution of Parliament by 
an exercise of the Royal Prerogative, proprio motu regis, 
might be followed by a vindication at the polls of those 
very Ministers whose advice had been set aside. The 
proposal, in fact, has only to be stated with its 
implicatio~78for its constitutional absurdity to be revealed.' 
Like 'The Times', Morgan was opposed to the exercise of a 
discretionary power by the King, because he was concerned 
that the King would become politically compromised by such 
action. 179 The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Herbert 
A "th f . ·1 . . 180 squi , was o a simi ar opinion. In a famous memorandum 
to the King, he referred to the political dangers which would 
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confront the Monarchy if it attempted to dismiss one set of 
Ministers and have them replaced by another. 181 Such action 
he feared, would induce the Crown to become a football 
between contending factions, especially in any subsequent 
parliamentary elections. 182 There can be little doubt that 
the King's refusal to dissolve Parliament would have been 
tantamount to Ministerial dismissal. 183 It would almost 
certainly have led to the resignation of the existing 
184 government. Many writers have subsequently aligned 
themselves with Asquith's point of view. 185 It would seem 
therefore, that notwithstanding the King's legal rights, 
constitutional reality prevented him from refusing a 
dissolution of Parliament. The King's legal rights could 
only be exercised on the advice of his existing Ministers. 
This conclusion must be read however, subject to at least 
two provisos. Firstly, the King himself, during the Home 
Rule crisis of 1912-1914, questioned the contention that he 
was obliged to act on the advice of his existing 
Ministers. 186 The King maintained the view that if his 
personal intervention could prevent a national disaster, help 
to avoid bloodshed among his subjects, or somehow produce a 
calming effect in periods of unusual national tension, he 
would not necessarily be bound by the advice of his existing 
Ministers. 187 Secondly, as Markesinis has noted: 188 
'Most constitutional lawyers seem to support the idea that 
in a divided House, and particularly with a multi-party 
system, a minority Government - whether defeated or 
undefeated - is not entitled to a dissolution if an 
alternative Government is possible and furthermore is 
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capable of carrying on with the existing House.' 
Markesinis has argued however, that this second proviso is 
open to doubt. 189 A refusal to grant a dissolution to a 
minority government would drag the King into the arena of 
political controversy, whether or not an alternative Ministry 
could have been constructed without elections. 190 Markesinis 
has pointed out that 'if there is anything worse than a 
biased and partial Monarch, it is a Monarch who is believed 
to be biased and partial'. 191 Such perceptions would not 
alter simply because one administration had the support of 
the House of Commons while its predecessor did not. 
Accordingly, whether or not the King would be 
constitutionally justified in refusing a dissolution to a 
minority government is irrelevant. The crucial factor is the 
political wisdom of exercising such a 'reserve' power, which 
would vary depending on the circumstances associated with 
each request for a dissolution. 192 It can be suggested 
however, that the refusal of a dissolution would be justified 
only in the gravest national emergency. What would 
constitute 'a national emergency' nonetheless would,be open 
to widely different interpretations. It is a problem which 
remains unsolved. 193 
The 1926 Imperial Conference made no attempt to clear up 
the ambiguity and confusion. In some ways, it actually made 
matters worse. Before 1926, it was a fairly settled 
conventional rule that the Governor-General could refuse a 
dissolution in certain circumstances. After 1926, it became 
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difficult to ascertain the true relationship between the 
Governor-General and his Ministers. The attempt to equate 
their relationship with that between the King and Ministers 
in the United Kingdom did not bring those difficulties to an 
end. The discretionary power of the King to act without 
Ministerial advice was the subject of endless controversy. 
Two schools of thought developed in the early part of the 
twentieth century; one led by Anson and Dicey; the other led 
by Asquith, Morgan, 'The Times', and later writers such as 
Jennings and Markesinis. 194 Lord Esher vacillated between 
the two opposing views. 195 The conference made no attempt to 
' 
settle the resultant confusion. 
It is tempting to assert that the Governor-General lost his 
discretionary power to act without advice. It is tempting to 
argue that any attempt to exercise a 'reserve' power would 
J 
have been highly injudicious. It would not be difficult to 
assert that the King had lost the ability to manoeuvre 
independently of his Ministers, because of the threat which 
would otherwise be posed to the security of his throne. The 
same could not be said however, about a Governor-General. 
The method of appointing a Governor-General differed 
markedly from methods of appointing a hereditary Monarch. 196 
Furthermore, the character of the tenure enjoyed by a 
Governor-General bore no relation to the form of tenure 
associated with an established royal dynasty. 197 The 
Governor-General had no throne to protect and no hereditary 
lineage to safeguard. In marked contrast to the Monarch, he 
was a transient, merely temporary figure on the 
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constitutional stage of a Dominion. He was in a better 
position to withstand accusations of political partisanship, 
because his term of office was short and he would soon be 
replaced by somebody else. 
Consequently, it is extremely difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions about the effect of the 1926 Imperial Conference 
on this matter. Wheare recognized that the issue was open to 
debate. 198 In South Africa attention has been focused on the 
dissolution crisis of 1939. This crisis will be referred to 
again, after the following heading has also been considered. 
(b) Who asks for dissolution 
Cabinet? 
the Prime Minister or the 
In the United Kingdom, the King is bound to the advice of 
his Ministers in almost all forseeable circumstances. 199 
Accordingly, it is important to establish which persons are 
ultimately responsible for offering him the advice to 
dissolve Parliament. The role of British conventional 
practice is important from the South African perspective for 
two reasons. Firstly, the system of government which was 
established in the Union in 1910, drew heavily upon the 
contemporary conventional practices which were then operating 
in the United Kingdom. 200 Secondly, one of the intentions of 
the 1926 Imperial Conference Resolution was to bring the 
conventional relationship between the Governor-General and 
his Ministers into line with the equivalent relationship 
between the King and his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 201 
In the following paragraphs, the role of the British Prime 
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Minister and his Cabinet will be described vis-a-vis the 
dissolution of Parliament. Thereafter, the role of the South 
African Prime Minister and his Union Cabinet will be examined 
to see if there were many similarities and differences 
between the operation of convention in both countries. 
Finally, the 1926 resolution will be examined, to see if a 
synthesis between the British and the South African 
conventions was achieved with the adoption of the 1926 
resolution. 
(i) The British experience 
A former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Herbert 
Asquith, has said that all dissolutions are submitted to the 
Cabinet for ultimate decision. 202 This assertion was true, 
baring the occasional departure from practice, 203 for all 
dissolutions of the United Kingdom Parliament up to and 
including the one in 1910. 204 
The first signs of change came during the First World 
War. 205 The King had decided to offer the premiership to the 
~ 
leader of the Opposition, Andrew Bonar Law. 206 Foreseeing 
however, that Bonar Law would make his acceptance of office 
conditional upon the dissolution of Parliament, the King 
sought the advice of Lord Haldane. 207 In his reply Lord 
Haldane asserted: 208 
' ... the only Minister who can properly give advice as to a 
dissolution of Parliament is the Prime Minister .•• the 
Sovereign cannot entertain any bargain for a dissolution 
merely with a possible Prime Minister before the latter is 
fully installed.' 
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Markesinis believes that Lord Haldane was taking account of 
the increasing importance of the office of Prime Minister, 
which was greatly accelerated by the demands of the war. 209 
By 1918 the position of the Prime Minister was pre-eminent, 
in large measure due to Lloyd George's dynamic and 
210 indefatigable direction of the country's war effort. 
Bearing these factors in mind, Markesinis argues that it is 
easy to understand why the 1918 dissolution openly breached 
tradition by originating from the Prime Minister himself. 211 
There appeared to be no question of consulting the body of 
the Cabinet about dissolution; the whole matter was left for 
the Prime Minister to decide for himself. 212 Markesinis has 
reviewed many subsequent dissolutions of Parliament, and with 
an exception being made for the dissolution of 1924, 213 he 
h t th f 11 . l . 214 as come o e o owing cone usion: 
'That the Prime Minister will usually discuss a possible 
dissolution with some of his senior and closer colleagues 
is an historically proven fact, though he is under no 
constitutional obligation to do this. A fortiore he is 
not obliged to bring this before the Cabinet for an 
official decision. But it is also equally certain ••• 
that it is the Prime Minister who finally takes the 
decision and the responsibility to advise dissolution, 
even if most prominent members of his administration 
strongly disagree with him.' 
(ii) The South African experience 
Lord Buxton was the first Governor-General to grant a 
dissolution of the South African Parliament. 215 In the 
following remarks about the conventions relating to 
dissolution, he drew attention to the important role played 
by the Prime Minister of the Union: 216 
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'The Governor-General can dismiss a Ministry, he can 
refuse a dissolution asked for by his Prime Minister, 
while he can himself dissolve Parliament against the 
wishes of his Ministers. But, unless he were absolutely 
confident that public opinion would fully uphold him in 
regard to any one of these actions, it would be folly and 
worse on his part to act against the advice of his Prime 
Minister.' 
The relevant words for present purposes are; 'he can refuse 
a dissolution asked for by his Prime Minister' and 'it would 
be folly and worse on his part to act against the advice of 
his Prime Minister'. These words would appear to be clear-
cut. Whenever a dissolution of Parliament was required, the 
request would be made by the Prime Minister of the Union. 
Furthermore, a Governor-General who ignored such advice would 
do so at his own peril. In what capacity, it may be asked, 
did the Prime Minister give advice? Was he alone in 
determining the date of a dissolution, or did he consult with 
the rest of the Cabinet? Was the advice of the Cabinet 
binding upon him, or could he over-rule it in view of other 
considerations to which he attached greater weight? Lord 
Buxton's remarks would not appear to satisfy any of these 
questions, although at one point he refers to the wishes of 
'Ministers' rather than to the wishes or advice of the 'Prime 
Minister'. No conclusions can be readily drawn. 
The pre-eminence of the Prime Minister's wishes first 
became obvious with the dissolution of 1924. After a series 
of by-election losses, the Smuts government suffered a 
humiliating defeat in the normally 'safe' Transvaal 
constituency of Wakkerstroom. 217 Without consulting the 
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Cabinet and without sounding the caucus of his party, Smuts 
decided to resign the premiership and test the feeling of the 
t · 1 1 t· 218 A f h ft th coun ry in a genera e ec ion. ew ours a er e 
Transvaal by-election result became know, the Prime Minister 
entered the House of Assembly and bluntly announced his 
decision to hold elections. 219 This behaviour created fierce 
resentment among his supporters, who considered the Prime 
Minister's decision rather high-handed. 22° Clearly, at the 
very least, they had expected the Cabinet to be 'consulted', 
and their reaction is perhaps indicative of a breach with 
previously established practice. 221 This is a matter 
however, which would merit further investigation. 
(iii) The 1926 Conference 
Prior to 1926, the relationship between British and South 
African practice was difficult to determine, because British 
conventional practice had been transformed. By 1918, the 
British Prime Miinister enjoyed far more influence in 
determining when a dissolution would be advised, than he had 
enjoyed in 1910. No one is able to say however, whether the 
influence of the South African Prime Minister had evolved in 
similar fashion over the same period. It was natural for 
General Smuts to copy the behaviour of Lloyd George and 
successive British premiers, when he advised a dissolution in 
1924 without consulting his colleagues. The adverse reaction 
which this caused nevertheless, would suggest that the 
evolution of South African convention remained a matter of 
some controversy. 
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The wording of the 1926 Imperial Conference resolution222 
failed to make matters any clearer. There are two 
alternative ways of interpreting the resolution however: 
1. Firstly, once the resolution was adopted, each Governor-
General would have to behave like the King. 223 As the 
King now dissolved Parliament solely on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, each Governor-General would have to do 
the same in the Dominions. As far as the dissolution of 
the United Kingdom Parliament was concerned, the advice 
of the British Prime Minister had become pre-eminent. 
This recent development reflected a somewhat altered 
1 t . h" b t th K" d h" M" · t 224 d re a ions ip e ween e ing an is inis ers, an 
accordingly, it would have to play an equally important 
role in the Dominions. The development of modern British 
convention would have to be reflected in the relationship 
between each Governor-General and his Dominion Ministers. 
The personal wishes of the Prime Minister would carry 
much greater authority than before. 
2. Alternatively, it may be suggested that the resolution 
had left things much as they were prior to 1926. The 
resolution was not intended to deal with the relationship 
between a Prime Minister and other members of his 
Cabinet. Accordingly, uncertainty about whether or not 
the Prime Minister had to consult the Cabinet about 
dissolution, and uncertainty about whether or not such 
advice would be binding on him, was in no way affected by 
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the adoption of the resolution. It can be argued that as 
far as the dissolution of Parliament was concerned, the 
precise nature of the Prime Minister's influence was of 
no immediate concern to the assembled statesmen at the 
Conference. Their primary concern was to promote 
equality of status between the member states of the 
Commonwealth. 225 Consequently, the resolution was 
largely designed to terminate Imperial supervision and 
t 1 th . D . . t 226 con ro over e various om1n1on governmen s. Apart 
from this basic intention however, the resolution had 
suprisingly little impact upon the conventional practices 
of the Dominions. 227 
Of the two alternative approaches to the interpretation of 
the 1926 resolution, the second one seems to be the most 
appropriate. Earlier, it was noted that a South African 
commentator had said of conventions: 'Hulle reflekteer ook 
die politieke moraliteit van die stelsel waarbinne hulle 
228 opereer.' Naturally, the political 'morality' or the 
political 'environment' in each of the member states of the 
Commonwealth differed in certain respects from each other. 
These differences, could be attributed to several factors, of 
which the following two examples are perhaps the most 
important. Firstly, the United Kingdom and the several 
Dominions each enjoyed a separate or distinct system of 
government. All of these were based upon the Westminster 
model of government, 229 but each had its own individual 
characteristics or idiosyncracies which were not reflected 
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elsewhere in the Cormnonwealth. 230 Secondly, the status of 
the Governor-General could not be equated with the status of 
the King. The actions of an hereditary Monarch have to be 
tempered with extreme caution, while those of an appointed, 
temporary office-holder do not. 
These differences explain why the harmonization of 
convention throughout the Cormnonwealth would have been so 
complex. It explains why the harmonization of the 'reserve' 
power to refuse advice has been all but meaningleps. 231 
Prior to the 1926 conference, it is questionable whether the 
relationship between a Prime Minister and his Cabinet 
colleagues, or between a Prime Minister and the relevant 
Governor-General, were identical in each of the Dominions. 
Similarly, it was unlikely that all of them reflected the 
contemporary position in the United Kingdom. 232 To a 
considerable extent, these relationships would have been the 
product of domestic, internal political circumstances. 233 
Consequently, there is no reason to suppose why these 
relationships should have changed automatically as soon as 
the 1926 resolution was adopted at the conference. The 
wording of the resolution was simply too vague and general to 
bear such an interpretation or meaning. Accordingly, it is 
submitted that those South African conventions which deal 
with such 'internal' governmental relationships, are not the 
product of the 1926 Imperial Conference. 234 Similarly, they 
are not the perfect reflection of the conventions in a 
foreign, 'mother' country like the United Kingdom. 
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Therefore, any proper understanding of the South African 
convention relating to the dissolution of Parliament, 
requires an investigation into eacp dissolution of the Union 
legislature ~ince the first one took place in 1915. 235 It 
is through the analysis of local dissolution practice, that a 
valid, local rule can be extrapolated. Hence, constant 
reference to the practice of dissolution in the United 
Kingdom or other Commonwealth countries is of limited 
usefulness to the South African commentator. 
Unfortunately, space does not allow for a detailed 
examination of all the circumstances surrounding each 
dissolution of the Union Parliament since 1915. A 
considerable amount of additional research is needed in this 
area. Some useful pointers may be gleaned however, from the 
factors involved in the dissolution crisis of 1939. 
(c) The 1939 dissolution crisis 
There are two closely inter-related aspects to the 
dissolution crises of 1939. These deal with the following 
matters: 
(i) the extent of'the Prime Minister's right to request a 
dissolution; 
(ii) the extent of the Governor-General's right to refuse 
such a request. 
Before these two issues can be explored in detail, it 
would be useful to give a factual account of the events in South 
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Africa which led up to the declaration of war against Germany 
in mid-1939. 
Since 1936, the Prime Minister, General Hertzog, had time 
and again declared that the Union would not take part in a 
European war unless its interests were at stake. 236 Several 
months after elections were held in May 1938, 237 the Cabinet 
adopted an official policy of neutrality over the Czech 
crisis. 238 The prospect of war loomed nearer in mid-1939 
with the crisis over the Polish Corridor, but Hertzog assumed 
that the policy of neutrality would be continued by his 
Cabinet. 239 By a co-incidence of timing, a special session 
of Parliament had been convened for 2nd September 1939. 240 
The United Kingdom was on the verge of declaring war, but 
Hertzog and Smuts both realised that the response of the 
Union would be determined by a vote tak~n in Parliament. 241 
Clearly, the government had to give some sort of a lead, and 
lay a coherent policy before the legislature. 242 
Accordingly, Hertzog suggested to Smuts that the policy of 
neutrality be continued. 243 Smuts immediately rejected the 
idea, and the Cabinet met that same day, 2nd September, to 
discuss the matter. 244 The United Kingdom declared war 
against Germany on 3rd September, forcing the South African 
Cabinet to come to an immediate decision. 245 The Cabinet met 
on the afternoon of 3rd September 1939, ,but it appeared to be 
hopelessly split. 246 Hertzog argued in favour of neutrality 
in the Polish war, but he failed to convince the majority of 
his Cabinet colleagues. 247 There was a majority of one in 
the Cabinet against his proposal to remain neutra1, 248 and 
-70-
therefore it was agreed to lay the whole question before 
Parliament on the following morning. 249 
On 4th September 1939, the Prime Minister announced in the 
House of Assembly that the Cabinet was divided on the war 
issue. 250 A debate then ensued, with H~rtzog arguing in 
favour of neutrality and Smuts countering with support for 
the war. 251 The debate lasted the whole day, and the vote 
was taken at 9pm. 252 By a majority of 80 to 67, the 
amendment moved by General Smuts was carried, and the 
original motion of the Prime Minister was lost. 253 The 
rejection of General Hertzog's proposal was tantamount to a 
motion of no confidence in his leadership. 254 For the first 
time since Union, a Prime Minister had been defeated in 
Parliament, and Hertzog immediately asked the Governor-
General to dissolve the legislature. 255 The Governor-
General, without further consultation, replied on 5th 
September 1939 in the following words: 256 -
'I have given careful consideration to the proposal you 
made to me last evening that I should dissolve Parliament 
with a view to a general election. There is a general 
feeling, which I share, that a general election at the 
present moment would lead to great bitterness and even 
violence. That situation must, however, be accepted if 
there is no constitutional alternative. 
The present Parliament was elected in May last year. The 
question of South Africa's participation in a war in which 
England was involved was at that time clearly before the 
people, and the policy of the Government, as proclaimed by 
you and your Ministers, was that the question would be 
decided by the chosen representatives of the people in 
Parliament. When war broke out the Government placed the 
question before Parliament for decision, but was divided 
on the recommendation that should be made to the House. 
Two opposing motions were submitted, by you and by General 
Smuts respectively, and the House decided by a 
considerable majority to adopt that of General Smuts. 
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In the circumstances I cannot see on what grounds I should 
be justified in rejecting the decision of the House and 
hold~ng a general election if General Smuts, whose policy 
obtained the support of the House, is in a position to 
form a government which will have the support of the 
House. I have therefore asked him, if possible today to 
inform me whether he can form such a government. If he is 
in a position to do so, I would not feel justified in 
accepting your proposal to dissolve Parliament.' 
Later that same day, General Hertzog resigned the 
premiership. 257 The Governor-General then called upon 
General Smuts to form a new Ministry. 258 Smuts had a 
majority of 17 supporters in the House of Assembly, counting 
those who had been absent on the crucial day. 259 It has been 
said however, about the state of opinion in the Union 
260 generally: 
it would be foolish to assume that he had a majority 
in the country or that a general election would have 
returned him to power. If an election or referendum were 
held today (December 1939) it is more than probable -
particularly in the case of a general election - that the 
majority would have approved the policy of the former 
Prime Minister.' 
The new government, headed by General Smuts, declared war 
261 against Germany on 6th September 1939. Whether or not the 
conventions of the constitution were broken by the Governor-
General is hard to establish. 262 In the absence of a 
detailed analysis of the practice of dissolution in the Union 
prior to 1939, no firm judgements can be made. Consequently, 
the observations which follow must not be regarded as the 
committed views of the writer. They are offered as a 
strictly limited' contribution to a proper analysis of the 
crisis. 
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(i) The extent of the Prime Minister's right to request 
dissolution 
Keith, writing in 1940, argued that no tradition existed in 
any of the Dominions, which entitled one of its Prime 
Ministers to obtain a dissolution against the will of the 
majority in his Cabinet. 263 These views have subsequently 
been echoed in a United Kingdom context by 'The Times' of 
London. Although the British Prime Minister would normally 
take the decision and the responsibility to advise a 
dissolution, 264 'The Times' argued in 1969 that: 265 
'if a Prime Minister, defeated in Cabinet, unable to carry 
his policy in the party meeting, were to ask for a 
dissolution for the apparent purpose of unnecessarily 
involving his party in his own downfall, the Queen would 
have ample grounds for refusing him and dismissing him 
provided an alternative leader of the majority party was 
in sight. Perhaps the best solution if a Prime Minister 
ever asks for a dubious dissolution is for the Queen to 
follow the nineteenth century practice of granting 
dissolution to a Cabinet rather than an individual.' 
These views have been echoed by De Smith, who has argued 
that a refusal would probably be justified and broadly 
acceptable if a Prime Minister, placed in a minority within 
his own Cabinet and threatened with repudiation by his 
parliamentary party, suddenly asked for a dissolution in 
order to forestall his imminent 
elaborates upon this point even 
. 266 H supersession. e 
267 further when he argues: 
'A fortiore, a Prime Minister who has actually been 
repudiated by his own party in favour of one of his 
colleagues can claim no constitutional right at all to 
demand a dissolution.' 
Markesinis has his doubts about the formulation in 'The 
Times 1 , 268 but he recognizes its applicability to the South 
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African situation in 1939. 269 He notes that General Hertzog 
was undeniably repudiated in both the Cabinet and the House 
of Assembly, and that the majority of his party were prepared 
to support an alternative administration. 270 The arguments 
which have been used by De Smith in a British context, would 
appear to be a tailor-made justification for the actions of 
the Governor-General during the South African crisis of 
1939. 271 
Without doubt, it looked as though Hertzog had lost any 
vestige of a right to call for the dissolution of Parliament. 
In one sense, it can be said that there was an 'inter-
regnum'. Hertzog's political authority had been rendered 
nugatory through a combination of circumstances. Once he had 
been rejected by a majority in both the Cabinet and the House 
of Assembly, he was effectively 'deposed'. For all intents 
and purposes, the premiership had now fallen vacant. General 
Hertzog had been 'killed-off', politically speaking, by his 
supporters. Political realignment was all too apparent, and 
it would soon demand the appointment of a new man to take the 
place of the old premier. Accordingly, the man who had asked 
Sir Patrick Duncan272 for a dissolution of Parliament on the 
evening of September 4th 1939, had already, in truth, been 
shed of the premiership. General Hertzog was already an ex-
Prime Minister in all but name. 
(ii) The extent of the Governor~General's right to refuse 
dissolution 
After 1926, the Governor-General's 'reserve' power to 
refuse a dissolution of Parliament was supposed to be the 
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same as the King's 'reserve' power to refuse dissolution. It 
has already been shown however, that this attempted 
assimilation of conventional practice was filled with 
-difficulties. 273 
• 
In 1939, when Sir Patrick Duncan received a request for 
dissolution from a defeated General Hertzog, the Governor-
General was unable to look to contemporary British practice 
for any suitable guidance. Equivalent political 
circumstances had simply not arisen in modern times in the 
United Kingdom. 274 
In South Africa, Sir Patrick Duncan seems to have been well 
aware of the fact that an exercise of the 'reserve' power was 
~otentially very unwise. It was perfectly clear from the 
letter which he sent to General Hertzog on 5th September 1939 
that he had absolutely no desire to emulate the political 
blunders of Lord Byng thirteen years previously in Canada. 275 
He did not propose an outright rejection of General Hertzog's 
advice, such rejection was conditional and depended upon 
Smuts' ability to construct a new House of Assembly majority. 
Hence, Sir Patrick Duncan had no intention of refusing a 
dissolution to one Prime Minister only to find himself forced 
to grant it to another almost immediately thereafter. The 
Governor-General's attitude displayed a thorough 
understanding of constitutional reality, particularly of the 
conditions which are necessary before an exercise of the 
'reserve' powers can be successful. A Government which has 
enjoyed majority support in the lower House can rarely be 
replaced by another, alternative government without the 
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holding of elections. 276 Although the Hertzog government had 
effectively broken up over the war issue, the Governor-
General needed further evidence that Smuts could turn his 
supporters into a viable, alternative administration. 
Ultimately, Sir Patrick Duncan's decision hinged upon the 
existence of an alternative, viable government. 277 The 
decision to refuse Hertzog's advice was enormously 
controversial nevertheless, and many people lost faith in the 
operation of constitutional government as a result of it. 278 
Accordingly, it may be wondered what had induced the 
Governor-General to exercise a 'reserve' power in the first 
place. Unless a satisfactory answer can be provided, there 
will always remain some lingering doubt about the 
constitutional correctness of the Governor-General's actions. 
Two different motives for the rejection of Hertzog's advice 
may be inferred from Sir Patrick Duncan's letter. Firstly, 
he was worried that an election over the war issue would lead 
to great bitterness and violence. In this respect, the 
Governor-General reflected the attitude of George V during 
the Home Rule Crisis of 1912-1914. 279 The King had asserted 
the right to reject the advice of his Ministers, if an 
impending national disaster, a ~hreatened outbreak of public 
violence or increasing political tension could be prevented 
thereby. 280 It is very difficult to pass comment on a motive 
of this kind. The type of circumstances that characterize a 
'national emergency' are fundamentally a question of 
political judgment. George V did not consider the Irish 
crisis to be of sufficient dimension to merit his direct, 
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personal intervention in affairs of state. 281 He maintained 
a strictly limited view of the role he could play in 
resolving the Irish problem, notwithstanding rumours of an 
. . . t . · 1 282 1nc1p1en c1v1 war. Possibly the Governor-General felt 
that the situation in the Union in 1939 was far more serious, 
and merited his direct intervention. 283 In the absence of a 
full, historical analysis of events at that time it is 
difficult to reach any firm conclusions about the 
appropriateness of the Governor-General's first motive. It 
must be noted however, that VerLoren Van Themaat has 
criticised the actions of Sir Patrick Duncan in the following 
terms: 284 
'Die goewerneur-generaal het sy weiering om die Volksraad 
te ontbind destyds gemotiveer deur te wys op die onrus wat 
'n verkiesing in hierdie verband in die land sal 
veroorsaak. Waarskynlik is meer onrus veroorsaak deur die 
bewindsoorname sonder 'n verkiesing van 'n kabinet wat 
weldra taamlik drasties opgetree het teen 
andersdenkendes.' 
The rejection of advice by the Governor-General can also be 
attributed to a second motive, which to a certain extent has 
been misunderstood in the past. Sir Patrick Duncan's letter 
to General Hertzog implied that Smuts had gained a sufficient 
'mandate' to proceed with the war. 285 The letter referred to 
the policy of the government during the May 1938 
elections, 286 when it had been plainly indicated to the 
electorate that the war issue would be determined by a vote 
taken in Parliament. 287 The Governor-General inferred that 
this election promise had been kept, and that Hertzog's 
request for a fresh mandate from the electorate was therefore 
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entirely unnecessary and inconsistent with previously stated 
government policy.
288 
There would seem to be a great deal of 
merit in this argument. The government had not committed 
itself to a policy of neutrality in the 1938 elections, and 
it had certainly not ruled out the possibility of war 
altogether. 289 The Hertzog government had merely promised 
the electorate that the ultimate decision would be taken by 
Parliament, and there can be no doubt that this promise had 
actually been complied with to the full. VerLoren Van 
Themaat has argued that the mandate for war was not specific 
enough, 290 but it is hard to see how a more precise m~date 
could have been obtained in the circumstances. 291 Events in 
Europe during 1938-1939 were moving extremely rapidly, and 
ideas about the aims and objectives of the Hitler regime were 
being hurriedly reassessed. 292 VerLoren Van Themaat has 
attempted to place far too rigid an interpretation on the 
theory of the mandate. He fails to take account of ardent 
critics of the theory. 293 Le May, who is one of these 
critics, has attacked the whole concept of the mandate with 
observations like the following: 294 
'In the first place, society is not static; and politics 
is a business of ceaseless accommodation to ceaseless 
change. The questions which are uppermost at the time of 
an election may well not be those which are first in 
importance two or three years later.' 
Accordingly, it can be argued that if the mandate theory is 
to have any credibility at all in relation to the 1939 
crisis, a reasonably flexible approach must be adopted 
towards its interpretation. 
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Without doubt,'the 'war mandate' of 1938 was vague. It is 
extremely unlikely that voters were thinking of Danzig or the 
Polish Corridor when Hertzog spoke of possible South African 
participation in a future war. VerLoren Van Themaat fails to 
explain however, why a vague mandate must necessarily be an 
invalid mandate. 295 
Alternatively it could be argued that the mandate theory 
was irrelevant in the particular circumstances which faced 
the Union in 1939. Jennings has conceded that the mandate 
can be waived in periods of emergency. 296 He has even gone 
so far as to say that it may be the duty of a government to 
break faith with the electors mandate in certain 
circumstances. 297 The writer is unable to say whether South 
Africa faced a national emergency in 1939. All that can be 
said is that Sir Patrick Duncan believed a serious political 
crisis was developing in the Union. 298 Whether he was right 
or wrong is not something about which the writer feels 
qualified to pass comment. Accordingly, further research is 
required to determine whether the 1939 crisis constituted one 
of those rare situations in which no mandate principle can be 
expected to apply. 
The exercise of a 'reserve' power by the Governor-General 
can be regarded as the practical solution to a difficult 
problem. It may have fanned the flames of unrest and 
bitterness, or it may have helped to still them. Unfortu-
nately, the validity of the Governor-General's first motive 
is not all that easy to assess. On the other hand, the value 
of the Governor-General's second motive is far easier to 
-79-
determine. As a result of the 1938 elections, Parliament had 
been given a mandate to decide the Union's response to any 
outbreak of war. Events in Europe deteriorated rapidly, and 
Parliament opted for war on 4th September 1939. In the 
circumstances, there are no particular reasons why Sir 
Patrick Duncan should have acceded to the request for a new 
mandate. Smuts could pursue the new war policy without 
delay. Elections on the other hand, would have resulted in 
yet further procrastination. Crucial decisions of the 
government would have been paralysed for several weeks while 
the outcome of the poll was being awaited. Chaos and 
confusion would have reigned in the military, diplomatic and 
economic spheres of government until the final results of the 
election battle were known. 
(iii) The 1939 dissolution crisis some conclusions 
The 1939 crisis was the product of local political 
circumstances. Whether the Union should fight a war in 
conjunction with the United Kingdom represented one of the 
major bones of contention in South African politics. The 
controversy destroyed the unity of the government in 1939, 
and thereby placed the Governor-General in a position for 
which there was no direct precedent. His response in many 
ways was a bold one. Whether the King could have behaved 
with similar confidence in the United Kingdom is a matter for 
speculation. No similar political crisis has ever arisen in 
the United Kingdom. A full study of dissolution practice in 
the Union prior to 1939 is not available. Consequently, it 
is difficult to place the 1939 crisis in its proper 
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historical perspective. Certain lessons can be drawn 
nevertheless from the actions of Sir Patrick Duncan. 
Firstly, the 1926 Imperial Conference resolution did not 
assimilate South African and British convention vis-a-vis the 
refusal of dissolution. It may well have been the intention 
of the conference to achieve complete assimilation, but it is 
doubtful whether this object was successfully attained. The 
Governor-General of South Africa faced a new and difficult 
situation in 1939 for which there was no obvious and helpful 
precedent. His subsequent actions may have been 
controversial, but sound reasons can be cited in defence of 
his behaviour. The 1939 crisis was eventually ended by a 
successful exercise of the Governor-General's 'reserve' 
power. It cannot be assumed however, that a British 
Sovereign would have responded to a similar crisis in exactly 
the same way. The behaviour of a British Monarch would 
probably be more circumspect, because of his inherent desire 
to protect the security of his throne. 299 
Secondly, the 1939 crisis placed certain limitations on the 
conventional rights of the South African Prime Minister. 
These limitations took account of certain basic political 
realities to which constitutional convention had to respond. 
Firstly, the premiership had to exist in substance as well as 
form. A Prime Minister who lacked the support of his 
colleagues was not in political reality a Prime Minister at 
all. Accordingly, a premier who had been repudiated in both 
the Cabinet and the House of Assembly was effectively shorn 
of his political authority. He was not thereafter entitled 
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to an automatic dissolution of the legislature, because the 
Governor-General was under no constitutional obligation to 
heed the wishes of a 'nominal' Prime Minister. This 
convention has not become established in the United Kingdom, 
because no British Prime Minister has ever sought a 
dissolution of the legislature after being repudiated in both 
the Cabinet and the lower House. The reasons for this are 
to be found in the differing political climates of the two 
countries. It can be suggested that no British Prime 
Minister would have asked the Sovereign to dissolve 
Parliament in order to forestall a growing rebellion among 
his Cabinet colleagues. Such a request would have involved 
the Sovereign in factional party warfare300- something which 
all British statesmen would be anxious to avoid. 301 
The political climate in South Africa has been somewhat 
different, because a similar anxiety did not seem to afflict 
the minds of South African politicians. Hertzog clearly had 
few qualms about involving the Governor-General in an 
explosive party squabble. His immediate political priorities 
were obviously different, and over-rode the inherent 
desirability of keeping a Governor-General out of party 
politics. 302 As a result of this, he placed Sir Patrick 
Duncan in an exceptionally awkward position. The crisis 
forced Sir Patrick Duncan to find a local solution to a local 
problem. The Governor-General's solution placed definite 
conventional limits on the rights of the South African Prime 
Minister. Similar restrictions have remained unnecessary in 
the United Kingdom however, because the political climate of 
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that country would render them without purpose. 
III THE COMMONWEALTH CONVENTIONS 
This chapter has dealt with conventions under two headings, one 
covering the period before 1926, and the other covering the 
period between 1926 and 1939. These conventions reconciled legal 
theory with political reality, because they brought the legal 
framework of government together with the basic features of the 
Westminster system. The conventions which have been analysed in 
this chapter were concerned with the 'internal' relationships of 
government. Some dealt with the relationship between the 
Governor-General and his Ministers, while others dealt with the 
relationship between the Cabinet and Parliament. 303 Many of them 
underpinned the influence of the Prime Minister of the Union, a 
vital factor without which an understanding of the Westminster 
system would be thoroughly incomplete. 
These conventions have failed to address what may be termed the 
'external' relationships of government. It must not be forgotten 
that in 1910, South Africa was still a colony of the United 
Kingdom. 304 Legally speaking, the Union was subordinate to the 
Imperial authorities in London. This meant that the legislative 
and executive authority of the Union was subordinate to the 
legislative and executive authority of the United Kingdom. 305 
The following legal constraints remained a hindrance to fuli, 
responsible government: 
(i) reservation and disallowance of legislation of the 
Union; 306 
(ii) lack of Ministerial access to the King, especially in 
\ 
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relation to prerogative powers; 307 
(iii) accountability of the Governor-General to the Imperial 
authorities in London; 308 
(iv) the over-riding sovereignty of the United Kingdom 
0 . 
Parliament; 3 9 and 
(v) territorial limitations upon the operation of legislation 
of the Union. 310 
The dichotomy between internal self-government and external, 
Imperial control was an anomally which came under increasing 
pressure in the Dominions. In the Union, Hertzog was demanding 
that the old, inferior status of the Dominions should be brought 
to an end. 311 By March 1926 he was arguing that the Union ought 
to be equal in status to the United Kingdom312 Similar pressure 
for change was also building up among Irish and Canadian 
political leaders. 313 Accordingly, when the Imperial Conference 
was convened in October 1926, the legal restraints which 
inhibited full Dominion autonomy were high on the conference 
agenda. 314 Abolition of these legal restraints posed many 
complex problems for the delegates. 315 Initially at least, they 
decided to tackle these problems on a conventional rather than on 
a legal basis. 316 Hence, at the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 
1930, a whole system of intra-Imperial or Commonwealth 
conventions were adopted by the conference delegates. These 
rules could not hope to solve all the problems associated with 
colonial subordination, 317 but they went a long way in satisfying 
practical political demands. 
The Commonwealth Conventions are no longer of any importance to 
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reserved for the signification of the King's pleasure, 321 
the King was never advised to veto such legislation by 
his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 322 The ultimate -
wishes or intentions of the South African government and 
Parliament were therefore always respected. 
Although equality of status was recognized by'the Imperial 
Conference of 1926, the delegates appreciated that a more 
systematic treatment of reservation was required. They 
acknowledged that legal form had become inconsistent with the 
new status of the Dominions, 323 and that a clearer exposition 
of certain constitutional principles was accordingly 
324 necessary. As far as the reservati--'on of Dominion 
legislation was concerned, the conference proposed at 
paragraph 3(c) of the Report: 325 
it should be placed on record that, apart from 
provisions embodied in constitutions or in specific 
statutes expressly providing for reservation, it is 
recognized that it is the right of the Government in each 
Dominion to advise the Crown in all matters relating to 
its own affairs. Consequently, it would not be in 
accordance with constitutional practice for advice to be 
tendered to His Majesty by His Majesty's Government in 
Great Britain in any matter appertaining to the affairs of 
a Dominion against the views of the Government of that 
Dominion.' 
The adoption of this resolution by the conference meant that 
Imperial control of Dominion legislation was largely brought 
to an end. 326 Two key matters were excluded from the ambit 
of this particular resolution however. Firstly, it excluded 
any provisions which were embodied in the constitutions of 
any of the Dominions. Accordingly, as Keith has pointed out, 
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constitutional change in the Dominions would remain subject 
to Imperial supervision and contro1. 327 Secondly, the 
resolution excluded specific statutes which expressly 
provided for reservation. Consequently, important 
legislation, such as Bills relating to merchant shipping 
affairs, would also remain subject to Imperial contro1. 328 
Being aware of the complexity of the issues which were 
associated with reservation - especially statutory 
reservation - the conference decided to recommend the 
establishment of a Committee of Experts. 329 This committee 
was charged with undertaking a more thorough investigation of 
all matters relating to reservation. 330 
The 'committee' met in 1929, and issued the following 
recommendations in a report entitled 'The Report of the 
Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and 
Merchant Shipping Legislation 1929': 331 
(i) Discretionary reservation by the Governor-General: this 
power was to be exercised only in accordance with the 
constitutional practice in each Dominion which governed 
the exercise of power by the Governor-Genera1. 332 
Hence, in South Africa for example, the discretionary 
power to reserve Bills was to be exercised only on the 
advice of Ministers of State for the Union. 333 
(ii) Reservation under instructions from the King: these 
instructions were no longer to be issued on the advice 
of the Imperial government in London. 334 By 
implication, the King was to issue instruction$ to the 
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Governor-General of a Dominion strictly on ~he advice of 
the Dominion Ministry most immediately concerned. 335 
(iii) Reservation and the signification of the King's 
pleasure: the Report recommended that as regards the 
signification of the King's pleasure, 'it would not be 
in accordance with constitutional practice for advice to 
be tendered to His Majesty by His Majesty's Government 
in the United Kingdom against the views of the 
Government of the Dominion concerned. 1336 Ultimate 
control of Dominion legislation therefore, was to be 
vested in the Dominion Ministry which was primarily 
involved. Accordingly, the Imperial government could 
not use the machinery of reservation to frustrate the 
legislative policy of any of the Dominions. 
The committee then went on to deal with the two classes of 
reservation which had been excluded from the principles laid 
down at the 1926 conference. As regards these outstanding 
matters the committee recommended: 
(iv) Compulsory reservation under statute: whenever this form 
of reservation occurred, the King's pleasure was to be 
expressed in accordance with the wishes of the Dominion 
Ministry, and not in accordance with the wishes of the 
Imperial government. 337 
(v) Compulsory reservation under a Dominion constitution: 
whenever this form of reservation occurred, the King's 
pleasure was to be expressed in accordance with the 
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wishes of the Dominion Ministry 338 The Imperial 
government was therefore surrendering its ultimate 
control over the nature of constitutional change in the 
Dorninions. 339 
The Imperial Conference of 1930 accepted the 
recommendations which had been made by the Conference of 
Experts in 1929. 340 The doctrine or convention that the 
Imperial government should not exercise its own judgment as 
to reserved Bills was therefore finally, and conclusively 
established. 341 Legal form however, remained highly 
unsatisfactory, 342 because it continued to invite the use of 
external, Imperial control. Assent to a reserved Bill could 
only be expressed through an Order-in-Council, and this still 
required a formal request from a Minister of the Crown in the 
United Kingdom. 343 
The Conference of Experts had recognized that Dominion 
governments might seek to remove reservation from their 
constitutions altogether. 344 In the Union, the Governor-
General's discretionary power to reserve Bills was abolished 
in 1934, along with compulsory reservation under other 
provisions of the South Africa Act. 345 
Thereafter, reservation under the Royal Instructions of 
1909 became an anachronism, 346 and it was finally ended by 
the issue of new, up-dated Royal Instructions in 1937_ 347 
By 1934, other forms of reservation in South Africa had 
also disappeared. Compulsory reservation under statutes such 
as the Colonial Courts of Adrnirality Act 1890, or the 
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Merchant Shipping Act 1894 were abolished by the Statute of 
Westminster 1931. 348 Abolition of reservation under these 
Acts was confirmed again in 1934, with the enactment of the 
Status of the Union Act by the Parliament of the Union. 349 
For almost all intents and purposes therefore, the 
Commonwealth conventions governing the use of reservation had 
a remarkably short life in South Africa. They were 
superceded within four years of the 1930 Imperial Conference 
by an elaborate combination of new legal rules. These rules 
had removed the possibility of reservation from almost all 
possible legislative spheres, 350 rendering the recently 
established conventional rules almost entirely ob~olescent. 
(b) The power of disallowance: the conventional restraints 
By 1926, disallowance had become virtually obsolete. 351 No 
Canadian Act had been disallowed since 1873, no New Zealand 
Act had been disallowed since 1867, and no Australian or 
South African Act had ever been disallowed. 352 As VerLoren 
Van Themaat has noted: 353 
'Die gebruik was al geruime tyd voor 1926 dat die Britse 
ministers nie die koning adviseer om wette teen die 
advies van die ministers van die vrygeweste nietig te 
verklaar nie.' 
The development of this convention was formally 
acknowledged in paragraph 3(c) of the 1926 Imperial 
Conference Report. 354 Using words which applied to 
disallowance as much as they applied to reservation, the 
paragraph declared: 355 
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it is recognized that it is the right of the 
Government of each Dominion to advise the Crown in all 
matters relating to its own affairs. Consequently, it 
would not be in accordance with constitutional practice 
for advice to be tendered to His Majesty by His 
Majesty's Government in Great Britain in any matter 
appertaining to the affairs of a Dominion against the 
views of the Government of that Dominion.' 
The conference decided to refer the whole question of 
disallowance to a Committee of Experts, which met, 
deliberated and reported in 1929 as the 'Conference of 
Experts. 1356 This latter conference confirmed that 
disallowance was obsolescent. It was stated quite simply in 
paragraph 23 of the 1929 Report: 357 
'The Conference agrees that the present constitutional 
position is that the power of disallowance can no longer 
be exercised in relation to Dominion legislation.' 
The recommendations of the 1929 report were confirmed by 
the Imperial Conference of 1930. 358 The abandonment of 
disallowance was therefore finally and conclusively 
established. 359 The government of the Union however, was not 
content to leave the control of disallowance to rules of 
convention. The Status of the Union Act 1934 was enacted to 
abolish the power of disallowance altogether, 360 and thus 
bring legal theory into line with modern political reality. 
Commonwealth convention vis-a-vis the power of disallowance 
therefore enjoyed a remarkably short life-span in the Union. 
It was superceded by legislation as early as 1934, and it has 
remained of purely historical interest ever since that date. 
-91-
(2) Access to the King 
In the years between 1926 and 1934, one of the problems 
which confronted Dominion governments was their lack of 
direct Ministerial access to the King. 
This problem caused particular difficulties with regard to 
the reservation of Bills and the disallowance of Acts - a 
matter which has already been alluded to in Chapter II. 361 
After 1926, 362 although the Sovereign was still obliged to 
act on the advice of Ministers of the Crown in the United 
. Kingdom, 363 he was now also expected to act in conformity 
with the views of the relevant Dominion Ministry. 364 Without 
the establishment of direct access however, there was no 
straightforward means of acquainting the King with the views 
of his Dominion Ministers. In practice, the British 
government was expected to act as a channel of communication 
betwen the King and his Ministers in the Dominions~ 365 but 
'there was no guarantee that it would always choose to do 
so. 366 Accordingly, as far as reservatiion and disallowance 
were concerned, the King's exclusive reliance on advice from 
his Ministers in the United Kingdom constituted a potentially 
serious threat to the smooth working of responsible 
government in the various Dominions. South Africa was in no 
way excepted from the implications of this difficulty. 
In certain respects, lack of direct Ministerial access to 
the King created even greater problems in the Union than 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth. This can be asserted because 
many prerogative powers of the Crown were still in the hands 
of the King, and few of these had been delegated to the 
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Governor-General of the Union. 367 Non-delegation meant that 
a wide variety of executive functions in South Africa 
required the personal co-operation of the King - an issue 
which has already been discussed in Ch;pter Ir. 368 As the 
King was obliged to act on the advice of his Ministers in the 
United Kingdom, 369 there was no guarantee that he would 
exercise prerogative powers in the way that his Ministers of 
State for the Union desired. 370 Accordingly, to the extent 
that prerogative powers were free of South African 
Ministerial control, it can be argued that executive 
government in the Union was subordinate to its immediate 
counterpart in the United Kingdom. 371 The subordination 
represented by lack of direct access to the King was a 
considerable threat to the system of responsible government 
in South Africa. The need for change was clearly apparent, 
and much was done in this respect through the adoption of 
convention. Hence, VerLoren Van Themaat has noted: 372 
'Gevolglik is die gebruik in 1931 ingestel dat die 
Unieminister direkte toegang tot die koning het. Die 
Unieministers het persoonlik dokumente wat die koning 
moes teken aan horn voorgel~. Gewoonlik was die 
prosedure dat die goewerneur-generaal gevra is om die 
brief van die eerste minister, waarin om die koning se 
· goedkeuring vir 'n bepaalde uitvoerende handeling 
versoek is, aan die koning deur te stuur. As die koning 
'n verdere mondelinge verduideliking wou h~, kon dit 
deur die Unie se hoe kommissaris in die Verenigde 
Koninkryk gegee word.' 
The adoption of a convention of direct access meant that 
the Union government's dependence on the co-operation of 
British Ministers was somewhat reduced. It could not be 
brought entirely to an end however while the seals which 
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confirmed executive acts of the King were still in the hands 
of Ministers of the Crown in the United Kingdom.373 The 
complete removal of all possible British influence therefore 
required the creation of a new set of South African based 
seals. Another outstanding problem connected with lack of 
access was the question of Ministerial co-signature. The 
King's sign manual was usually confirmed by the co-signature 
of one of his Ministers in the United Kingdom. 374 Unless 
this procedure could be eliminated, direct access would 
always require a modicum of British co-operation as regards 
the Union's internal affairs. 375 
The South African Parliament took both these outstanding 
matters in hand with the enactment of the Royal Executive 
Functions and Seals Act 1934. 376 By this stage, the power of 
reservation and disallowance had already been abolished. 377 
Accordingly, the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act is 
important in this context only in relation to the King's 
prerogative powers. 
Firstly, as regards the use of seals, the Act made 
provision for a Royal Great Seal of the Union and a Signet 
Sea1. 378 Both of these were to be kept by the Prime Minister 
of the Unioh. 379 The Act established that the King's sign 
manual was to be confirmed by the Great Seal of the Union on 
all royal proclamations. 380 The use of seals on other public 
instruments bearing the King's sign manual was to be 
determined by subsequent proclamation. 381 The enactment of 
these provisions ensured that the use of British seals could 
be brought to an end. Secondly, the Act established that the 
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King's sign manual was to be confirmed by the co-signature of 
a Minister of State for the Union. 382 The need for British 
Ministerial co-signature was accordingly brought to an 
383 . 
end. Consequently, although direct access to the King was 
established by convention in 1931, it was the 1934 Act which 
made it~ meaningful procedure from the South African point 
of view. What is more, the 1934 Act dealt with the one 
outstanding problem which convention was unable to resolve. 
The King continued to be physically inaccessible, because he 
was separated from his Ministers by the length of an entire 
continent. Accordingly, it was inevitable that there would 
be some awkward delays in the transaction of certain 
government business. 384 The Royal Executive Functions and 
Seals Act anticipated this particular difficulty however, by 
circumventing the need for access altogether. The Act 
established that the King's sign manual could be dispensed 
with completely, and substituted with the signature of the 
Governor-General of the Union. 385 
In this way, prerogative powers could be exercised without 
the personal co-operation of the King. Formal control of 
such powers in other words was finally transferred to the 
government of the Union. 386 
A purely conventional approach to the problem of access was 
therefore not adopted. The conventional rule of 1931 was 
' supplemented and largely superceded by statutory legal rules 
in 1934. Both types of rule lost their significance however 
when South Africa became a republic and left the Commonwealth 
in 1961. The establishment of a republic meant that the role 
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of the Sovereign in government was entirely eliminated. 387 
Access to the King in other words became utterly redundant. 
(3) The role of the Governor-General: conventional reform 
The dual nature of the Governor-General's functions has 
already been discussed in Chapter II. 388 Each Governor-
General was a local representative of the King. Each of them 
was also an Imperial appointee, who was accountable for his 
actions to Ministers of the Crown in the United Kingdom. The 
twin roles which had to be played by Governors-General was 
the cause of increasing dissatisfaction among Dominion 
governments. It was inconsistent with the concept of 
equality of status, and it remained a constant threat to the 
system of responsible government. The Imperial Conference of 
1926 gave the matter considerable thought, and it finally 
resolved to adopt the following words at paragraph 3(b) of 
its Report: 389 
'In our opinion it is an essential consequence of the 
equality of status existing among the members of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations that the Governor-
General of a Dominion is the representative of the 
Crown, holding in all essential respects the same 
position in relation to the administration of public 
affairs in the Dominion as is held by His Majesty the 
King in Great Britain, and that he is not the 
representative or agent of His Majesty's Government in 
Great Britain or of any Department of the Government.' 
Whether or not a Governor-General could be equated exactly 
with the King has already been discussed in detail in an 
earlier part of this chapter. 390 At this stage the primary 
intention is to point out however, that a Governor-General 
was no longer exp~cted to act as an agent of the Imperial 
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authorities in London. He was expected to act solely as a 
representative of the King, or in VerLoren Van Themaat's own 
words: 391 
'Die goewerneur-generaal is die verteenwoordiger van die 
koning en nie van die Engelse regering nie. Die 
goewerneur-generaal handel dus volgens die advies van 
die regering van die betrokke vrygewes.' 
The change in the status of the Governor-General had 
important consequences in two closely related areas. 
Firstly, it led to a change in the method of appointing 
Governors-General, and secondly, it led to the establishment 
of a separate High Commissioner for South Africa. The 
background to these changes will now be examined. 
(a) Appointment of the Governor-General 
Originally, no British Minister would have thought of 
consulting the wishes of any colony regarding the proposed 
appointment of a Governor. 392 The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, with the approval of the British Prime Minister, 
recommended for the sanction of the Sovereign suitable 
persons to fill the office of Governor. 393 From 1882 to 1889 
various colonies agitated against the existing procedure. 394 
In 1889 it was finally agreed that colonies should be 
informally consulted about the appointment of their 
Governors, and that they should enjoy an informal right to 
object to the appointment of any particular candidate. 395 
Accordingly, from 1889 onwards, colonies and Dominions were 
consulted about the appointment of Governors and Governors-
General, but sole responsibility remained in the hands of the 
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Imperial government in London.396 
After the adoption of paragraph 3(c) of the 1926 report, 
Dominion governments were expected to advise the Crown in all 
matters relating to their own particular affairs. 397 
Consequently, it was assumed that Governors-General would be 
appointed by the King on the advice of the Dominion 
gov~rnment most immediately concerned. 398 Any lingering 
doubts about the correct procedure were dispelled by the 
Imperial Conference of 1930, because in the words of VerLoren 
Van Themaat: 399 
'By die rykskonferensie van 1930 is 'n uitdruklike besluit 
geneem dat die koning op advies van sy vrygewestelike 
ministers, as die partye wat belang by die saak het, die 
goewerneur-generaal aanstel, nadat eers 'n informele 
raadpleging met die koning was.' 
The combined effects of the 1926 and 1930 Imperial 
Conferences were not apparent in South Africa until 3rd 
December 1930. On that day the Earl of Clarendon was 
appointed Governor-General of the Union - the first such 
appointment for more than six 400 · years. The Union government 
was solely responsible for the decision. 401 It was the Prime 
Minister of the Union who made the necessary recommendation 
to the King, and it was the Prime Minister of the Union who 
counter-signed the Commission of appointment. 402 A similar 
procedure was followed thereafter in respect of all 
subsequent Governors-General of South Africa. 403 Once the 
change in the status of the Governor-General was established, 
it was only a matter of time before a South African national 
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would be chosen to fill the position. The first such 
appointment occurred in 1936, when Sir Patrick Duncan became 
the Governor-General of the Union. 404 All subsequent 
Governors-General have also been South African, 405 and a 
convention soon developed which made local citizenship a 
.. t f · t t 406 prerequ1s1 e or appo1n men. 
(b) The High Commissioner 
The origin of the office of High Commissioner for South 
Africa goes back to 1846. 407 In that year, the Governor of 
the Cape of Good Hope was appointed 'Her Majesty's high 
commissioner at the Cape of Good Hope for certain 
purposes' . 408 The primary duty of the Cape's High 
Commissioner was to control relations between the colony and 
neighbouring Black tribes - subject to any directions which 
he might receive from the Imperial authorities in London. 409 
Among his other duties was an obligation to prevent attacks 
upon the colony by these adjoining Black tribes, and to 
endeavour to place such tribesmen under a settled form of 
government. 410 Eventually, the High Commissioner became 
Governor of Basutoland, while he also supervised the affairs 
411 of Swaziland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In 
addition, he came to exercise control over the affairs of 
Southern Rhodesia, until the grant of responsible government 
to that territory on 1st October 1923. 412 Between 1910 and 
1930, the office of High Commissioner was vested in 
successive Governors-General of the Union. 413 They held this 
·t· d t . . h 414 pos1 ion un er separa e commissions, owever. 
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The combination of offices in one person became 
increasingly untenable, especially after the Imperial 
Conference of 1926. 415 The termination of the Governor-
General's accountability to the Imperial authorities in 
London meant that it was. no longer logical to make him 
accountable in his capacity as High Commissioner for South 
Africa. 416 Accordingly, the decision was taken to separate 
the office of Governor-General from the office of High 
Commissioner. 417 The formal split took effect in 1930, after 
the retirement of the Earl of Athlone as Governor-General of 
th U . 418 e nion. Consequently, from 1930 onwards, there existed 
a separate High Commissioner for South Africa. He was the 
chief government official in the three 'High Commission 
Territories 1 • 419 He also served as a link between the 
British government and South Africa. 420 The High 
Commissioner thus became the United Kingdom's main diplomatic 
representative in the Union. 
(c) Legal Consequences 
The conventional rules which regulated the position of the 
Governor-General in South Africa were soon thereafter to be 
supplemented by statute. The Status of the Union Act of 1934 
s 4(1) declared: 421 
'The Executive Government of the Union in regard to any 
aspect of its domestic or external affairs is vested in 
the King, acting on the advice of His Ministers of State 
for the Union, and may be administered by His Majesty in 
person or by a Governor-General as his representative'. 
The possibility that the Governor-General would breach 
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convention and act on the advice of Ministers in the United 
Kingdom therefore receded. Any such behaviour on the part 
of the Governor-General would have been tantamount to a 
. 1 t· ft 422 vio a ion o he law. S 4(3) of the Status of the Union 
Act excluded certain functions of the Governor-General from 
the ambit of the new statutory rule. 423 To this extent 
only, the convention which had been established by 
resolution of the 1926 Imperial Conference remained of 
importance to this country. Any lingering doubts that the 
Governor-General might have exercised some of his powers on 
the advice of British Ministers were dispelled by 1937, 
however. In that year, new Letters Patent and Royal 
Instructions were issued to the Governor-General to replace 
the outdated original versions which had survived since 
1909. 424 The new Letters Patent ended the authority of the 
Privy Council or Ministers of the United Kingdom government 
to give instructions to the Governor-General of the 
Union. 425 Any residual fears therefore, that the Governor-
General might appoint and dismiss Ministers on the advice 
of the British government, or that he might summon, prorogue 
or dissolve Parliament on British Ministerial advice, were 
totally dispelled. 426 
(4) The sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament 
The sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament has already 
been discussed in Chapter II. 427 The Parliament of the 
United Kingdom was 'Imperial' because it had full authority 
to legislate in all colonies of the British Crown. 428 The 
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Parliament of the United Kingdom could also be described as 
'sovereign' by virtue of the doctrine of 'repugnancy 1 • 429 
These two matters must be examined separately. 
(a) The legislative authority of the Imperial Parliament 
The legal power of the United Kingdom Parliament to 
legislate for the colonies became subject to a convention of 
self-restraint. It may be asserted that such a convention 
had already been accepted before the Imperial Conference of 
1926 agreed to the idea of 'equality of status' •430 Open 
acknowledgment of the existence of this convention, however, 
had to wait until 1929. In that year, the Report of the 
Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and 
Merchant Shipping Legislation declared in paragraph 54: 431 
'It would be in accord with the established 
constitutional position of all members of the 
Commonwealth in relation to one another that no law 
hereafter made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
shall extend to any Dominion otherwise than at the 
request and with the consent of that Dominion'. 
In the Australian courts, it was decided in Copyright 
Owners Reproduction Society Ltd v EMI (Australia) (Pty) Ltd 
that the convention of legislative self-restraint 
undoubtedly existed in 1928. 432 It needs to be emphasized, 
however, that the adoption of a conventional restraint made 
no difference to the continuing legal authority of the 
British Parliament to legislate for the colonies. 433 
VerLoren Van Themaat has argued that the British government 
wished to retain a residual legislative authority over the 
Dominions. 434 This left room for the exercise of a 'reserve 
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power' by the United Kingdom Parliament if a serious crisis 
ever developed in one of the Dominions of the Crown. 435 
An opportunity to clear up the confusion about the existence 
and extent of any British 'reserve power' was not seized 
upon at the Imperial Conference of 1930. 436 The convention 
did not seem to survive for long, however, because it was 
superceded by statute in 1931. The Statute of Westminster, 
an enactment of the Imperial Parliament, declared ins 4: 437 
'No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after 
the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed 
to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of the 
Dominion unless it is expressly declared in that Act that 
the Dominion has requested, and consented to, the 
enactment thereof'. 
It can be argued that this statutory provision did not 
entirely replace the importance of the conventional rule. 
Wheare has argued: 438 
'The enacted provision does not go so far in controlling 
the power of the parliament of the United Kingdom as the 
convention does. The convention lays down a rule to 
determine when the power may be exercised; the law lays 
down a rule to determine when the power has or may be 
deemed to have been exercised. If the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom passed a law extending to a Dominion but 
inserted in the law a declaration that the request and 
consent of the Dominion had been obtained, it would have 
broken the convention, but it would not have broken the 
legal rule. The convention and the legal rule work 
together and neither is completely effective without the 
other'. 
There is another ground on which it could be argued that 
the convention remained important. In reality, s 4 of the 
Statute of Westminster was only a self-imposed limitation, 
the voluntary nature of which could be attributed to the 
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doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 439 As the British 
Parliament has always been unable to bind any of its 
440 successors, there has never been a legal obstacle to stop 
it from abolishing the Statute of Westminster altogether. 
The only thing which seems to have inhibited this 
possibility is the continuing vitality of the conventional 
rule. Recognition of this state of affairs was hinted at by 
Lord Sankey in the case of British Coal Corporation v The 
. 441 442 King. Lord Sankey noted: 
'It is doubtless true that the power of the Imperial 
Parliament to pass on its own initiative any legislation 
that it thought fit extending to Canada remains 
unimpaired; indeed the Imperial Parliament could, as a 
matter of abstract law, repeal or disregard section 4 of 
the Statute. But that is theory and has no relation to 
realities' . 
Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs may have 
induced the South African Parliament to enacts 2 of the 
Status of the Union Act of 1934. 443 The provision declared: 
'The Parliament of the Union shall be the sovereign 
legislative power in and over the Union, and 
notwithstanding anything in any other law contained, no 
Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom .•• passed 
after the eleventh day of December, 1931, shall extend, or 
be deemed to extend, to the Union as part of the law of 
the Union, unless extended thereto by an Act of the 
Parliament of the Union'. 
S 3 of the Status of the Union Act incorporated the 
Statute of Westminster into South African law as a South 
· 444 African statute. The combined effect of these two 
provisions, it may be argued, would have protected the Union 
from the consequences of any British attempt to repeal the 
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1931 statute. 445 Although s 2 of the Status of the Union 
Act was vulnerable to legal attack, 446 there can be little 
doubt that South African courts regard the British 
Parliament as having irrevocably abdicated its power to 
legislate over South Africa. 447 Stratford ACJ, for example, 
448 declared in the case of Ndlwana v Hofmeyr: 
'Mr Buchanan •.• questioned the sovereignty of the Union 
Parliament. He said that the Statute of Westminster by 
removing the fetters upon the legislative power of the 
Union Parliament did not confer sovereignty; that the 
power conferred rested upon a Statute of Great Britain 
and could therefore be revoked by a similar statute. We 
cannot take this argument seriously. Freedom once 
conferred cannot be revoked'. 
Centlivres CJ echoed these sentiments in Harris v Minister 
of the Interior when he saict: 449 
the only legislature which is competent to pass 
laws binding in the Union is the Union legislature'. 
Accordingly, it can be said that there has been judicial 
recognition of a political fact - involving a revolutionary _ 
b k "th t b ct· t· 450 rea w1 pas su or 1na ion. It can be argued as far 
as South African courts are concerned that the legislative 
independence of this country's Parliament rests on statute. 
The important role of the Commonwealth conventions has been 
eliminated. 
(b) The doctrine of repugnancy 
The sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament gave rise to 
451 another inequality - the doctrine of repugnancy. 
Dominion legislatures enjoyed no general power to repeal or 
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amend any past or future Act of the United Kingdom 
Parliament which extended to a Dominion as part of the law 
of that Dominion. 452 The doctrine of repugnancy can be 
traced back to the earliest stages of British colonial 
development, 453 but in its more modern form it was to be 
found ins 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865. 454 
The Report of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion 
Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation in 1929 
recognized the fact that legislation would be necessary to 
end the inequalities occasioned by the doctrine. 455 A 
constitutional convention could not be developed to 
terminate the practical effect of repugnancy. This may be 
asserted because no conventional rule could amend or repeal 
a statute, and no conventional rule could alter pre-existing 
common law. 456 The necessary legislation was finally 
enacted by the Imperial Parliament in terms of s 2 of the 
Statute of Westminster~ 457 Conventions, therefore, had no 
role to play in the development of Dominion autonomy in this 
particular respect. 
(5) Legislation with extra-territorial effect Dominion 
incapacity 
The extra-territorial limitation upon the operation of 
Dominion legislation has already been highlighted in Chapter 
II. 458 The existence of this limitation was inconsistent 
with the whole notion of equality of status. The Imperial 
Conference of 1926 recognized that the problems involved 
needed further investigation. 459 In 1929 the Report of the 
Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and 
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Merchant Shipping Legislation recommended the enactment of 
legislation to end the restriction on Dominion legislative 
competence. 460 They noted that the law relating to the 
restriction was so full of obscurity that no other course of 
action was feasible. 461 It can also be pointed out that no 
convention of 'self-restraint' could have developed in these 
circumstances because no court of law would have been 
462 competent to enforce such a rule. Accordingly, s 3 of 
the Statute of Westminster was enacted to make it perfectly 
clear that Dominion Parliaments were to enjoy full power to 
make laws with extra-territorial effect. 463 Convention, 
therefore, had no role to play in the removal of this legal 
restriction on the competence of Dominion legislatures. 
(6) The Commonwealth Conventions: conclusions 
This brief description of some of the more important 
conventional rules of the Commonwealth has helped to 
demonstrate that these rules were vital to the full 
development of a Westminster system in South Africa. 
These Commonwealth rules are no longer of any significance 
to this country, because South Africa left the Commonwealth 
in 1961. Many of the conventional rules had long been 
obsolescent, however, because many of them had been 
superceded by statutory provisions in 1931 and 1934. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SCOPE OF CONVENTIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters II and III have demonstrated that a proper 
understanding of the constitution becomes impossible without an 
appreciation of the role played by conventional rules. In the 
chapters which follow, therefore, particular attention will be 
paid to the basic character of such rules. The purpose of the 
present chapter, however, is to explain the scope of conventional 
rules. Their full significance in relation to the constitution 
of the country will only be understood when their field of 
influence has been highlighted. 
II. THE SCOPE OF CONVENTIONS: DICEY'S VIEW 
Any study of the scope of constitutional conventions must 
refer, in the first instance at least, to the views of Dicey. 
His definition of the term 'Constitutional Law' has demonstrated 
that conventional rules are intimately associated with the 
regulation of powers of government. Dicey observed: 1 
( 
'Constitutional law, as the term is used in England, appears 
to include all rules which directly or indirectly affect the 
distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the 
state. Hence it includes (among other things) all rules 
which define the members of the sovereign power, all the 
rules which regulate the relation of such members to each 
other, or which determine the mode in which the sovereign 
power, or the'members thereof, exercise their authority ... 
Observe the use of the word "rules", not "laws". This 
employment of terms is intentional. Its object is to call 
attention to the fact that the rules which make up 
constitutional law, as the term is used in England, include 
two sets of principles or maxims of a totally distinct 
character. The one set of rules are in the strictest sense 
"laws", since they are rules which (whether written or 
unwritten, whether enacted by statute or derived from the 
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mass of custom, tradition or judge-made maxims known as the 
common law) are enforced by the courts; these rules 
constitute "constitutional law" in the proper sense of that 
term, and may for the sake of distinction be called' 
collectively "the law of the constitution." 
The other set of rules consist of conventions, 
understandings, habits or practices which, though they may 
regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign 
power, of the Ministry, or of other officials, are not in 
reality laws at all since they are not enforced by the 
courts. This portion of constitutional law may, for the 
sake of distinction, be termed the "conventions of the 
constitution", or constitutional morality.' 
The definition of constitutional law which was provided by 
Dicey turned, therefore, upon a distinction between legal and 
non-legal rules. According to Dicey, however, the non-legal 
rules of the constitution - or constitional conventions -
suffered from one apparent difficulty. He said: 2 
'They are multifarious, differing as it might at first sight 
appear, from each other not only in importance but in 
general character and scope.' 
Dicey believed that the one common factor which can be 
attributed to conventions is that all, or most of them are rules 
for determining the mode in which the discretionary powers of the 
Crown - or of Ministers as servants of the Crown - ought to be 
exercised. 3 Dicey went on to explain that the discretionary 
powers of the Crown include every kind of action which can be 
legally taken by the Crown, or by its servants, without the 
necessity for new statutory authority being granted by 
Parliament. 4 As every lawful act of the Crown is derived either 
from statute or prerogative powers, 5 Dicey was asserting 
that the conventions of the constitution are in the main precepts 
for determining the mode and spirit in which the prerogative is 
f 
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to be ex~rcised. 6 
He demonstrated the relationship between conventions and the 
prerogative with examples. Thus, he argued that the convention 
that the Cabinet must retire from office when outvoted on a vital 
question may be formulated to read: the Prerogative of the Crown 
to dismiss its servants at the will of the Queen must be 
exercised in accordance with the wish of the Houses of 
Parliament. 7 Using another of his examples, the convention that 
Parliament must meet at least once a year may be formulated to 
assert: the Crown's legal right or prerogative to call Parliament 
together at the Queen's pleasure must be so exercised that 
8 Parliament meets once a year. 
In view of the fact that prerogative powers cover a wide 
variety of potential government functions, 9 it can be said that 
conventions have a role to play in personal decisions of the 
Sovereign, actions taken by ~he Sovereign with the advice of 
10 Ministers, and actions of the Ministry in the Sovereign's name. 
III THE CONSTITUTION: MODERN PERSPECTIVES 
Although Dicey's description of the content of constitutional 
law was a reflection of his perceptions of nineteenth century 
British society, his ideas continue to influence more recent 
writers who have enjoyed a broader perspective. 
Wheare is one writer whose ideas seemed to echo those of Dicey. 
He explained what is meant by the term 'Constitution' in the 
following manner: 11 
'.The word "constitution" is commonly used in at least two 
senses in any ordinary discussion of political affairs. 
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First of all it is used to describe the whole system of 
government of a country, the collection of rules which 
establish and regulate or govern the government. These 
rules are partly legal, in the sense that courts of law will 
recognize and apply them, and partly non-legal or extra-
legal, taking the form of usages, understandings, customs or 
conventions which courts do not recognize as law but which 
are not less effective in regulating the government than the 
rules of law strictly so called. In most countries of the 
world the system of government is composed of this mixture 
of legal and non-legal rules and it is possible to speak of 
this collection of rules as "the constitution." ' 
Wheare has noted that the term 'constitution' may be used in a 
d h H . d 12 secon, narrower sense, owever. e sai: 
'It is used to describe not the whole collection of rules, 
legal and non-legal, but rather a selection of them which 
has usually been embodied in one document or in a few 
closely related documents. What is more, this selection is 
almost invariably a selection of legal rules only. "The 
Constitution", then, for most countries in the world, is a 
selection of the legal rules which govern the government of 
that country and which have been embodied in a document.' 
The first, wider meaning of the term 'constitution', and the 
second, narrower meaning of the term inter-act and complement 
each other. 13 As Wade and Phillips have observed in language 
which could be applied to the Union constitution of South Africa 
as much as to any other constitution: 14 
'The wider sense of the word constitution includes a 
constitution in the narrower sense. In countires like 
Canada, the US A and the states of Western Europe, the 
written constitution occupies the primary place amongst the 
'assemblage of laws, institutions and customs' which make up 
the constitution in the wider sense. However, undue 
emphasis can be placed on the possession of a written 
constitution. No written document alone can ensure the 
smooth working of a system of government ... ·Around a written 
constitution will evolve a wide variety of customary rules 
and practices which attune the operation of the constitution 
to changing conditions ... ' 
The scope of conventions would therefore seem to be intimately 
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connected with the practical workings of government. Although 
Dicey's ideas have had a considerable amount of influence on 
later writers, this does not mean to say that his description of 
the scope of conventions has not been subjected to criticism. 
Dicey's assertion that conventions are largely concerned with the 
exercise of prerogative powers has been vigorously disputed by 
Jennings. Consequently, attention must now turn to Jennings' 
description of the scope of convention. 
IV. THE SCOPE OF CONVENTIONS: JENNINGS' VIEWS 
Jennings had no dispute with Dicey about the basic role of 
conventions. After all, it was Jennings who observed that 
'constitutional conventions clothe the dry bones of the law, making 
the legal constitution work and keeping it in touch with the 
growth of ideas.' 15 He disagreed, however, with Dicey's 
treatment of the scope of conventions. His criticism was based 
16 on three, related grounds: 
(1) The Royal Prerogative 
Jennings argued that conventions are concerned with far 
more than the exercise of prerogative powers. 17 He believed 
that conventions 'provide for the whole working of the 
complicated governmental machine.' 18 Jennings' criticism of 
Dicey was based on the assertion that the latter had failed 
to comprehend the importance of the Cabinet. 19 He argued 
that the Cabinet is concerned with matters which range far 
beyond the traditional confines of the royal prerogative, 
and that the Cabinet has developed a life and an authority 
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20 of its own. Nowadays, government is largely concerned 
with statutory functions which have been entrusted to 
Ministers, 21 rather than the exercise of common law 
prerogative powers of the Crown. Jennings noted that 
governments now enjoy considerable flexibility as to the 
course of action they wish to pursue. 22 A government which 
lacks sufficient common law or statutory authority to pursue 
a particular course of action may always seek the necessary 
authority from Parliament in the form of legislation. 23 
Jennings' criticism of Dicey in this respect has to carry 
considerable weight. Even Munro, who has a tendency to 
disagree with Jennings on many issues relating to 
conventional rules has accepted that Dicey's analysis of the 
scope of conventions was distorted. 24 The weakness of 
Dicey's approach to the scope of conventions has been summed 
up by Wade in words which demonstrate the strength of 
Jennings' influence: 25 
'Conventions relating to internal government go much 
further than the examples which were chosen by Dicey from 
the exercise of the royal prerogative and the 
relationship between the two Houses of Parliament. They 
nowadays provide for the working of the whole complicated 
governmental machine. A Cabinet in deciding upon policy will 
require to know whether it already has the power in law 
to take the action which it proposes. It is certainly 
not limited to exercising those prerogative powers of the 
Sovereign which are entrusted to it by convention. 
Through its command of a majority in the House of Commons 
it is normally in a position to take legal powers if they 
do not already exist'. 
(2) Constitutional Conventions and the British Commonwealth 
Jennings has highlighted the impact of conventions in an 
area of government which Dicey could not have anticipated. 
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It was observed by Jennings that, conventions have been 
crucial to the development of the British Commonwealth in at 
26 least two respects. Firstly, they contributed to the 
establishment of internal self-government for the older 
Dominions of the British Crown. 27 This has already been 
28 demonstrated in a South African context in chapter III. 
Secondly, conventions laid the foundations upon which inter-
governmental relationships were built throughout the whole 
Commonwealth of Nations. 29 
( 3 ) The Powers and Privileges of Parliament 
Dicey conceded that some of the conventions of the British 
constitution have no reference to the exercise of royal 
prerogative powers. 30 He noted that some conventions are 
rules which determine the way in which one or other or both 
Houses of Parliament are supposed to exercise their 
d . t· . ·1 31 1scre ionary powers or pr1v1 eges. Dicey has been unable 
to escape criticism from Jennings, even in this context 
however. Most of the examples of such conventions which 
Dicey offered have become entirely obsolete. 32 Many others 
which he could have mentioned were.entirely overlooked. 33 
In this context, Jennings observed: 34 
'But there are many more conventions regulating 
Parliamentary procedure than those which Dicey mentioned. 
To a large extent these rules are to be found in "the law 
and custom of Parliament" .•• ' 
He also noted that there are many other conventions 
subsisting in the 'informal' custom of Parliament. 35 These 
are crucial to the survival of the British Parliament as a 
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living institution because most of these conventions relate 
to the operation of the party system. 36 In this context 
Jennings said: 37 
'There is nothing except convention which restrains the 
Government from appointing a committee consisting only of 
members of the Government party. Similarly, it is 
convention only which determines that a speech from the 
Government side shall be followed by a speech from the 
Opposition. Indeed, the whole idea of "Her Majesty's 
Opposition" is a product of convention.' 
(4) Jennings' view of the scope of conventions: a conclusion 
Jennings has undoubtedly shown that there were weaknesses in 
Dicey's analysis of the scope of convention. Blame cannot 
be placed entirely on Dicey's shoulders, however. The 
importance of the nascent Commonwealth conventions, for 
example, could not have been appreciated in the era in which 
Dicey was writing. 38 Munro has come to the defence of 
Dicey's oversights, moreover, in the following terms: 39 
'This distortion is perhaps excusable, for Dicey has 
described what is certainly the most important class of 
conventions, and what was no doubt the most conspicuous, 
as the means whereby effective power had been transferred 
from a sovereign to ministers responsible to Parliament.' 
V. THE SCOPE OF CONVENTIONS: MARSHALL'S VIEW 
Marshall is also critical of Dicey's perception of the scope of 
conventions. Although Marshall has conceded that conventions 
provide the framework of Cabinet government and political 
accountability, he argues that conventions spread more widely 
than Dicey suggests. 4O Besides the conventional rules that 
govern the powers of the Crown, Marshall says that there are many 
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other constitutional relationships between governmental persons 
or institutions which illustrate the existence of conventional 
rules. 41 Among these relationships he notes: 42 
(a) Relations between the Cabinet and the Prime Minister; 
(b) Relations between the Government as a whole and Parliament; 
(c) Relations between the two Houses of Parliament; 
(d) Relations between Ministers and Civil Servants; 
(e) Relations between Ministers and the machinery of justice; 
and 
(f) Relations between the United Kingdom and the member 
countries of the Commonwealth. 
It is doubtful whether the full scope of conventions will ever 
be authoritatively settled. One of the reasons for this state of 
affairs may be attributed to the vagueness of many conventional 
rules. 43 The question of vagueness will be explored further in 
44 Chapter V. 
VI. THE SCOPE OF CONVENTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
One of the difficulties with academic debate about the scope of 
convention is that discussion always seems to take place within 
the context of the British system of government. The full scope 
of conventional rules in South Africa has not been the subject of 
a systematic analysis. A comprehensive examination of all 
possible conventional rules in this country would be of 
invaluable benefit to South Africa's constitutional lawyers. 
Unfortunately such an ambitious project is well beyond the ambit 
of this present work. 
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It can be assumed to a considerable extent, nevertheless, that 
the scope of conventions in South Africa has mirrored the 
equivalent extent of such rules in the United Kingdom. The basis 
of this assumption is the shared constitutional heritage of the 
two countries. Many of the conventions which give expression to 
the Westminster form of government have been as much a part of 
South Africa's constitutional tradition as they remain a part of 
the United Kingdom's constitutional heritage. 45 As VerLoren Van 
Themaat has commented: 46 
'Saam met die parlementere stelsel, wat eers in die 
afsonderlike kolonies in 'n meerdere of mindere mate 
ingevoer is en toe met die Zuid-Afrika Wet 1909 ten opsigte 
van die hele Unie ingevoer is, het 'n aantal gebruike en 
regsreels uit die Engelse staatreg, 4~etsy uitdruklik hetsy stilswyend, deel van ons reg geword (vir sover hulle nie 
alreeds deel van die reg van die kolonies was nie). Hierdie 
reels en gebruike is wel mettertyd gewysig, maar 'n groot 
gedeelte daarvan geld nog in die Republiek.' 
South Africa, of course, has never complied entirely with all 
48 the usual requirements for a Westminster form of government. 
This has thrown the existence of some constitutional conventions 
in this country into doubt. 49 On the whole, however, it may be 
asserted for present purposes, that the scope of conventions in 
South Africa includes all those conventional rules which have 
provided the framework for Cabinet government. It is not being 
asserted that the content of conventional rules are exactly the 
same in both South Africa and the United Kingdom. All that is 
being suggested is that the scope of these rules is roughly 
similar to the extent that they have determined the operation of 
the Westminster system in this country. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CHARACTER OF CONVENTIONS 
I THE OBLIGATORY CHARACTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
(1) 'Rules' and 'habits or practices' 
The definition of constitutional law which has been 
formulated by Dicey is founded upon a distinction between 
legal rules and non-legal rules. 1 According to Dicey's 
theory, legal rules are enforced by the courts. 2 Non-legal 
rules on the other hand are not enforced by the courts. 3 
The differences between legal rules and non-legal rules 
have also been examined by Hart. The basis of his 
distinctions will be explored in this paragraph, using the 
term 1A11 to describe legal rules, and 1A21 to describe non-
legal rules. As far as 1A11 are concerned, one of their 
salient characteristics is that deviation therefrom will be 
met by a hostile reaction. 4 The consequences of breach are 
definite and officially organized, taking the form of punish-
ment from officials. 5 As far as 1A21 are concerned, breach 
or deviation therefrom will also lead to a hostile 
reaction. 6 Deviation from 1A21 is regarded as a lapse or a 
fault open to criticism, and a threatened deviation will be 
met by pressure for conformity. 7 Unlike the reaction to 
breach of 1A11 however, the reaction to breach of !.__!2:._ will 
be less definite or organized in character. 8 What is more, 
the forms of criticism and pressure will vary, depending 
upon what 1A21 rules are involved. 9 
1 2 Hart goes on to contrast these 'A' and 'A' rules from 
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what may be described as 'B'. 10 The latter consists of 
those habits, usages or practices of a group which may be 
described simply in terms of convergent behaviour. 11 'B' 
are not re-enforced by pressure for conformity, and no proof 
or punishment will spring from the non-observance thereof. 12 
Accordingly, the mere existence of convergent behaviour 
between the members of a certain group will not automati-
cally give rise to a sense of obligation. Members are not 
'pushed' into behaving in only one particular way. 
Using Dicey's formulation, it can be said that the non-
legal rules of the constitution are made up of 
constitutional conventions. 13 Accordingly, it is possible 
to distinguish constitutional conventions on the one hand, 
from those habits, usages or practices which amount to 
convergent behaviour on the other. It can be asserted that 
constitutional conventions are 'rules', and as such they are 
prescriptive or obligatory in character. 14 Habits, usages 
and practices are not 'rules' however, and hence they cannot 
b d "b d. . ·1 15 e escri e in any simi ar way. 
(2) Conventions: the extent of obedience 
It should not be assumed too readily that conventions are 
obligatory, because this may lead to certain difficulties. 
Many writers accept that conventions are binding in 
16 character, but only one of them would argue that this is a 
fundamental prerequisite. 17 The confusion is exemplified by 
Dicey. At one and the same time he has asserted that 
conventions are obligatory, while adding a proviso that the 
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invariableness of obedience is itself more or less 
fictitious. 18 The fiction of obedience continues to be 
maintained nevertheless, because as Dicey has remarked: 19 
'The uncertain character of the deference paid to the 
conventions of the constitution is concealed under the 
current phraseology, which treats the successful 
violation of a constitutional rule as proof that the 
maxim was not in reality part of the constitution.' 
(a) The key conventions 
There can be no doubt however that certain key conven-
tions are rigorously obeyed. 20 Dicey has noticed for 
example that the British Parliament is summoned year by 
year, as though its annual meeting were provided for in some 
law of nature. 21 Conventions such as these help to secure 
the fundamental principle of the British constitution22 -
the substance of which Dicey has explained as follows: 23 
'Some few of the conventions of the constitution are 
rigorously obeyed .•• and •.. though particular under-
standings are of uncertain obligation, neither the 
Crown nor any servant of the Crown ever refuses 
obedience to the grand principle which •.• underlies 
all the conventional precepts of the constitution, 
namely, that government must be carried on in accord-
ance with the will of the House of Commons, and 
ultimately with the will of the nation as expressed 
through that House.' 
Dicey has argued that any attempt to violate the key 
conventions would inevitably lead to a breach of the law. 24 
Hence - to use one of his favourite examples again - the 
convention which requires annual meetings of Parliament 
could not be broken without encountering major legal 
obstacles. 25 The levying of taxes and the appropriation of 
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government revenues both require parliamentary authorisation 
on a strictly annual basis. 26 Similar parliamentary 
authorisation is also regularly required in order to sustain 
the statutory validity of the British armed forces. 27 
Accordingly, Parliament's failure to meet within the times 
prescribed by convention would soon represent a threat to 
28 orderly and peaceful government. The levying of taxes 
would ultimately become illegal, as would continued 
government spending of any of its revenues. 29 The 
maintenance of the armed forces would also be brought into 
question, especially if Parliament failed to meet for more 
than five years. 3° Consequently, a government which seeks 
to avoid illegal or revolutionary action cannot choose to 
ignore important conventional rules. 31 It is being argued, 
in other words, that a variety of important constitutional 
conventions will always be obeyed. 
A more detailed examination of this subject will be made 
in a South African context in the course of Chapter VIr. 32 
(b) The vague conventions 
Dicey has conceded that a class of more vague conventions 
are also in existence, and that these receive only a varying 
amount of obedience. Of these vague conventions he has 
said: 33 
'Other constitutional maxims stand in a very different 
position. Their maintenance up to a certain point 
tends to secure the supremacy of Parliament, but they 
are themselves vague, and no one can say to what extent 
the will of Parliament or the nation requires their 
rigid observance; they therefore obtain only a varying 
and indefinite amount of obedience.' 
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The vagueness of certain conventions may be attributed to 
the fact that many of them are framed as general rules whose 
precise limits have not been fully explored. 34 Vagueness 
may also arise for other reasons however, such as whenever 
two conventional rules come into potential conflict with 
each other. 35 Consistent obedience to vague conventions is 
therefore not without an element of difficulty. Dicey has 
highlighted the extent of this problem with particular 
reference to one conventional rule. 36 He has referred to 
the rule which requires a Ministry to resign if it loses the 
confidence of the House of Commons. 37 This rule, he has 
said, should always be obeyed, although it may be difficult 
to establish when parliamentary confidence has been 
indisputably withdrawn. 38 
This sort of problem is not confined to rules which are 
only found in conventional form. Legal rules may also 
suffer from the penumbra of ambiguity. 39 'Converting' a 
convention into a legal rule will not automatically solve 
any difficulties associated with vagueness. As De Smith has 
said, the texture of the 'converted' rule may still be too. 
open, and its content too indeterminate for legal adjudi-
cation to be appropriate. 40 Accordingly, the rules which 
govern the resignation of an unpopular Ministry are not 
bound to be more precise when they are placed in legal form. 
Confirmation of this latter assertion may be found in a 
major Nigerian constitutional dispute, which culminated in 
the well-known Privy Council decision of 
Adegbenro v Akiritola. 41 Details of the Adegbenro case are 
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recorded elsewhere, 42 and all that needs to be said for 
present purposes will be found in the following two remarks. 
Firstly, it can be asserted that the statutory rule which 
regulated the State Governor's dismissal of Chief Akintola 
was sufficiently vague to invite conflicting judicial 
interpretation. 43 Secondly, it can be argued that the 
vagueness of the relevant statutory rule was in part the 
product of the type of 'political' behaviour which it was 
attempting to control. A Head of State's dismissal of an 
unpopular Premier is without doubt a highly sensitive 
political matter. It involves considerations of policy and 
propriety, both of which will have to be weighed, as and 
when the occasion arises. 44 A rigid legal rule may 
encourage inflexibility, inducing a loss of some of the 
political sensitivity which should otherwise be displayed. 45 
The vagueness of certain conventional rules has therefore 
got nothing to do with their non-legal character. It may be 
attributed instead to the fact that they are political 
rules, 46 whose systematic codification would be rather 
difficult to achieve. 47 In these circumstances, it is 
hardly surprising that obedience to vague conventions is not 
easy to ensure. 
(3v Conventions and the process of change 
The obligatory character of constitutional conventions may 
be hard to reconcile with their capacity for change. 48 
There are only four methods of change which writers like De 
Smith recognise however, 49 and each is compatible with the 
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notion of obligatory rules. Hence: 
(a) Express agreement: the first method of change is 
i:;0 
through express agreement.J As far as change of this 
sort is concerned Marshall has observed: 51 
'One form of conventional change is then the deliberate 
abrogation of an old convention or the creation of a 
new one by agreement, if the old rule is felt to be 
outdated or inconvenient. In this sense, of course, 
conventions are not rules that have to be followed 
unconditionally and permanently. It will always be 
possible for governments or politicians to propose a 
change of convention. They must be followed only in 
the sense that they cannot be changed unilaterally and 
must be com~~ied with if in force until changed by 
agreement.' 
Marshall has failed to mention however, that there is a 
difficulty with this method of change. At ti_mes, it 
may be hard to determine whose agreement is first 
required before a conventional rule can be successfully 
altered. 53 
(b) Change induced by fresh political circumstances: the 
second method of change may occur because of the 
development of new circumstances. 54 In this context 
Marshall has observed: 55 
'In thi56process agreed precedents are the stepping-stones, and arguments about what the conventions are 
will in principle always be about the existence and 
implications of existing rules. Like rules of lingui-
stic usage, it will be the case that the rules 
ultimately reflect what people do. In that sense 
conventions will become in the end whatever politicians 
think it right to do. But at any one time what 
politicians in fact do may conflict with and infringe a 
rule based on existing precedents or agreements.' 
One of the most striking examples of change induced by 
fresh political circumstances occurred in 1965. Prior 
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to Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence fro~ Britain in November 1965, the British 
Parliament had already ceased to enact legislation 
which would have force and effect in the self-governing 
colony. 57 British legislative restraint was the 
product of a convention, and it was created by an 
agreement which had been made in 1961. 58 After the 
unilateral declaration of independence however, the 
British Parliament immediately reasserted plenary 
legislative authority over the rebel colony. 59 De 
Smith has argued that this could not reasonably be 
construed as a breach of convention. 60 He argued that 
the survival of the old convention presupposed the 
continuance of a constitutional relationship which 
Southern Rhodesia had repudiated. 61 A similar opinion 
has been expressed by the Privy Council in the case of 
Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke. 62 
(c) Change induced by the breach of conventional rules: 
this represents the third method by which conventions 
can be altered. 63 General acquiescence to breach, 
however, is a vital prerequisite before change will 
occur. 64 Events in the United Kingdom during November 
1918 represent a clear example of change of this 
sort. 65 The Prime Minister of the time advised a 
dissolution of Parliament without placing the decision 
before the Cabinet. 66 Lloyd George's Cabinet 
colleagues not merely acquiesced in this step, but 
erroneously justified it by reference to precedent. 67 
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The history of past dissolutions has suggested however 
that Lloyd George's behaviour was a departure from the 
norm. Former practice had been for the Cabinet as a 
whole to determine when to advise a dissolution of the 
legislature. 68 The breach of 1918 led to a change of 
convention as Lloyd George's behaviour has been copied 
by almost all subsequent Prime Ministers of the United 
Kingdom. 69 Accordingly, the decision to advise a 
dissolution of the British Parliament is currently 
taken by the Prime Minister alone. 70 
It has been noted that general acquiescence to breach 
is crucial to the alteration of convention by this 
third method. Breach normally leads to the imposition 
of a sanction on the rule-breaker, 71 but this will not 
occur if the violation is generally accepted. 72 The 
attitude adopted by the Cabinet to the proposed breach 
of convention has an important bearing on the eventual 
outcome of the violation. 73 Similarly, the attitude of 
Parliament is important, as Dicey himself was quick to 
recognise. 74 The significance of parliamentary 
acquiescence wjll be more readily appreciated in 
Chapters VI and VII, when the sanctions which are 
imposed for breach of convention are examined in consi-
derable detail. 
(d) The alteration of 'experimental' conventions: this 
represents the fourth and final method of change which 
De Smith has recognised. As far as this final category 
- ...... 
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is concerned he has said: 75 
'··· decisions by the Prime Minister or the Cabinet 
about the manner in which the Cabinet is to operate may 
be superceded by new decisions. But perhaps conven-
tions of this sort ought to be put into a special 
category in that (like some of the sessional orders of 
the House of Commons) they are understood to be 
experimental, though undoubtedly binding until they are 
altered or discarded in the accepted manner.' 
De Smith compares this type of convention with judicial 
precedents, because the latter are also binding until 
they are authoritatively reversed, over-ruled or 
disapproved. 76 The comparison is further emphasised 
when he says of judicial precedents: 77 
'We do not regard them as non-binding merely because 
their authority may be ephemeral, unless i 78is clear that they are based on a wrong principle.' 
(4) The obligatory character of conventions: some 
conclusions 
De Smith concludes that whether a convention retains its 
binding force, and if so, how much, is often demonstrable 
only by the empirical test of 'break it and see. 179 He goes 
80 on to say: 
'The outcome of such an experiment may still be 
equivocal; breach may be represented, or !qterpreted 
after the event, as a mere ad hoc waiver; allegations 
of unconstitutional behaviour are frequently made in 
the cut and thrust of day-to-day politics and are as 
often shrugged off, sometimes on the spurious ground 
that no binding convention on the matter had ever 
existed ... ' 
As any attempt to list the conventions of the constitution 
would be unlikely to command universal assent, it is hardly 
surprising that the binding character of conventional rules 
is blurred and indistinct. 82 In these circumstances, it is 
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only to be expected that conventional rules will defy neat 
categorisation. 
(5) Right or entitlement-confering conventions 
Marshall has offered a new perspective on the binding 
character of conventional rules. He suggests that: 83 
'The emphasis on obligatory behaviour .•. may obscure 
the point that the conventions, as a body of constitu-
tional morality, deal not just with obligations but 
also with rights, powers and duties. Some familiar and 
important conventions do not in fact impose obligations 
but confer rights or entitlements.' 
Two main objections can be raised to Marshall's 
observations. Firstly, until now, it has been assumed that 
constitutional conventions are 'rules', and that as such 
they are obeyed because of the sanctions which can be 
imposed if they are not. 84 Marshall's observations would 
seem to indicate however, that right or entitlement-
confering conventions are not 'rules'. There is no 
suggestion for example that such conventions 'ought' to be 
obeyed, 85 and there is no indication that sanctions can be 
imposed whenever breach has occurred. 86 Accordingly, it is 
hard to understand where Marshall's right-confering conven-. 
tions fit into the usual pattern of non-legal constitutional 
, rules. 87 At face value, Marshall's observations seem to 
describe usages and practices which amount to something more 
than convergent behaviour. 88 This does not mean that they 
should be referred to however, in terms of constitutional 
'rules'. Secondly, the examples of right-confering conven-
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tions which Marshall has given are inappropriate. He cites 
two of the rules of collective responsibility in support of 
his contentions, but neither of his choices is entirely 
satisfactory. The first rule which he refers to is the one 
which requires a Minister to refrain from publicly criti-
cising of dissociating himself from government policy. 89 
The second rule is one which requires the process by which 
government decisions have been reached to be kept secret. 90 
It is hard to understand how these rules can be interpreted 
in terms of a 'right' instead of in terms of an 
'obligation'. These rules are not observed out of mere 
choice, but because they ought to be obeyed. The alterna-
tive to obedience is not an attractive proposition. Both 
rules by tradition are carefully observed, because Prime 
Ministers and Cabinets feel too exposed to criticism if they 
allow members to indulge in public disagreement with each 
other. 91 Although a government can continue in power for as 
long as it enjoys the support of the legislature, 92 it 
remains important for electorally damaging splits and 
resignations to be avoided. 93 Every Cabinet Minister 
appreciates that his hold on office is based upon membership 
of a united party which enjoys majority electoral support. 94 
Collective responsibility helps to re-inforce the necessary 
party unity. 95 It thus helps to safeguard each Minister's 
hold on the reins of power. Ultimately therefore, it can be 
argued that solidarity and secrecy 'ought' to be obeyed, 
because adverse consequences may well result if they are 
not. Accordingly, the rules of collective responsibility 
-· -- -- --------
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that moral standards are taught or communicated as a 
matter of course to all in society; 100 
(c) There is general recognition that if moral standards 
were not generally accepted, far-reaching and distaste-
ful changes in the life of individuals would occur. 101 
While there can be no doubt that many constitutional 
conventions are considered to be important, 102 others 
can be disregarded without any grave consequences for 
society. 103 Importance therefore, would not seem to be 
an essential attribute of rules which are described as 
conventional in character. Marshall has remarked that 
many constitutional conventions are wholly morally 
104 neutral. Furthermore, he has gone on to suggest 
that governments may decide to ignore particular 
conventional rules, if an over-riding moral 
justification can be perceived for such a course of 
t . 105 ac ion. 
(2) Immunity from deliberate change 
Hart has argued that standards of conduct cannot be 
endowed with, or deprived of, moral status by human fiat. 106 
Hence, moral rules cannot arise or change through simple 
agreement. An earlier part of this chapter has already 
shown however, that the same cannot be said in respect of 
conventional rules. 107 Marshall has commented that unlike 
moral rules, the content of all conventional rules is 
determined to some extent by the special agreement of the 
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parties affected thereby. 108 In many instances therefore, 
the revision, change or abolition of conventional rules may 
be traced back to an alteration, or a termination of the 
agreement concerned. 109 It has already been noted that 
conventions do not have to be followed unconditionally and 
permanently. 110 Governments and politicians are always able 
to propose changes to convention. 111 
(3) The voluntary character of moral offences 
Hart has asserted that a person will be excused from moral 
responsibility for breach of moral rules or principles as 
long as he can show that breach was unintentional, and that 
it occurred despite every possible precaution that he was 
able to take. 112 The same cannot be assumed, however, in 
respect of a breach of conventional rules. It is difficult 
to imagine the circumstances in which a government would be 
able to claim that a breach of convention was both uninten-
tional and unavoidable. Furthermore, even if such 
circumstances did in fact exist, the issue of responsibi-
lity would be determined by Parliament. 113 There is no 
reason to suppose that Parliament would acquiesce in the 
breach, as the attitude of the legislature would be 
influenced by a considerable number of different political 
factors. 114 Much would also depend on the importance of the 
constitutional convention who's breach has been involved. 115 
The response to a breach of a conventional rule therefore, 
could be quite different from the response to a breach of a 
moral rule. 
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(4) The form of moral pressure 
Hart has noted that the moral pressure which is used to 
support moral rules is distinctive. 116 The typical form of 
such pressure consists of appeals to those who share the 
117 rules. The appeal seeks to re-inforce respect for the 
1 th . . t t. th 1 118 A d' 1 rues as 1ngs 1mpor an in emse ves. ccor 1ng y, 
moral pressure is usually exerted by reminders of the moral 
character of the action contemplated and of the demands of 
morality. 119 Hart has also observed that pressure is rarely 
exerted in the form of threats or appeals to interest or 
120 fear. He has commented that emphatic reminders of what 
moral rules demand, appeals to conscience, and reliance on 
the operation of guilt and remorse, are the characteristic 
and most prominent forms of pressure used for the support of 
. 1 1·t 121 socia mora 1 y. 
The forms of pressure or sanction which are used to 
support the conventions of the constitution will be examined 
in considerable detail in chapters VI and VII. At this 
stage it would be appropriate to note however, that the sort 
of moral pressure which has been described by Hart is not 
crucially important for the observance of conventions. 
Dicey argued that nothing less than the force of law stood 
behind obedience to constitutional conventions. 
122 
Other 
writers have suggested alternative reasons for obedience, 
such as fear of political difficulties and the protection of 
plain self-interest. 123 Moral 'feelings' may indeed have a 
124 small role to play, but their effectiveness can always be 
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re-inforced with pressures of a more practical nature. 
III THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONVENTIONS 
(1) Precedents and Agreements 
Constitutional conventions may arise in at least two 
different ways. 125 They may arise through: 
(a) Precedents or usages which have given rise to a binding 
rule of behaviour; 126 or 
(b) Agreements among the people concerned to work in a 
particular way and to adopt a particular rule of 
conduct. 127 
It is not difficult to ascertain the establishment of 
conventions which are the product of specific agreements. 128 
The establishment of the Commonwealth conv~ntions for 
example, can be traced back to the resolutions of various 
Colonial and Imperial Conferences. 129 Greater uncertainty 
abounds however, over the establishment of conventions which 
arise from precedent. 130 As Hood Phillips has said: 131 
'It is not easy to say precisely how or when conven-
tions based on usage come into existence. Every act by 
the Queen or a responsible statesman is a "precedent" 
in the sense of an example which may or may not be 
followed in subsequent similar cases, but it does not 
necessarily create a binding rule.' 
Two alternative approaches may be adopted to deal with 
this particular difficulty. The first of these may be 
called the 'descriptive' approach, and the second one as the 
'prescriptive' approach to constitutional conventions. 
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(2) Precedent: a descriptive approach 
Hood Phillips believes that the general acceptance of a 
practice or precedent as obligatory is all that is required 
before a convention can be said to come into being. 132 Such 
a view means that the existence of a convention is largely 
determined by the beliefs of the people involved with the 
actual workings of the rule. 133 Hood Phillips' opinion can 
be regarded as a descriptive approach as far as the estab-
lishment of conventions are concerned. 134 This is because 
the creation of a binding rule becomes a question of 
historical and sociological fact. 135 Marshall would 
categorise conventions which are described in this way as 
the 'positive morality' of the constitution. 136 
This particular approach to the establishment of conven-
tions has been criticised by several leading constitutional 
writers. 137 Its probable demise has been hastened by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, which has decided to favour the 
alternative 'prescriptive' test in relation to the estab-
lishment of conventions. 138 
(3) Precedent: the prescriptive approach 
Jennings has criticised the descriptive approach, because 
he has argued that the beliefs of participants in the 
political process may be wholly erroneous. 139 Consequently, 
he has developed his own, simple guide to help determine 
h th t . . t t 140 Th" ·ct . 1 we er a conven ion exis s or no. is gui e invo ves 
three principal considerations: 
(a) What are the precedents? 
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(b) Did the actors in the precedents believe that they were 
bound by a rule? 
(c) Is there a reason for the rule? 
The personal beliefs of the participants in the political 
process are clearly one of the factors which Jennings is 
willing to take into account. Such beliefs are not conclu-
sive proof however, either one way or the other. As far as 
Jennings is concerned, a convention will be recognised only 
'f th · d f th · t of the rule. 141 1 ere is a goo reason or e exis ence 
Furthermore, he has argued that this 'good reason' must 
accord with the prevailing political philosophy of 
society. 142 Accordingly, not only does a convention have to 
be obligatory in character, it has to complement the general 
framework of the particular constitution with which it is 
associated. 143 Under Westminster-style government, Jennings 
has argued that convention would have to help the democratic 
144 system operate more smoothly. He has concluded by 
. 145 saying: 
'A single precedent with a good reason may be enough to 
establish the rule. A whole string of precedents 
without such a reason will be of no avail, unless it is 
perfectly certain that the persons concerned regarded 
them as bound by it. And 1~§en ... the convention may be broken with impunity.' 
Jennings and his supporters may be said to adopt a 
'prescriptive' approach to the creation of conventions. 147 
They regard conventions as prescriptive statements of what 
'should' happen, based in part upon observation and in part 
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upon constitutional principle. 148 Consequently, conventions 
may be described as the rules which political actors ought 
to feel obliged by - if they have considered the precedents 
and reasons correctly. 149 Marshall refers to conventions 
which are viewed in this manner as the 'Critical Morality' 
of the constitution. 150 Of the two alternative approaches 
to the creation of convention from precedent, the latter 
appears to be the most satisfactory. 151 As Marshall 
says: 152 
'It allows critics and commentators to say that 
although a rule may appear to be widely or even univer-
sally accepted as a convention, the conclusions 
generally drawn from earlier precedents, or the reasons 
advanced in justification, are mistaken. This, on some 
occasions, is what political or academic critics do 
wish to say. But if the existence of a convention were 
only a question requiring empirical investigations of 
politicians beliefs, it would be impossible to say that 
they wrongly believed a convention to exist.' 
The one problem with the 'prescriptive' approach is that 
it fails to take account of the vague conventions. It may 
be difficult to describe how a political actor 'ought' to 
behave, if the content of a particular rule is open to 
varying interpretations. This will become more apparent in 
Chapter VII, especially in relation to the convention of 
M .. t . 1 · "b"l"t 153 inis eria responsi ii y. 
CHAPTER VI 
LEGAL RULES AND CONVENTIONAL RULES THE DISTINCTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the previous chapter has helped to demonstrate 
that conventional rules can be distinguished from other types of 
non-legal rule. The most controversial aspect of any study of 
conventions, however, centres upon the exact nature of the 
relationship between the non~legal rules of the constitution and 
ordinary rules of law. Key aspects of this particular 
controversy are associated with the views of two well-known 
constitutional writers. Dicey has been attributed with one 
particular perspective on the relationship between law and 
convention, while Jennings may be said to have an utterly 
opposing point of view. The disagreement between these two 
writers is one of the main themes of both this chapter and the 
one which immediately follows. In the present chapter, the 
opposing views of both writers will be examined in a 
constitutional context which is overwhelmingly British. An 
attempt will be made to reassess their opinions, however, in view 
of two innovative analyses which have stemmed from both Munro and 
1 the Supreme Court of Canada. The exact nature of the 
relationship between law and convention will be placed in a South 
African context in Chapter VII. 
II THE VIEWS OF DICEY 
In his definition of 'Constitutional Law', Dicey has asserted 
that 'law' and 'convention' are separate and distinct. 2 He has 
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pointed out that this distinction is based on the method of 
enforcement of the two different types of rule. 3. On the one 
hand, Dicey has argued that a rule of law can be enforced by the 
courts. 4 On the other he has emphatically rejected the notion 
that a rule of convention is enforceable in the courts. 5 At 
first sight this may seem a little puzzling, because Dicey has 
insisted that conventions are obligatory. It is hard to 
understand how conventions can be obligatory, if respect for 
these rules cannot be safeguarded through enforcement in the 
courts. A considerable portion of Dicey's writing was devoted to 
the unravelling of this apparent paradox, and it is therefore 
necessary to examine his ideas in a certain amount of detail. 
(1) The sanctions behind enforcement of the conventions 
Although Dicey has conceded that not all of the 
conventions are obeyed all of the time, 6 he has insisted 
that neither the Crown nor any servant of the Crown ever 
refuses obedience to the underlying, fundamental principle of 
the constitution. 7 Government, in other words, has to be 
carried on in accordance with the will of the House of 
Commons, and ultimately with the will of 'the nation' as 
expressed through that House. 8 Dicey has proceeded to 
investigate the methods by which obedience to conventions is 
normally ensured. He has rejected the following two methods, 
however, as wholly inadequate. 9 
(a) Impeachment 
According to the first of these two rejected approaches, 
conventions should not be regarded as 'understandings' at 
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all, but as 'laws' in the truest sense of the term. 10 The 
one peculiarity of these 'laws', however, is that they are 
enforced through the High Court of Parliament. 11 Obedience 
is not secured through the ordinary courts of the land. 
The enforcement of these 'laws' through the High Court of 
12 Parliament is a process known as 'Impeachment'. Although 
this process may have influenced the conduct of statesmen in 
the distant past, Dicey has dismissed the notion that it has 
had any appreciable influence over the behaviour of modern 
statesmen. 13 He remarked that: 14 
'The process, which is supposed to ensure the retirement 
from office of a modern Prime Minister, when placed in a 
hopeless minority, is, and has long been, obsolete. The 
arm by which attacks on freedom were once repelled has 
grown rusty by disuse; it is laid aside among the 
antiquities of the constitution, nor will it ever, we may , 
anticipate, be drawn again from its scabbard'. 
Dicey has also argued that Impeachment is a questionable 
method of trying to restrain a daring politician, because the 
whole process is dependant upon the success of proceedings 
h . h h t b d t d. P 1· t 15 AM .. t h w ic ave o econ uc e in ar iamen. 1n1s er w o 
was dreading Impeachment could always circumvent the process, 
if the Crown could be advised not to summon Parliament. 16 Of 
course, such circumvention would provide only temporary 
relief for a politically embattled Minister, because 
Parliament would have to be summoned sooner or later. 17 
There would seem to be considerable force in Dicey's 
observations however. Impeachment is a process which is now 
unknown in modern Britain. It has not been used for over a 
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century and a half. 18 In South Africa, the powers and 
privileges of Parliament are regulated by statute. 19 The 
Impeachment procedure is not governed by such legislation 
however, and it is doubtful whether such a process may be 
utilised in this country. 20 It is interesting to note that 
VerLoren Van Themaat treats the constitutional'provisions 
for the removal of the State President as roughly equivalent, 
21 or related to Impeachment. It is hard to envisage any 
circumstances, however, in which a South African State 
President would be subjected to such removal procedure. 
Resignation would be preferable to the prospect of a total 
public humiliation. 
(b) Public Opinion 
The second, supposed method of securing obedience to 
conventions is the force of public opinion. Dicey would not 
seem to hold much faith with the force of public opinion 
either. 22 He conceded that 'the Nation' would expect 
Parliament to be convened annually. 23 It would also expect a 
Minister to resign if he lost the confidence of the House of 
24 Commons. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
public opinion is a sanction capable of compelling obedience 
to the conventions of the constitution. 25 Dicey has argued 
that public opinion is of little effect in guaranteeing 
obedience to the 'law of the land'; crimes are always being 
committed, notwithstanding the law-abiding sentiments of the 
majority of people. 26 He has argued that in the last resort, 
law is obeyed because of the physical power at the disposal 
of the state to ensure that such obedience is obtained. 27 
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Having adopted a strongly 'Positivist' view of the law, 28 
Dicey went on to draw a parallel between law and convention. 
He asserted that: 29 
'To contend that the understandings of the constitution 
derive their coercive power solely from the approval of 
the public, is very like maintaining the kindred doctrine 
that the conventions of international law are kept alive 
solely by moral force'. 
(c) The force of law 
Dicey went on to say that if an element of force is needed 
to achieve conformity to the rules of international law, then 
something in addition to public approval must give force to 
the conventions of the constitution. 30 This extra force, he 
believed, was nothing less than the force of law. 31 Dicey 
has conceded that the dread of Impeachment and the force of 
public opinion have contributed to the development of modern 
British political ethics. 32 More than anything else, 
however, he believed that: 33 
the sanction which constrains the boldest political 
adventurer to obey fundamental principles of the 
constitution and the conventions in which these 
principles are expressed, is the fact that breach of 
these principles and of these conventions will almost 
immediately bring the offender into conflict with the 
courts and the law of the land.' 
Dicey then proceeded to use concrete examples, which helped 
to demonstrate that the fundamental maxims of the British 
constitution are safeguarded by force of law. 34 It was noted 
in Chapter V that if Parliament did not meet for more than one 
year, it would be difficult for the Crown to lawfully maintain 
the Army. 35 It would also be impossible to levy taxes or 
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spend public revenues. 36 Consequently, although the rule that 
Parliament must convene once a year is a conventional rule 
which cannot be enforced by the courts, it cannot be violated 
without involving hundreds of persons in distinct acts of 
illegality which are cognizable by the courts. 37 Accordingly, 
Dicey was able to show that the convention which prescribes 
annual meetings of Parliament is in reality based upon, and 
secured by the law of the land. 38 In much the same way he was 
able to demonstrate that a Ministry must resign or submit itself 
to re-election, whenever it is censured by the House of 
Commons. 39 Violation of this convention will almost 
inevitably lead to a breach of the law, because a determined 
House of Commons has the means at hand to impose its will on a 
recalcitrant government. 40 As Parliament enjoys ultimate legal 
control over 'the Purse and the Sword', the government can be 
forced to choose between upholding the constitution or 
· 41 
breaking the law. 
Dicey was well aware of the fact that there were flaws in his 
contentions. 42 A government may always seek to gain its ends 
through the execution of a 'Coup d' Etat'. Nothing would seem 
to be able to restrain a government which is determined to 
overthrow the law. This fact was a political reality which 
Dicey was quick to recognise. 43 He acknowledged that 
government-led revolution will lead to a violation of the 
law. 44 No constitution is ever safe, he conceded, and no law 
is beyond defiance. 45 He insisted, nevertheless, that a 
desire to obey the law will hinder the ability to defy 
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convention. 46 He reiterated that conventions derive their 
power from the fact that they cannot be broken without a 
breach of the law. 47 Hence, a government must accede to the 
demands of convention if it desires to remain within the 
letter of the law. 
It is interesting to note that the British Parliament has 
never cut off the supply of money to the Crown, nor has it 
refused to pass the Army (Annual) Act and its modern 
48 successors. It could be argued, therefore, that the 
legislature's power in this regard has grown 'rusty with 
disuse'. It may well have joined the process of Impeachment 
among the antiquities of the constitution. There is 
considerable force in this suggestion, and it may be assumed 
to underlie the radically different contentions which are 
proferred by Jennings. It should not be forgotten, however, 
that Dicey had anticipated observations of this sort. He 
asserted that: 49 
the power of Parliament to compel obedience to its 
wishes .•. is so complete that the mere existence of the 
power has made its use unnecessary ••• To this we must add, 
that in the rare instances in which a Minister had 
defied the House, the refusal to pass the Mutiny Act has 
been threatened or contemplated.' 
There is one final objection to Dicey's contentions. Many 
conventions are somewhat vague, and it may be hard to 
establish whether they have been violated or not. 50 In these 
circumstances, it cannot be stated with any certainty that a 
breach of convention will automatically lead to a concomitant 
breach of the law. Other conventions, moreover, may be 
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broken with impunity, because Parliament may choose to 
disregard the violation of such rules. 51 
Awareness of the fact that sanctions are not always clearly 
imposed does not in any way undermine the strength of Dicey's 
arguments. He has emphasised that the purpose of conventions 
is to underpin the fundamental principle of the Constitution. 
This means that conventions are designed to ensure the 
obedience of all persons to the deliberately expressed will 
of the House of Commons, and ultimately to the will of 'the 
nation' as expressed through that House. 52 The imposition of 
a legal sanction for the breach or disregard of convention is 
a matter entirely for Parliament to determine. Only 
Parliament can decide to cut off the supply of money to the 
government, and only Parliament can decide to let the Army 
and Air.Force Acts lapse. The choice whether or not to 
impose legal sanctions is thus exclusively in the hands of 
the legislature, and this can only be regarded as consistent 
with basic constitutional principle. Accordingly, there is 
no convincing reason why Parliament should not be able to 
waive the application of a particular conventional rule in 
unusual circumstances. Similarly, there is no convincing 
reason why it should not be entitled to waive the imposition 
of sanctions, whenever it is uncertain about the full content 
of a vague conventional rule. 
There are several more grounds on which it is possible to 
criticise Dicey's opinions. Many of these are explored by 
Jennings - a writer who has long been regarded as one of 
Dicey's most strident adversaries. 53 Accordingly, much of 
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the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to Jennings' 
analysis of the sanctions behind conventions of the 
constitution. In this way it is hoped that a fuller 
understanding may be attained of the relationship between law 
and convention. 
III THE VIEWS OF JENNINGS 
Jennings has adopted the attitude that law and convention are 
inextricably linked. 54 He has conceded that a formal distinction 
of the kind recognised by Dicey does exist, 55 but he argued that 
this distinction is of no great substance in practice. 56 
Jennings has implied that the legal force behind the conventions 
of the constitution has grown 'rusty with disuse. 157 He 
concluded that law and convention are obeyed for the same reasons 
- the reasons in both cases being 'consent' or 'acquiescence' 
rather than a fear of courts of law. 58 Jennings' main line of 
attack, therefore, has been to undermine Dicey's analysis of the 
sanctions which safeguard obedience to convention. His attack 
may be considered under four headings. 
(1) Time-lapse 
Jennings' first line of attack was to note that if the 
government breached a constitutional convention, there could 
be a considerable time-lapse before any subsequent 
illegalities would ensue. 59 A time-lag would develop until 
the current Appropriation Act had expired, or until the 
legislation which governs the armed forces had run its course 
and thereafter lapsed. 60 This line of attack would appear to 
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be without substance. It sheds no further light on the true 
nature of the relationship between law and convention. 
Although Dicey did not scrutinize the implications of a time-
lapse between the breach of convention and any ensuing 
illegality, his writings have implied that such delay is not 
of any significance. 61 To the extent that breach of 
convention may lead directly to a breach of the law, there is 
nothing in Jennings' observations about time to invalidate 
the force of Dicey's analysis. 
(2) Loans 
Secondly, Jennings was not happy with Dicey's contentions in 
relation to the government's authority to raise and expend 
public revenues. 62 Jennings has argued that permanent 
legislation entitles the Crown to raise revenues by way of 
loan. 63 He has noted that when the House of Lords rejected 
Lloyd George's budget in 1909, the government was able to 
avert financial disaster through the utilisation of loans. 64 
The capacity of the United Kingdom government to finance 
itself with loans clearly weakens the ability of Parliament 
to disrupt the government's financial objectives. Beyond this, 
however, there seems to be little of substance in Jennings' 
observations. Although the Executive can circumvent 
Parliament's refusal to authorise the imposition of taxes, 
this does not mean that revenues obtained by government 
borrowing can be spent without reference to the legislature. 
As Jennings himself conceded, no money can be spent by the 
government unless it is authorised by Parliament. 65 
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Consequently, the possible use of loan-raising powers by the 
Executive would not materially prejudice the ability of 
Parliament to control the financial programme of the 
government. It can be contended, therefore, that the 
substance of Dicey's analysis remains intact. 
(3) Conventions unsupported by law 
Jennings' most effective criticism is his assertion that 
Dicey's ideas only apply to those few, rather important 
conventions which determine the relationship between the 
Cabinet and the House of Commons. 66 He demonstrated this 
contention by reference to those conventions which he 
believed could be violated without any consequential breaches 
of the law. 67 He noted that if lay Peers attended the 
judicial proceedings of the House of Lords, it would be hard 
to imagine that a breach of the law would necessarily 
follow. 68 Using another of his persuasive examples, he 
argued that the withdrawal of the recognition accorded to 
'Her Majesty's Opposition' would not, similarly, lead to a 
violation of the law. 69 Jennings has discovered a defect in 
Dicey's analysis which must carry considerable weight. At 
the same time it must be remembered, however, that Dicey 
recognised the existence of conventions which could be broken 
., 
without concomitant breaches of the law. Dicey has explained 
this anomaly in terms of the vagueness of certain 
conventions. 70 His comments about Parliament acquiescing in 
a breach of convention would also be relevant in this 
context. 71 
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As a by-product of his attack on Dicey's ideas, Jennings has 
helped to make the reasons for obedience to conventions 
somewhat clearer. Cutting off the supply of money to the 
government, or allowing armed forces legislation to lapse, 
could only seriously be threatened by Parliament in 
exceptional circumstances. 72 Other factors must obviously 
come into play, and it was Jennings' belief that the political 
attitude of the House of Commons was crucial in this 
regard. 73 
(4) The political sanctions behind obedience to convention 
Jennings believed that political factors were important 
with regard to continued respect for conventions. He argued 
that the real question which is presented to a government is 
not whether a rule is 'law' or 'convention', but what the 
House of Commons would think about it if a certain action was 
proposed. 74 He amplified this idea further when he 
observed: 75 
'The protection against illegal and unconstitutional 
action is the same. In the case of a Government it lies 
in the power of the opposition to use the action as 
political ammunition ••. The government has to justify 
itself in a House of Commons where, certainly, it has a 
majority, but where every member holds his seat through 
popular support, where there is an official opposition to 
act as the spear-head of every attack, and which is itself 
imbued with democratic traditions. Few of the government's 
actions lose votes in the House of Commons, though they 
would if they were serious; but the government requires 
votes not merely in the House itself but in the country 
generally if it is to maintain itself in office. Here as 
elsewhere the primary protection is the operation of the 
democratic system, the right of the electorate to choose 
freely - a right which really means in practice7~ right to turn out any government that it does not like.' 
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The restraining influence of political factors on the 
actions of the government have also been echoed by other 
writers. MacIntosh, for example, has commented: 77 
'The second major limitation on the freedom of action of 
the Prime Minister and his colleagues is the need to carry 
public support as institutionalised in the House of 
Commons and in the majority party ••• While a government 
does not need to have the backing of the press or of the 
public as revealed in opinion polls or by-elections or 
referenda, evident lack of support is a source of weakness 
which becomes greater with the approach of a general 
election at which the government may be defeated. For 
these reasons all ministers pay close attention to both 
the House of Commons and the other indicators of public 
feeling ••. ' 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Wade. 78 
Accordingly, there would seem to be considerable force in the 
idea that governments obey convention because of the 
political difficulties which may follow if they do not. 79 In 
the light of this conclusion, doubts may now be cast over the 
continued validity or relevance of Dicey's original analysis. 
It may be argued that the legal sanctions behind enforcement 
of the constitutional conventions are as redundant now as the 
process of Impeachment. Jennings' emphasis on the political 
factors which help to safeguard respect for the conventions 
is not entirely satisfactory however. It is misleading to 
suggest that the right of the electorate to defeat a 
government at the polls somehow protects the obligatory 
nature of conventional rules. There are no legal obstacles 
to prevent the legislature from abolishing the democratic basis 
of British government altogether. 80 This may be asserted 
because a sovereign British Parliament may terminate the need 
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for regular elections by ordinary legislative enactment. 81 
It is hard to foresee the circumstances in which the 
government might persuade Parliament to subvert the 
democratic principles of the British constitution. There can 
be little doubt, nevertheless, that the termination of 
elections would prevent the electorate from 'punishing' a 
government which had broken with the accepted constitutional 
conventions of the day. It is ironic that in order to 
understand why successive British governments have submitted 
themselves to a test of popularity at the polls, it may be 
useful to refer to Dicey once again. 
IV DICEY AND JENNINGS: A LIMITED SYNTHESIS 
Dicey believed that the exercise of sovereign power is always 
limited by a combination of external and internal factors. 82 
(1) External limits to sovereign power 
Dicey explained what he meant by external limitations on 
power in the following terms: 83 
'The external limit to the real power of a sovereign 
consists in the possibility or certainty that his 
subjects, or a large number of them, will disobey or 
resist his laws'. 
The authority of a sovereign, in other words, depends upon 
the readiness of his subjects, or of some portion of his 
subjects to obey his behests. 84 Dicey argued that in 
reality, this readiness to obey must always be limited. 85, 
Accordingly, it can be said in a modern political context 
that the sovereignty of Parliament is limited on every side 
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by the possibility of popular resistance. 86 Dicey proceeded 
to list the various types of legislation which a British 
Parliament would be unable to enact and observed: 87 
'In each case widespread resistance would result from 
legislation which, though legally valid, is in fact beyond 
the stretch of parliamentary power. Nay, more than this, 
there are things which Parliament has done in other times, 
and done successfully, which a modern Parliament would not 
venture to repeat. Parliament would not at the present 
day prol@§g by law the duration of an existing House of 
Commons. Parliament would not without great hesitation 
d~prive of t§9ir votes large classes of Parliamentary electors ... ' 
Although Dicey's comments were strictly limited to 
explaining restraints which may influence the behaviour of a 
sovereign power, there are certain similarities with the 
ideas expressed by Jennings. It was the latter who asserted 
that law and convention both rest upon the acquiescence of 
the community.go Jennings believed that where there is great 
opposition to the enforcement of a rule, its effectiveness 
must be called into question. 91 
A combination of the views of these two writers might help 
to explain why the British Parliament has resisted any 
temptation to abolish elections. A law which outraged the 
feelings of the community would need considerable 
determination to enforce. The possibility would always exist 
that the enforcement of such a law would lead to revolt 
against that very sovereign power which had created the 
unpopular law in the first place. 
The hostile reactions of the community to the actions of a 
sovereign power are not, however, the only factors which 
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militate against the exercise of untrammelled power. Dicey 
believed that 'internal limitations' also exist, which may 
inhibit a sovereign authority from using power in certain 
ways. 
(2) Internal limits to sovereign power 
Dicey explained what he meant by internal limitations on 
power in the following terms: 92 
'The internal limit to the exercise of sovereignty arises 
from the nature of the sovereign power itself. Even a 
despot exercises his powers in accordance with his 
character, which is itself moulded by the circumstances 
under which he lives, including under that head the moral 
feelings of the time and the society to which he belongs 
..• the internal check works together with the external 
check, and the influence of the internal limitation is as 
great in the case of a Parliamentary sovereign as of any 
other; perhaps it is greater.' 
Dicey conceded that the boundaries of the external and 
internal limitations on sovereignty are blurred and 
indistinct. 93 He was aware of the fact that the nature and 
extent of the two types of limitation do not necessarily 
coincide. 94 Wade has been able to marry the two concepts 
together, however, and in the observations which follow he 
managed to fill the lacuna which Jennings had overlooked. 
The following remarks by Wade are thus supplementary to 
Jennings own contentions: 95 
'They [Ministers] are influenced in their political 
conduct by the desire to govern in accordance with the 
traditions of representative government. In short, 
whether it be the sovereign in the exercise of the 
personal prerogatives, or Ministers in all other public 
conduct, there is a 96andard of political authority which commands obedience.' 
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Wade's observations are as relevant to the conduct of a 
sovereign legislature as they are to the behaviour of 
Ministers and other members of the executive branch of 
government. They help to explain why Parliament has not 
attempted to enact legislation to abolish elections, and they 
would explain why Ministers have resisted the temptation to 
introduce such measures to the floor of the Commons. 
(3) Conclusion 
It may be concluded that Jennings' emphasis on the 
political factors which inhibit a government from breaching 
convention is highly persuasive. These political factors 
will only continue to work as an effective restraint, 
however, if the democratic character of government prevails 
as the fundamental constitutional theory of the day. 97 
Constitutional conventions are designed to give expression to 
the democratic principle in Westminister-style government. 98 
Accordingly, any weakening of respect for the democratic 
basis of government will seriously threaten the existence of 
those conventions which underpin democracy in practice. 99 
V LAW AND CONVENTION: MUNRO'S ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Although the purpose of the present chapter is to explore the 
relationship between law and convention, the focus of attention 
has tended to concentrate on the sanctions which give force to 
the conventions of the constitution. The emphasis which has been 
placed on sanctions is perfectly understandable, however, because 
it is an essential component in Dicey's treatment of the 
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dichotomy between legal and conventional rules. Dicey believed 
that a distinction could be made between law, on the one hand, 
and conventions on the other. He argued that a legal rule was 
enforceable by courts of law, whereas a conventional rule could 
never be enforced by the courts of the land. 100 Jennings' 
perception of the relationship between law and convention was in 
sharp contrast to the approach which Dicey had adopted. Jennings 
believed that law and convention are fundamentally the same, 
because both types of rule rest, ultimately, on consent or 
· 1 O 1 Ob · 1 · . th. t t th t f acquiescence. vious y, in is con ex, e na ure o 
sanctions is important, and it is therefore understandable that 
Jennings became so preoccupied with reasons for obedience to 
legal and convention~l rules. 102 
Jennings has demonstrated the important role which political 
factors can play in safeguarding obedience to the conventions of 
the constitution. Even his most ardent critic, Munro, 
acknowledges the value of Jennings' analysis in this particular 
respect. 103 Munro has ably demonstrated, however, that the 
emphasis on sanctions is an erroneous one. 104 He believes that 
an understanding of the relationship between law and convention 
involves far more than a simple analysis of the sanctions which 
are behind either type of rule. 1~5 His approach to the study of 
law and convention is therefore quite distinct from that of the 
two main protagonists in this field. Munro's point of view will 
now be examined, because no proper understanding of the 
disagreement between Dicey and Jennings is possible without him. 
First of all it should be noted that Munro approves of Dicey's 
'court-enforcement criterion'. 106 He considers it to be an 
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adequate litmus-test for distinguishing law and convention. 107 
The reasons he used to support this contention will become 
t 1 h . th. h t 1 OS F th t h apparen e sew ere in is cap er. or e momen, owever, 
it is important to note that he feels the court-enforcement test 
b 1 t d . . 109 can e supp emen e in various ways. He points out that the 
differences between law and convention can be illuminated by the 
many inquiries of legal philosophers into the meaning of the term 
I 1 I 110 aw. 
Notwithstanding various other options, Munro has chosen to focus 
111 on Hart's model of a legal system. He proceeds to 
demonstrate, quite graphically, that conventional rules have no 
place in Hart's theoretical system of law. They cannot be 
reconciled in any meaningful way with the ancillary or secondary 
rules which are inherent in the abstract legal model which Hart 
has constructed. 112 
(1) Primary Rules of Obligation 
Munro asserts that Hart found the key to jurisprudence in a 
combination of primary and secondary rules. 113 The primary 
rules are described as duty-imposing rules or rules of 
obligation. 114 Every known society has had such primary 
rules, and it is conceivable that a primitive society might 
115 possess only such rules. A society which only recognised 
primary rules of obligation, however, would lack the 
essential requirements of a proper legal system. 116 While a 
primary rule of obligation can prescribe a certain standard 
of behaviour, it cannot be used to determine the existence of 
117 other primary rules. One primary rule cannot be used to 
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introduce or change another, and one rule of obligation cannot 
prescribe the circumstances in which the violation of others 
is declared. 118 These drawbacks apply equally to 
constitutional conventions, because they are also primary 
rules of obligation whose requirements ought to be obeyed. 119 
120 Munro is therefore able to say: 
'The situation without secondary or ancillary rules is 
likened by Hart to the rules of etiquette, as well as to 
the model of an early primitive community. The analogy 
applies equally to constitutional conventions.' 
The rule of Recognition is the first of Hart's ancillary 
121 or secondary rules. The other two are the rule of Change 
and the rule of Adjudication. 122 The three of them are 
vitally important to Hart's system of law, but Munro is able 
to demonstrate their incompatability with the character of 
conventional rules. 
(2) The Secondary or Ancillary rules 
(a) The rule of Recognition 
Hart has asserted that primary rules do not form 'a 
system', because they are without any identifying or common 
mark. 123 He goes on to point out: 124 
'Hence, if doubts arise as to what the rules are or as to 
the precise scope of some given rule, there will be no 
procedure for settling this doubt, either by reference to 
an authoritative text or to an official whose declarations 
on this point are authoritative. For, plainly, such a 
procedure and the acknowledgement of either authoritative 
text or persons involve the existence of rules of a type 
different from the rules of obligation or duty which ex 
hypothesi are all that the group has.' 
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Primary rules would therefore be plagued with 
uncertainty, 125 unless they could be supplemented by an 
ancillary rule which remedies the problem. Hart suggests 
that the simplest remedy is the introduction of a rule of 
R ·t· 126 H t th t . d 1 d 1 1 ecogni ion. e goes on o say a in a eve ope ega 
system, the rule of Recognition is quite complex. 127 It 
identifies primary rules by reference to some general 
characteristic which they all possess. 128 He says: 129 
'This may be the fact of their having been enacted by a 
specific body, or their long customary practice, or their 
relation to judicial decisions ... By providing an 
authoritative mark it introduces ••. the idea of a legal 
system: for the rules are now not just a discrete 
unconnected set but are, in a simple way, unified.' 
Munro shows that this analysis cannot be extended by 
analogy to conventional rules. He argues: 130 
'Contrast conventions. There is no authoritative mark of 
their existence, so that uncertainty abounds. The sources 
of convention are open-ended and diverse, and no 
importance attaches to them. Conventions have no unifying 
feature and so do form merely a "discrete unconnected set" 
••. The existence of a convention is tested, so far as it 
can be, by its individual content - an inference has to be 
made according to the strength and purpose of the 
particular political practice involved.' 
Munro's observations echo many of the issues which were 
highlighted in the previous chapter of this work. 131 It has 
already been pointed out that an attempt to list the 
conventions of the constituti?n would be unlikely to command 
universal assent. 132 One of the few ways of finding out\ 
whether a rule is conventional or not is 'to break it and 
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see'. 133 
(b) The rule of Change 
The static character of primary rules is another of the 
drawbacks of which Hart is aware. 134 He notes: 135 
'There will be no means •.• of deliberately adapting the 
rules to changing circumstances, either by eliminating old 
rules or introducing new ones: for, again, the possibility 
of doing this presupposes the existence of rules of a 
different type from the primary rules of obligation by 
whiqh alone the society lives.' 
Hart assets that the remedy for the 'static' quality of 
primary rules is the introduction of a rule of Change. 136 He 
says that the simplest form of such a rule is that which 
empowers an individual or body of persons to introduce new 
primary rules for the conduct of the life of the group, or of 
some class within it, and to eliminate old rules. 137 
Munro is able to demonstrate that the rule of Change has no 
application to a collection of purely conventional rules. He 
remarks: 138 
'Thus, a working legal system has express or implicit 
provisions specifying how the legislative process is to 
operate, how laws may be repealed, and so on. Given the 
absence of a means to recognise conventions, it is hardly 
surprising to find that there is equally no definite means 
of knowing when a new convention comes into being or an 
old one is amended or abolished.' 
The uncertainty which attaches to the creation of 
convention has already been examined in the previous 
chapter. 139 It was noted that difficulties can also arise in 
relation to the process of change. 140 A convention may be 
changed, for example, by express agreement, but even 
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amendment by this procedure can play host to certain 
problems. At times it may be unclear who must be a party to 
such an agreement before the relevant conventional rule can 
141 be successfully changed. 
(c) The Rule of Adjudication 
Hart notes that primary rules suffer from a third defect, 
which he describes as the inefficiency of the various social 
pressures by which the rules are supposed to be 
· t · d 142 H 143 main a1ne. e says: 
'Disputes as to whether an admitted rule has or has not 
been violated will always occur and will •.. continue 
interminably, if there is no agency specially empowered to 
ascertain finally, and authoritatively, the fact of 
violation.' 
The adoption of a rule of Adjudication overcomes the 
inefficiency to which Hart has drawn attention. 144 The rule 
empowers individuals to make authoritative determinations of 
the question whether or not a primary rule has been broken on 
a particular occasion. 145 Besides identifying the individuals 
who are to adjudicate, Hart says the rule will also define 
146 the procedure to be followed. Like the other secondary 
rules, the rule of Adjudication is on a different level from 
the primary rules. 147 Hart goes on to say that the rule 
confers judicial powers and a special status on judicial 
declarations about the breach of obligations. 148 Like the 
other secondary rules, it defines an important group of legal 
concepts: in this case the concepts of judge or court, 
jurisdiction and judgment. 149 
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Munro highlights the absence of a rule of Adjudication from 
the ambit of conventional rules. He argues: 150 
'Contrast conventions. There is, of course, no final 
judge of their violation or interpretation, any more than 
of their existence. Moreover, whereas the question of a 
breach of law is generally externally and authoritatively 
determined, by officials forming only a small part of 
those to whom the law applies, conventions are generally 
self-interpreted, often variously, by those to whom they 
apply.' 
Munro concludes his examination of Hart's system of law by 
making some final observations about the application of 
sanctions. 151 He notes: 
'The sanctions of law are institutionalised and display 
some degree of predictability. The consequences of a 
breach of convention have considerably less certainty, 
except in one respect, their self-destructive quality. If 
a convention is defined as "a rule of behaviour accepted 
as obligatory by those concerned in the working of the 
constitution!!, then, once such a rule is broken, it 
becomes appropriate to ask whether it may still be 
regarded as binding.' 
His comments about the application of sanctions echo 
several observations which were made in the previous chapter 
of this work. 152 
Munro has persuasively argued that the conventions lack any 
secondary rules. They cannot be reconciled with Hart's 
system of law, and thus serious doubts must now arise with 
regard to one of Jennings' most basic contentions. His belief 
that law and convention lack any distinction of substance has 
been radically undermined. 
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VI. THE COURT-ENFORCEMENT TEST: A REHABILITATION 
Earlier it was noted that Munro regards the court-enforcement 
criterion as the litmus-test to distinguish law and 
convention. 153 His description of Hart's system of law was 
merely designed to reinforce the arguments in favour of Dicey's 
classic analysis of the two different categories of rule. It is 
implicit in Munro's examination of the rule of Adjudication that 
conventional rules are incapable of enforcement in court. 154 
There can be little doubt that the whole tenor of his arguments, 
however, assumes that rules of law are enforceable in court. 155 
The question whether or not this litmus-test amounts to anything 
in substance is a matter which has preoccupied Jennings. 156 After 
reviewing both statutory provisions and a certain amount of case 
law, Jennings came to the conclusion that the test is wearing 
th . 157 1n. He laid heavy stress on a number of court judgments 
which have extended a certain amount of 'recognition' to the 
existence of conventional rules. 158 This induced him to 
declare: 159 
the boundary between law - legislation and case law -
and convention is wearing very thin, and •.• even judges are 
not always certain where it lies.' 
It can be argued, however, that 'the proof of the pudding is in 
the eating'. There would seem to be very little evidence that 
the judges are confused. This can perhaps best be illustrated by 
reference to some of the judges themselves. There are two 
notable cases which have been heard since Jennings first 
publicised his point of view; and both of these have emphatically 
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rejected the temptation to declare the judicial enforceability of 
conventional rules. 
(1) The case of Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke160 
The Privy Council expressed the opinion in Madzimbamuto v 
Lardner-Burke that they were quite unconcerned with 
conventional rules which were in conflict with statute law. 
Their Lordships observed: 161 
'If the Queen in the Parliament of the United Kingdom was 
sovereign in Southern Rhodesia in 1965, there can be no 
doubt that the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, and the Order 
in Council made under it were of full legal effect 
there .•• The learned judges refer to the statement of the 
United Kingdom Government in 1961 ••• setting out the 
convention that the Parliament of the United Kingdom does 
not legislate without the consent of the Government of 
Southern Rhodesia on matters within the competence of the 
Legislative Assembly. That was a very important 
convention but it had no legal effect in limiting the 
legal power of Parliament. 
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for 
the United Kingdom Parliament to do certain things, 
meaning that the moral, political and other reasons 
against doing them are so strong that most people would 
regard it has highly improper if Parliament did these 
things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the 
power of Parliament to do such things. If Parliament 
chose to do any of them the courts could not hold the Act 
of Parliament invalid. It may be that it would have been 
thought, before 1965, that it would be unconstitutional to 
disregard this convention ••. Their Lordships in declaring 
the law are not concerned with these matters. They are 
only concerned with the legal powers of Parliament'. 
The importance of this judgment should not be over-
emphasised, however. No real attempt was made to analyse the 
relationship between law and convention. The Judicial 
Committee did not assert that a conventional rule is 
incapable of enforcement in court. Their opinion was merely 
a restatement of judicial attachment to the long held 
1 
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doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament. 162 A legal rule 
which has been enacted by one Parliament cannot be used to 
restrict any of its successor~. 163 It is only logical to 
conclude, therefore, that conventional rules are equally 
incapable of such an inhibiting effect. 
A clear statement of judicial attitudes to the court-
enforcement of convention, ne~ertheless, may be discovered in 
the following recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
(2) Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada 
(Nos 1, 2 and 3) 164 
The majority opinion of Martland, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, 
Chouinard and Lamer J J of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
case Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada 
(Nos 1, 2 and 3), represents the ultimate vindication of 
Dicey's court-enforcement criterion. 165 In a strikingly 
clear analysis of the relationship between law and 
convention, the court rejected the entire concept of the 
judicial enforcement of non-legal rules. The learned judges 
noted: 166 
'The conventional rules of the Constitution present one 
striking peculiarity. In contradistinction to the laws of 
the Constitution, they are not enforced by the courts. 
One reason for this situation is that, unlike common law 
rules, conventions are not judge-made rules. They are not 
based on judicial precedents but on precedents established 
by the institutions of government themselves. Nor are 
they in the nature of statutory commands which it is the 
function and the duty of the courts to obey and enforce. 
Furthermore, to enforce them would mean to administer some 
formal sanction when they are breached. But the legal 
system from which they are distinct does not contemplate 
formal sanctions for their breach. 
Perhaps the main reason why conventional rules cannot 
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be enforced by the courts is that they are generally in 
conflict with the legal rules which they postulate and the 
courts are bound to enforce the legal rules. The conflict 
is not of a type which would entail the commission of any 
illegality. It results from the fact that legal rules 
create wide powers, discretions and rights which 
conventions prescribe should be exercised only in a 
certain limited manner, if at all.' 
The court referred to the royal veto as an example of a 
matter over which law and convention are in direct 
conflict. 167 It was noted that while, as a matter of law, 
the Queen can refuse assent to every Bill passed by both 
Houses of the Canadian Parliament, she cannot, by convention, 
168 refuse to assent to any such Bill on any grounds. The 
court went on to say: 169 
'We have here a conflict between a legal rule which 
creates a complete discretion and a conventional rule 
which completely neutralizes it. But conventions, like 
laws, are sometimes violated. And if this particular 
convention were violated and assent were improperly 
withheld the courts would be bound to enforce the law, not 
the convention. They would refuse to recognise the 
validity of a vetoed bill.' 
The court noted that although the remedy for breach of 
I 
convention does not lie with the courts, alternative means 
are available to deal with any violations. 170 Other 
institutions of government could provide a remedy, although 
it would not be a formal remedy, and it might be administered 
with less certainty or regularity than it would be by a 
court. 171 This line of reasoning was explained further in 
terms which Jennings might have greatly appreciated. 172 
'It is because the sanctions of convention rest with 
institutions of government other than courts, such as the 
Governor General or the Lieutenant-Governor, or the Houses 
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of Parliament, or with public op1n1on and ultimately, with 
the electorate that it is generally said they are 
political.' 
The court referred to a substantial body of case law in 
order to discover whether or not a convention has ever 
'crystallized' into law. 173 It concluded that no such 
crystallization or transformation of conventional rules has 
ever taken place. 174 The whole notion of crystallization 
overlooks the fact that conventions are political in 
character and exist merely because they enjoy political 
recognition by those for whose benefit or detriment they, were 
developed. 175 The concept of crystallization would imply 
that there is a 'common law of constitutional law' whose 
origins can be traced in political practice. 176 The court 
utterly rejected this notion, however, 177 and it sought to 
distinguish any examples of such crystallization which have 
occurred in the context of 'International Law.' 178 As far as 
conventions relating to internal self-government are 
concerned, the court took the view that: 179 
'The attempted assimilation of the growth of a convention 
to the growth of the common law is misconceived. The 
latter is the product of judicial effort, based on 
justiciable issues which have attained legal formulation 
and are subject to modification and even reversal by the 
courts which gave them birth when acting within their role 
in the state in obedience to statutes or constitutional 
directives. No such parental role is played by the courts 
with respect to conventions.' 
The courts approach to the relationship between law and 
convention may have been influenced by Hart's notion of 
primary and secondary rules. 180 The absence of any 'system' 
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to conyentional rules is highlighted by the judgment on a 
number of occasions. 181 The opinion of the majority in this 
Supreme Court case would appear to have rejected Jennings' 
perspective on the dichotomy of law and convention. The 
learned judges seem to have accepted that there are certain 
fundamental differences between the basic character of laws 
and the basic character of constitutional conventions. These 
differences would seem to extend far beyond the question of 
judicial enforceability. 
At one stage in his attack on Dicey, the court-enforcement 
test was dismissed by Jennings as important only for a lawyer 
who accepted the idea that law is 'enforced' in courts. 182 
The decision in Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of 
Canada (Nos 1, 2 and 3) would suggest that judges are indeed 
lawyers who take court-enforcement of law rather seriously. 
VII. THE DICHOTOMY OF LAW AND CONVENTION CONCLUSIONS 
(1) The court-enforcement test 
Dicey believed that law and convention are separate and 
distinct. The litmus-test of this distinction is his court-
enforcement criterion. He argued that a legal rule may be 
enforced by the courts, whereas a conventional rule is 
incapable of judicial enforcement. The test has been 
subjected to considerable criticism from Jennings. It was 
argued by Jennings that the courts have blurred the 
distinction between legal and conventional rules. The test 
has been vigorously defended by Munro, however, and it has 
recently been upheld as a valid test by the Supreme Court of 
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Canada. It can be concluded that the judgment of the 
Canadian court is eloquent testimony to the esteem with 
which Dicey's test is still viewed. 
(2) The relationship between law and convention 
Although the court-enforcement test might appear to be 
somewhat arbitrary, it must be understood in the context of 
the wider relationship between law and convention. The 
biggest criticism that can be directed at Dicey was his 
failure to explore the full ramifications of the 
relationship between legal and conventional rules. Dicey 
appeared to be completely preoccupied with exposing the 
reasons for obedience to the non-legal rules of the 
constitution. No systematic attempt was made, however, to 
explain why these rules are attributed with a non-legal 
character. The assertion that they are non-legal because 
they are not enforced by the courts leaves many questions 
unanswered about the basic nature of such rules. 
Jennings believed that law and convention are inextricably 
linked. Like Dicey before him, he concentrated on an 
exposition of the reasons for obedience to both categories 
of rule. Certain aspects of Jennings' analysis are 
extremely enlightening. He demonstrated the importance of 
political factors in securing obedience to conventional 
rules. There can be no doubt that this aspect of his 
analysis continues to hold considerable authority. Some of 
Jennings' other contentions, however, may now be seriously 
questioned. He tried to argue that law and convention are 
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more or less the same, because both categories of rule are 
based on nothing more than acquiescence. In another, 
closely related contention, he tried to undermine the 
strength of Dicey's court-enforcement distinction. He 
attempted to do this with reference to cases which 
demonstrated the courts increasing involvement with a 
combination of legal and conventional rules. Both of these 
contentions have now been decisively rejected. 
Munro may be attributed with the exposure of the 
weaknesses in Jennings' arguments. He has demonstrated that 
Jennings, like Dicey before him, fell into the trap of over-
emphasising the role of sanctions as a means to categorize 
legal and conventional rules. Munro referred to Hart's 
model of a legal system, and thereby demonstrated the 
fundamental differences between law and constitutional 
convention. Regardless of whether or not they rest on 
acquiescence, Munro has been able to show that there are 
considerable differences between the two types of rule. He 
has argued persuasively that conventional rules operate out-
with any coherent 'system'. This is becau~e they lack any 
of the secondary or ancillary rules which are intrinsic to a 
developed system of law. The fundamental differences which 
he exposed would suggest that the judicial enforceability of 
conventional rules is an extremely remote prospect. 
The decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re 
Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos 1, 2 and 3) 
would seem to confirm that Munro's approach to the 
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relationship between law and convention is to be favoured 
over those of his predecessors. The court's analysis of the 
distinctive characteristics of the two categories of rule 
bears a striking resemblance to the approach which Munro has 
adopted. The court has emphasised that conventions are 
political rules, both in terms of their origin and their 
purpose. The political character of conventions, their 
fundamental irreconcilability with many of the formal legal 
rules of the constitution, and their absence of any coherent 
'system' has meant that it is inopportune for any court of 
law to give direct effect to conventional rules. 183 
There can be little disagreement with the Canadian Supreme 
Court's observation that 'constitutional conventions plus 
constitutional law equal the total constitution of the 
country.' 184 This does not mean that a court of law can and 
will enforce convention. A political rule cannot be equated 
with a legal rule. Political rules are an entirely 
inappropriate subject for judicial interpretation and 
enforcement. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONVENTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has examined the relationship between law 
and convention in an overwhelmingly British constitutional 
context. Munro's perspective on the subject transcends national 
barriers, however, and the recent decision of the Canadian 
Supreme Court has relevance for all countries with Westminister-
style systems of government. 1 Accordingly, many of the 
observations which have been made in Chapter VI about the 
fundamental differences between law and convention do not have to 
be repeated in the present chapter in a specifically South 
African context. 
It is to be noted, however, that both Dicey and Jennings have 
analysed the sanctions which safeguard obedience to convention 
with exclusive reference to the position under the British 
constitution. Obviously, the legal factors which might inhibit a 
breach of convention cannot be assumed to transcend all national 
barriers. The same can clearly be said about political factors 
as well. Although South Africa and the other former Dominions of 
the British Crown inherited the basic patterns of Westminister 
government, it cannot be assumed that political conditions in 
each of these countries would replicate the domestic political 
circumstances of the United Kingdom. 
South Africa's steady drift away from the Westminister pattern of 
2 government makes a thorough investigation of all factors which 
secure obedience to conventional rules all the more urgent and 
necessary. Dicey's exposition of the legal forces which 
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safeguard continued respect for conventional rules will therefore 
be examined within the framework of South Africa's own system of 
law. Once this has been achieved, the emphasis which Jennings 
placed on certain political factors will be investigated from a 
purely South African perspective. 
II. DICEY: A SOUTH AFRICAN EXCURSION 
Dicey has illustrated that the British Parliament's control 
over 'the Purse and the Sword' has ensured that it always has the 
ultimate legal powers at hand to safeguard government respect for 
convention. The controls are comparatively simple. No public 
revenues may be appropriated by the government without the 
authority of an Act of Parliament. 3 No taxes may be levied 
without parliamentary assent, 4- and no armed forces can be 
lawfully maintained without regular legislative authorisation. 5 
The question whether or not these controls have existed in South 
Africa forms the basis of the following investigation. All 
references are being made to the legal position which existed 
under the two previous, 'Westminister' style constitutions of the 
country. Any legal changes which have occurred since the 
enactment of the current 'tri-cameral' constitution of South 
Africa are beyond the scope of this present work. It is to be 
hoped, however, that the theme of this particular chapter will lay 
the foundations for future investigation by other researchers. 
, 
-172-
(1) Control of Finance 
(a) The appropriation of Public Revenues 
(i) The position under the Union constitution of 1909 
The South African Parliament has always enjoyed legal 
control over the expenditure of public revenues. The matter 
was originally regulated in ss 117 and 120 of the South 
Africa Act of 1909. 6 S 117 provided: 
'All revenues, from whatever source arising, over which 
the several Colonies have at the establishment of the 
Union power of appropriation, shall vest in the Governor-
General-in-Council. There shall be formed a Railway and 
Harbour Fund, into which shall be paid all revenues raised 
or received by the Governor-General-in-Council for the 
administration of the railways, ports and harbours, and 
such fund shall be appropriated by Parliament to the 
purposes of the railways, ports, and harbours in the 
manner prescribed by this Act. There shall also be 
formed a Consolidated Revenue Fund, into which shall be 
paid all other revenues raised or received by the 
Governor-General-in-Council, and such fund shall be 
appropriated by Parliament for the purposes of the Union 
in the manner prescribed by this Act, and subject to the 
charges imposed thereby.' 
S 120 provided: 
'No money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund or the Railway and Harbour Fund except under 
appropriation made by law.' 
Accordingly, the South African government was not legally 
entitled to spend any of the moneys which accrued in the 
Railway and Harbour Fund or the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
without prior parliamentary authorisation for the necessary 
withdrawals. This authorisation was granted with the 
enactment of the Appropriation Act. 7 Parliament made sure, 
however, that a financial 'carte blanche' was not presented 
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to the government. An Appropriation Act would only 
authorise withdrawals from each of the two funds for the 
duration of the relevant financial year. 8 The legislature's 
determination to establish an annual cycle of financial 
control over the expenditure of the government was apparent 
as early as 1911. The Exchequer and Audit Act of 1911 laid 
down ins 34 as follows: 9 
'No Appropriation Act shall be construed as authorizing 
moneys appropriated thereby to be expended in any 
financial year other than the financial year to which it 
is expressed to relate, and any moneys so appropriated 
which may be unexpended at the close of any financial 
year shall be surrendered to the Exchequer Account.' 
The wording of this provision was subsequently reflected 
ins 33 of the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1956. 10 
(ii) The position under the 1961 constitution of South Africa 
As originally enacted, the South African Parliament's 
control of government expenditure under the 1961 Constitution 
was laid down in ss 98; 99; and 100 of the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act of 1961. 11 S 98 provided: 
'There shall be a Consolidated Revenue Fund into which 
shall be paid all revenues raised or received by the 
State President, other than revenues referred to in 
section ninety-nine, and such fund shall be appropriated 
by Parliament for the purposes of the Republic in the 
manner prescribed by this Act, and subject to the charges 
imposed thereby.' 
S 99 provided: 
'There shall be a Railway and Harbour FuDd into which 
shall be paid all revenues raised or received by the 
State President from the administration of the railways, 
ports and harbours and such fund shall be appropriated by 
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Parliament for the purposes of the railways, ports and 
harbours in the manner prescribed by this Act.' 
S 100 provided: 
'No money shall, subject to the provisions of the12 Exchequer and Audit Act, 1956 (Act No 23 of 1956) be 
withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or the 
Railway and Harbour Fund except under appropriation made 
by law.' 
There was clearly a remarkable similarity between the 
financial provisions of the 1961 Constitution Act and those 
of the former South Africa Act. The financial provisions of 
the 1961 Act underwent considerable amendment, however. The 
Consolidated Revenue Fund, and the Railway and Harbour Fund 
came to be regulated by entirely separate legislation. 
The Exchequer and Audit Act of 1975 converted the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund into the State Revenue Fund. The 
Act repealed ss 98 and 100 of the 1961 Constitution Act and 
substituted a news 98 for both of them. 13 The amended s 98 
accordingly read as follows: 
(1) 'There shall be a State Revenue Fund into which 
shall be paid all revenues as defined in section 1 of 
the Exchequer and Audit Act, 1975.' 
(2) 'No moneys shall be withdrawn from the State 
Revenue Fund, except in accordance with an Act of 
Parliament.' 
The term 'revenue' was defined ins 1 of the Exchequer and 
Audit Act of 1975. 14 Virtually all public moneys fell 
within the statutory definition of the word 'revenue'. The 
principle exception, of course, remained the Railway and 
Harbour Fund. 15 It can be concluded, however, that as far 
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as the withdrawal of moneys from the State Revenue Fund was 
concerned, the requirement for parliamentary authorisation 
remained unchanged. 16 
Control of moneys in the Railway and Harbour Fund was 
removed from the 1961 Constitution Act. The excision was 
carried out in terms of s 13(b) of the Railways and Harbours 
Acts Amendment Act of 1980. 17 Thereafter, the Railway and 
Harbour Fund was governed by the Railways and Harbours 
Finances and Accounts Act of 1977 18 as amended by the 1980 
Act. 19 Notwithstanding these changes, however, the effect 
of the original statutory rule ins 99 of the 1961 
Constitution Act was retained. No moneys could be withdrawn 
from the Railway and Harbour Fund except in accordance with 
an Act of Parliament. 20 After the repeal of the Railways 
and Harbours Finances and Accounts Act of 1977, 21 control of 
moneys which had been in the Railway and Harbour Fund became 
regulated by the South African Transport Services Finances 
and Accounts Act of 1983. 22 The Railway and Harbour Fund, 
as such, disappeared. 23 The appropriation of money for the 
expenditure requirements of South African Transport Services 
24 became regulated bys 4 of the 1983 Act. The effect of 
the original statutory rule ins 99 of the 1961 Constitution 
Act was still maintained, however. The need for annual 
appropriation by Act of Parliament remained intact. 25 
(iii) Legal control of appropriation: conclusions 
The statutory provisions to which reference has been made 
demonstrates that Parliament remained in firm legal control 
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of all government expenditure in South Africa. Dicey's 
excursion to this country would have been successful, 
because 'the power of the purse' remained legally intact. 
(b) The levying of taxes 
The South Africa Act of 1909 was totally silent about the 
power to levy taxes. The 1961 Constitution Act was equally 
reticent in this respect. At first sight this may seem a 
little extraordinary, because taxation powers raise 
questions of great constitutional significance. The 
oversight may be dismissed, however, as more apparent than 
real. First of all it should be pointed out that, 
regardless of who enjoys the power to levy taxes, only 
Parliament may sanction the appropriation of public 
revenues. Legislative control of public finance is thus 
ensured. Secondly, it should be noted that Parliament's 
exclusive legal right to authorise the levying of taxes 
remains unchallenged. Legislative control of taxation, in 
other words, is unquestioned. The origin of the law 
relating to taxation ·powers may seem rather obscure. A 
short historical review of the legal situation is therefore 
required. 
In England, during the mid Seventeenth century, John 
Hampden refused to pay 'ship money', a tax which was being 
levied by Charles I for the purpose of furnishing ships in 
time of national danger. When the Case of Ship Money26 
reached the courts, counsel for Hampden argued that the King 
could only levy taxes in times of actual as opposed to 
merely threatened emergency. The Crown conceded that the 
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subject could not be taxed in normal circumstances without 
the consent of Parliament, but contended that the King was 
the sole judge of whether an emergency justified the 
exercise of his prerogative power to raise funds to meet a 
national danger. The Court of Exchequer gave judgment for 
the King. 27 The decision created a political storm. 28 By 
the time the dust had settled, one King had been beheaded, 
and another had fled into exile. 29 Exclusive parliamentary 
control over the levying of taxes was finally and 
conclusively established in 1689. In that year the Bill of 
Rights was enacted. 30 One of its most crucial provisions 
was 'article' 4, which declared: 31 
'That levying money for or to the use of the Crowne by 
pretence of prerogative without grant of Parlyament for 
longer time or in other manner then the same is or shall 
be granted is illegall.' 
Although the legal position in England had now become 
perfectly clear, the extent of the King's prerogative power 
to levy taxes in conquered territories was unsettled. In 
Calvin's Case32 it was declared that if a King comes to a 
Kingdom by conquest, he may at his pleasure alter and change 
the laws of that Kingdom. 33 The extent of the King's power 
over conquered territories was graphically explained by Lord 
Mansfield in the case of Campbell v Hal1. 34 He said: 35 
'It is left .•• to the King's authority to grant or 
refuse a capitulation: if he refuses, and puts the 
inhabitants to the sword or exterminates them, all the 
lands belong to him. If he receives the inhabitants 
under his protection and grants them their property, he 
has a power to fix such terms and conditions as he thinks 
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proper •.. These powers no man has ever disputed, neither 
has it hitherto been controverted that the King might 
change part or the whole of the law or political form of 
government of a conquered dominion.' 
Lord Mansfield's judgment went on to describe the 
' 
legislative powers which were enjoyed by the King. 36 
Clearly, in a conquered territory, the King was entitled to 
impose taxes through an exercise of his prerogative powers. 
The judgment acknowledges the right of the King to do 
this. 37 A difficulty arises, however, because Lord 
Mansfield acknowledged that Englishmen had no special 
privileges distinct from indigenous inhabitants of a 
conquered territory. 38 How could an Englishman suffer 
taxation at the hands of the King in a conquered territory 
if one of his basic liberties was freedom from such taxation 
in England?39 Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, 
the case of Campbell v Hall has great constitutional 
significance for South Africa. 
Lord Mansfield decided that the King irrevocably lost his 
prerogative power to legislate for the conquered island of 
Grenada once he had promised a legislative assembly for its 
inhabitants. 40 Accordingly, he decided that the King's 
attempt to tax by way of prerogative was invalid, because 
all of the King's tax-raising powers had been transferred to 
the new legislative body. 41 The Cape was annexed by the 
British in 1806. 42 Whether or not the King had sufficient 
prerogative power to tax the inhabitants of the Cape is not 
clear. 43 On the basis of the decision in Campbell v Hall, 
however, any suggestion that the King was invested with such 
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power was dispelled as soon as a legislative assembly was 
established for the colony. 
Representative44 and responsible government45 had already 
been established in the South African colonies prior to the 
creation of the Union in 1910. Accordingly, it can be 
assumed that the application of Lord Mansfield's judgment 
was appreciated in South Africa, and that the enactment of 
an equivalent statutory provision was regarded as 
unnecessary. VerLoren Van Themaat has argued that the 
establishment of representative government includ~d the 
acceptance of the fundamental English liberties contained in 
Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, Habeas Corpus, and most 
significant of all, the Bill of Rights. 46 This would 
suggest that Article 4 of the Bill of Rights is part of 
South African law. The weight of evidence would seem to 
suggest that only the South African Parliament can levy 
taxes in this country. 
Parallels with the position in the United Kingdom are 
obviously close. The nature of the controls which have been 
established by Parliament differ little in s4bstance between 
the two countries. In the United Kingdom, the tax-
collecting machinery is governed by permanent statute, while 
the rates of income tax and corporation tax are set by 
Parliament every year in the Finance Act. 47 The nature of 
the legislative controls in this country have become much 
the same. The first Act which imposed a tax on general 
income in South Africa was the Income Tax Act of 1914. 48 
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S 4(1) of the 1914 Act declared: 
'There shall be charged, levied, and collected throughout 
the Union for the benefit of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund •.• an income tax at the rates and calculated in the 
manner specified hereunder, in respect of any taxable 
income.' 
S 4(2) of the Act defined the term 'taxable income', and in 
the process it confirmed the purely annual nature of the tax 
levy. S 4(2) said: 
' "Taxable income" shall mean an income exceeding one 
thousand pounds, which has been received by, or has 
accrued to or in favour of, any person wheresoever 
residing, from any source whatever in the Union, during 
the twelve months ended the thirtieth day of June, 1914.' 
The Income Tax Act of 1915 imposed an income tax on 'taxable 
incomes' for the period between 1st July 1915 and 31st March 
1916. 49 An Income Tax Act was again passed in 1916, 50 to be 
followed by a consolidating measure, the Income Tax 
(Consolidation) Act of 1917. 51 The 1917 legislation 
confirmed that a tax on incomes would be levied on an annual 
basis by successive statutes. S 5(1) declared: 
'There shall be charged, levied and collected throughout 
the Union for the benefit of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund, an income tax •.• in respect of the taxable income 
..• received by or accrued to or in favour of any person 
during the year ending the thirtieth day of June 1917.' 
S 5(2) declared: 
'If for any year thereafter the levying of an income tax 
is authorized by Parliament the provisions of this Act 
shall apply, except in so far as it may be amended.' 
The established pattern of annual statutes was altered in 
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1925, however. The Income Tax Act of 192552 created a 
permanent legislative basis for the collection of taxes on 
income. The key provisions of the Act were contained in 
s 5(1) & (2), which declared as follows: 53 
S 5 (1) 'There shall be charged, levied and collected 
annually throughout the Union for the benefit of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund, an income tax •.• in 
respect of the taxable income •.• received by or 
accrued to or in favour of any person during the year 
of assessment ending the thirtieth day of June 1925, 
and each succeeding year of assessment thereafter' 
(2) 'The rates of tax chargeable in respect of each 
such succeeding year of assessment shall be fixed 
annually by Parliament, but the rates fixed by the 
Act for the year of assessment ending the thirtieth 
day of June, 1925, and the rates fixed by any Act of 
Parliament in respect of any subsequent year of 
assessment shall be deemed to continue in force until 
the next such determination of rates ••• ' 
Parliament was required to fix the rate of tax every year, 
in other words, but if a new rate had not been determined by 
the start of the next year of assessment, the old rate would 
continue in force. Parliament could not neglect to fix the 
rate of tax indefinitely however. Authority to collect 
taxes on the basis of a rate which had been fixed for the 
previous year would only last for the duration of one year 
of assessment. A delay in fixing the rate which lasted any 
longer than the first year of assessment for which no rate 
had been determined would result in the termination of the 
Commissioner's authority to calculate the taxes which were 
due. This is apparent from the wording of s 5(2), which 
went on to declare: 
' •.. the rates fixed by any Act of Parliament in respect 
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of any subsequent year of assessment shall be deemed to 
continue in force until the next such determination of 
rates and shall be applied for the purpose of calculating 
the tax payable in respect of any taxable income ••• 
during the next succeeding year of assessment if, in the 
opinion of the Commissioner, the calculation and 
collection of the tax chargeable in respect of such 
taxable income cannot be postponed until after the rates 
for that year have been determined without risk of loss 
of revenue ... ' 
S 5(2) of the 1925 Act may therefore be regarded as an 
early legislative example of the Provisional Collection of 
Taxes Act, which was enacted by the British Parliament in 
1968 to overcome the legal difficulties associated with the 
delay in the passage of its annual Finance Act. 54 The South 
African statute which presently governs a tax on income is 
the Income Tax Act of 1962. 55 It repeats the pattern which 
was established in 1925. Income tax is paid annually for 
the benefit of the State Revenue Fund, 56 and the rate of 
tax is to be fixed annually by Parliament. 57 Like the 1925 
Act, it provides that the rates fixed by Parliament in 
respect of any one year of assessment or financial year 
shall be deemed to continue in force until the next such 
determination or variation of rates. 58 The rate which 
Parliament has fixed for one year may therefore be used, 
temporarily, to calculate the tax payable for the next 
succeeding year. 59 As Parliament is obliged to fix the 
rate of tax on a strictly annual basis, however, the rate 
for any one year is determined long before the end of the 
. 60 
year of assessment or financial year concerned. 
The statutory provisions to which reference has been made 
demonstrates, when combined with the dictum of Lord 
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Mansfield in Campbell v Hall, that Parliament remained in 
firm legal control of the taxation power in South Africa. 
It can be confirmed, once again, that Dicey's contentions 
have considerable force in South Africa. Control of both 
the taxation power and the appropriation of public revenues 
clearly illustrates that Parliament retained a tight legal 
grip on the public finances of this country. 
(2) Control of the armed forces 
In South Africa, there is no equivalent of the British 
Army (Annual) Act or its modern successors. 61 The South 
African armed forces enjoy permanent statutory 
authorisation, unlike the armed forces of the United 
Kingdom. A proper appreciation of the legal position of the 
armed forces in this country requires some knowledge of the 
historical and past legal background of these forces. 
In the mid to late nineteenth century, Imperial forces 
were still used in the self-governing colonies of the 
British Crown to ensure both internal tranquility and 
protection against foreign attack. 62 In 1862, however, the 
House of Commons had already resolved that, while it was 
recognized that all parts of the Empire must have Imperial 
assistance against danger resulting from Imperial policy, 
as far as was possible the responsibly governed colonies 
should bear the expenses of their own internal defences. 63 
It was also resolved that such colonies ought to assist in 
their own external defence. 64 The Cape Colony already had 
its own Colonial forces in the 1870's, and much friction 
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resulted between the Governor of the colony and the Molteno 
ministry about the deployment of these forces in the 
frontier wars. 65 At one stage the dispute between the 
Governor and the Cape colonial government about control of 
these forces threatened the existence of 'responsible 
government' at the Cape. 66 
At the time of Union in 1910, legal authority for the 
colonies to set up their own armed forces was set out in 
S 177 of the Army Act of 1881. 67 This Imperial Act applied 
to the whole of the British Empire, 68 and it is doubtful if 
the establishment of armed forces in South Africa would have 
been successful without this Act. 69 Two, inter-related 
reasons may be given for this assertion. Firstly, the Bill 
of Rights of 1689 is an inherent part of South African 
constitutional law. Accordingly, the maintenance of a 
standing army through the exercise of the Royal Prerogative 
would have been contrary to law. Secondly, the South 
African Parliament was a colonial legislature, which meant 
that none of its enactments could have extra-territorial 
effect. A sound statutory basis for local armed forces 
would have required legislation to enable these forces to be 
deployed beyond the immediate frontiers of the country. 
(a) The Bill of Rights of 1689 
It has already been noted that VerLoren Van Themaat 
regards the Bill of Rights of 1689 as an inherent part of 
South African constitutional law. 70 The English theory of 
the general law of the colonies so far as they had been 
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settled was simple. 71 The common law of England was the 
common law of the plantations, and all statutes in 
affirmance of the common law passed in England antecedent to 
the settlement of any colony were in force in that colony. 72 
The theory also provided that no English statute passed 
since the establishment of a colony would be in force there 
unless it specifically mentioned the colony in question. 73 
It needs to be emphasized that the Cape Colony was a 
conquered colony, and the Roman-Dutch laws of the Cape were 
retained largely intact. 74 There can be little doubt, 
however, that English law was received at the Cape to the 
extent that it determined the authority of the King and the 
British Parliament in the colony. 75 The importance of 
English law, and its relationship with the indigenous Roman-
Dutch law is best summed up by VerLoren Van Themaat as 
follows: 76 
'In die eerste plek berus ons staatsreg op die Engelse 
staatsreg. Die Engelse staatsreg het die gesag van die 
Koning en die Engelse Parlement oor die gebiede wat later 
die Unie gevorm het, bepaal, en die omvang en perke 
daarvan omskryf. Op grond van 'n reel van Engelse 
staatsreg het die Romeins-Hollandse reg in die gebiede wat 
later die Unie gevorm het, gegeld in alle gevalle waar 
die hoogste gesag van die Koning en Parlement nie in die 
gedrang gekom het nie. Die Romeins-Hollandse reg was ook 
van toepassing op daardie prerogatiewe van die Koning wat 
nie voortgespruit het uit die gevolgsverhouding nie, maar 
te doen het met ou feodale, privaatregtelike of 
prosesregtelike voorregte van die Kroon.' 
In England, the right of the King to maintain a standing 
army by virtue of his Royal Prerogative was declared 
contrary to law in 1689. The Bill of Rights of 1689 
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'article' 6 declared: 
'That the raising or keeping a standing army within the 
Kingdome in time of peace unless it be with consent of 
Parlyament is against law.' 
To the extent that English statute law has been received 
in South Africa, it may be asserted that article 6 of the 
Bill of Rights is part of South African constitutional law. 
The military prerogative is closely tied up with the King's 
legal and political authority, and it is inconceivable that 
this matter would have been governed by the rules of Roman-
Dutch law. The Bill of Rights was enacted in 1689, more 
than a century before the Cape was annexed by the British in 
1806. Accordingly, it is suggested that the military 
prerogative was carried to the Cape in the truncated form 
which had resulted from enactment of the Bill of Rights. 
This, of course, may seem to be inconsistent with the 
extensive rights of the King in territories which he had 
conquered. 77 It was noted by Lord Mansfield in Campbell v 
Hall, however, that the King's legislative authority in 
conquered territory had to be exercised in accordance with 
'fundamental principles 178 These 'fundamental principles' 
were not specified, 79 but it is suggested that these 
principles would have included the basic provisions of the 
Bill of Rights. In the absence of a local colonial 
legislature; it is suggested, therefore, that the King would 
only have been able to maintain ~olonial forces with the 
consent of the Imperial Parliament. 80 
Regardless of what the position may have been when the 
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Cape was annexed in 1806, however, there can be little doubt 
that control of the military prerogative passed to the Cape 
colonial legislature after the establishment of 
representative government in 1850. In Campbell v Hall Lord 
Mansfield had said in relation to conquered territory that 
the King's legislative and taxation powers would vest in the 
local legislature once representative government was 
introduced. 81 The rights of the conqueror were thereby 
eliminated, so that his powers in the new possession would 
be the same as in other settled colonies. 82 Similarly, 
control of the military prerogative must have vested in the 
local legislature, 83 and the principles of the Bill of 
Rights must have been incorporated into the colony's laws. 
Unless this can be asserted, the prerogative rights of the 
King in a colony which had been acquired by conquest since 
1689 would have remained greater than his prerogative rights 
in a colony which had been acquired by way of settlement 
after that date. 84 This, it is suggested, would have' been 
contrary to the basic reasoning behind Lord Mansfield's 
judgment. Accordingly, while the position in the Cape may 
have been confused prior to 1850, it is contended that the 
·Bill of Rights became rooted in all the South African 
colonies once a system of representative government was 
received by them. 
Consequently, it may be said that after the foundation of 
the Union of South Africa, the creation and maintenance of 
South African armed forces required the enactment of 
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legislation passed by the Union Parliament. An exercise of 
the Royal Prerogative would have been contrary to law. 85 
(b) Extra-territorial limitations to South African 
legislation 
The creation and maintenance of armed forces by South 
African legislation had its difficulties, however. The 
South African Parliament of 1910 was a colonial Parliament, 
and it was subject to all the usual restrictions and 
limitations of a colonial legislature. 86 ·One of these 
restrictions was its inherent inability to enact legislation 
with extra-territorial effect. 87 The restriction was 
somewhat obscure in origin, but it amounted to more than a 
mere rule of construction for the interpretation of s 59 of 
the South Africa Act of 1909. 88 The Report of the 
Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and 
Merchant Shipping Legislation of 1929 had noted: 89 
'But in the case of the legislation of Dominion 
Parliaments there is also an indefinite range in which 
the limitations may exist not merely as rules of 
interpretation but as constitutional limitations .•• The 
subject is full of obscurity, and there is a conflict in 
legal opinion as expressed in the Courts and in the 
writings of jurists both as to the existence of the 
limitation itself and as to its extent.' 
The uncertainty associated with this restriction was a 
considerable, practical handicap to the South African 
legislature. Effective armed forces could not be created 
for the Union, because it would not be possible to deploy 
them beyond the frontiers of the country. Legal 
uncertainties would have abounded. The efficiency of the 
local military machine would thereby be seriously brought 
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into question. 
Imperial legislation was therefore vital, if South 
Africa's armed forces were to enjoy the capacity to act 
beyond the borders of the Union. It is in this context that 
s 177 of the Army Act of 1881 is so important. 90 Legal 
authority to operate extra-territorially could only be given 
by Imperial legislation. 
(c) The Defence Act of 191291 
Armed forces were established for the Union by the Defence 
Act of 1912. Although it was not immediately apparent in 
the 1912 Act, the Union Defence Force was dependent on 
annual legislation. To a certain extent it can be said that 
the statutory pattern in South Africa reflected the 
statutory position of the armed forces in the United 
Kingdom. The annual legislation which was required had to 
be enacted by the Imperial Parliament, and the South African 
legislature had no part to play in this process. Two 
closely related reasons may be offered to explain the 
dependance of the Union Defence Force on annual Imperial 
legislation. Both of these were connected with the problem 
of extra-territoriality. 
1. S 123 of the Defence Act of 1912 was the key provision 
which enabled the statute to operate with extra-territorial 
effect. S 123 declared: 92 
'By virtue of the prov1s1ons of section one hundred and 
seventy-seven of the Army Act, this Act shall extend to 
all members of the Defence Force of the Union whether 
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serving within or outside the Union 
The term 'Army Act' was defined ins 124 of the 1912 Act as 
follows: 
' "Army Act" shall mean the Army Act of the Parliament of 
Great Britain and Ireland as amended from time to time.' 
This was clearly a reference to the Army Act of 1881. 93 
As the South African Parliament could not legislate with 
extra-territorial effect, it could not give itself this 
power through its own legislative enactments. 94 This could 
only be granted by the Imperial Parliament itself. S 177 of 
the Army Act of 1881 gave the colonial Parliaments the 
legislative competence to create and maintain armed forces 
which could operate beyond immediate colonial borders. 95 
Accordingly, s 123 of the Defence Act of 1912 was competent 
to operate with extra-territorial effect only because it was 
given this ability bys 177 of the 1881 Imperial Act. 
The Army Act of 1881, however, was dependent for its 
continued validity on annual 'renewal' legislation. 
S 191(1) of the 1881 statute subjected the whole of the Army 
Act to annual renewal by the Army Discipline and Regulation 
(Annual) Act and its successors. 96 A failure on the part of 
the British Parliament to pass on annual Act would have 
resulted in the lapse of the Army Act of 1881. Its expiry 
would not have been restricted to the United Kingdom, 
however. It would have lapsed throughout the British Empire 
and in all other places where it might have been in force. 
The expiry of the Army Act would have meant the expiry of 
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s 177 of the 1881 Act. The immediate consequence of this 
expiry would have been the loss of the Union Defence Forces' 
capacity to operate on an extra-territorial basis. 
Considerable problems might well then have ensued. 
2. S 95 of the Defence Act of 1912 incorporated the 
British Military Discipline Code into the law of South 
Africa as the Union Military Discipline Code. S 95 
declared: 97 
95(1) 'By virtue of section one hundred and seventy-
seven of the Army Act, the provisions of that Act 
shall apply in relation to the Defence Forces of 
the Union and to all officers, non-commissioned 
officers and men thereof -
(a) save and except the portions of the said Act 
which are mentioned in the Fifth Schedule to this 
Act; and 
(b) subject to such adaptions and modifications 
as the Governor-General may and is hereby 
authorized from time to time to make to the 
remaining provisions of the said Army Act and to 
the rules of procedure made under section seventy 
thereof ..• 
(3) The said remaining provisions and the said rules, 
as adapted and modified from time to time under 
this section, may be cited for all purposes as the 
Union Military Discipline Code.' 
Consequently, the effect of s 95 was to create a Union 
Military Discipline Code. The code was partially created by 
the adoption of relevant sections of the Imperial statute, 
namely those provisions of the Army Act of 1881 which 
governed the military discipline of the Imperial forces. 98 
There was one apparent difficulty with the adoption of an 
Imperial Act, however. Although the South African 
Parliament could adopt the Army Act, it could not give that 
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statute any extra-territorial effect. This meant that 
although the Union Military Discipline Code would have had 
full legal force within the Union, its validity elsewhere 
would have been open to doubt. S 177 of the Army Act of 
1881 overcame this apparent difficulty, however, because it 
authorized the colonies to make certain laws which would 
have extra-territorial effect. 99 South Africa was therefore 
able to adopt provisions from the Imperial Act and through 
s 177 give them extra-territorial application. The end result 
of all this ensured that South African forces would remain 
subject to the Union Military Discipline Code when they 
operated beyond the frontiers of the country. 
It is obvious that the Union Military Discipline Code was 
largely the product of an Imperial Act. This created 
potential problems for South Africa. The difficulty stemmed 
from the fact that the Army Act needed annual renewal by the 
Imperial Parliament, 1OO and doubts could have arisen about 
the validity of the Union's Discipline Code if the necessary 
renewal had not been forthcoming. 101 
(d) The armed forces: termination of annual renewal 
After the enactment of the Statute of Westminister of 
1931, 102 the South African Parliament was given the power to 
legislate with extra-territorial effect. The power granted 
was framed in general terms, which meant that the Union 
legislature would no longer have to rely on specific 
Imperial Acts if it wanted South African legislation to 
extend beyond the frontiers of the country. Dependence on 
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Imperial statutes such as the Army Act of 1881 and all the 
subsequent annual renewal legislation was therefore no 
longer absolutely necessary. 
Consequently, the South African Parliament almost 
immediately enacted a statute to terminate the dependence of 
its Defence Act on Imperial legislation. The South African 
statute which cut the links with the Army Act of 1881 was 
the Defence Act (Amendment) and Dominion Forces Act of 
1932. 103 The key provision of this 1932 statute was 
s 4 which laid down: 
'Section one hundred and twenty-three of the principal 
Act is hereby amended by the deletion of the words "By 
virtue of the provisions of section one hundred and 
seventy-seven of the Army Act." ' 
The effect of this provision was to make the Defence Act 
of 1912 operate in its own right without any reference to 
104 . the Army Act of 1881. The Union Defence Force could 
thereafter operate both within the country and beyond its 
borders by virtue of legislation which was exclusively South 
Af . . . . 105 rican in origin. The other important provision of the 
1932 statute was s 2(1), which declared: 
'The provisions of the Army Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Viet C 58) 
of the United Kingdom as amended from time to time up to 
the commencement of this Act, and the rules of procedure 
made under section seventy thereof, as adapted and 
modified under section ninety-five of the principal Act, 
which by virtue of section ninety-five of the principal 
Act, comprise, at the commencement of this Act, the Union 
Military Discipline Code, shall, notwithstanding the 
repeal of section ninety-five of the principal Act by 
this Act ••• continue to apply in relation to the Defence 
Forces of the Union and to all members thereof, subject 
to such adaptions and modifications as the Governor-
General may, by notice in the Gazette, make thereto'. 
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Accordingly, the Union Military Discipline Code, which had 
been governed largely by the provisions of Imperial statute 
was incorporated into South African law. Any future 
amendment by the Imperial Parliament of the Army Act of 1881 
would no longer effect South Africa's own military 
discipline code. The abolition of s 95 of the Defence Act 
of 1912 meant that the Imperial connection had been 
permanently cut. 
The termination of dependence on the Army Act of 1881 had 
become a practical necessity after enactment of the Statute 
of Westminister in 1931. Two reasons can be suggested for 
the rapidity with which the links were broken. Firstly, the 
relationship between the Defence Act of 1912 and the army 
legislation of the Imperial Parliament was inconsistent with 
the whole spirit of equality of status which had been 
developing since 1926. 106 Secondly, the Union's continued 
dependence on the passage of an Army (Annual) Act by the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom would have meant that the 
clumsy 'request and consent' procedure would have been 
needed on a regular basis. 107 
The end result of the Defence Act (Amendment) and Dominion 
Forces Act of 1932 was to place South Africa's armed forces 
on a permanent legislative basis. There is no longer any 
need to resort to annual renewal acts or other similar 
devices to ensure their domestic and extra-territorial 
statutory validity. The present legislation governing the 
armed forces of South Africa is to be found in the Defence 
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108 
Act of 1957. The current law makes no reference to the 
need for periodic renewal of the principal Act, either by 
the South African or any other Parliament. Whether or not 
this departure from long-held constitutional tradition is 
desirable may be regarded as a moot point. In 1780, Edmund 
Burke commented bitterly about the Irish Parliament's 
decision to pass a Perpetual Mutiny Bill: 109 
'This scene of shame and disgrace has, in a measure, 
whilst I am speaking, ended by the perpetual 
establishment of a military power in the dominions of the 
Crown (the Irish Perpetual Mutiny Act) without the 
consent of the British Legislature, contrary to the 
policy of the Constitution, contrary to the declaration 
of rights, and by this your liberties are swept away 
along with your supreme authority'. 
Edmund Burkes' reaction may be regarded as a little 
extreme and induced by the political passions of the time. 
In the North American colonies during the period of British 
rule, the colonists lacked the benefits of the Bill of 
Rights. 110 Each Governor enjoyed the Military Prerogative 
by virtue of his Commission, which meant that local armed 
forces could be raised in America without local legislative 
th . t· 111 K "th h b d h 112 au oriza ion. ei as o serve, owever: 
the military prerogative was wholly useless without 
the support of the legislature. It was impossible to 
train troops without funds, which had to be voted, and it 
was equally impossible to manage them without penal 
provisions. Hence legislation was constantly resorted 
to ••. This need of law and of finance gave the 
Assemblies an enormous power; New York and New Jersey 
insisted on Annual Acts, and did not even always pass 
them ••• ' 
The key to Parliamentary control of the Army is, and 
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always has been, finance. The armed forces of colonial 
America, Britain and South Africa were as dependent on the 
receipt of public revenues as any other government-related 
service. In Britain and South Africa this situation does 
not appear to have changed. Parliament has exclusive 
control of finance. No taxes can be raised except through 
legislative enactment, and no supplies may be appropriated 
without the relevant Act of Parliament. The Army is, 
therefore, as dependent on Parliament as any department 
of State. The denial of funding by Parliament would have 
the same crippling effect on the armed forces of South 
Africa as it would on any other recipient of public 
revenues. 
(3) Dicey's South African excursion: some conclusions 
The sanctions which Dicey believed would securE respect 
for the conventions of the constitution are not exclusive to 
the United Kingdom. Ultimate legal control of 'the purse' 
is enjoyed by Parliament, both in South Africa and the 
United Kingdom. The constitutional position cf the· armed 
forces in the two countries, however, are not identical. 
The British Parliamer:t retains the 'power of the sword' 
because legislation governing the armed forces has to be 
renewed every five years. In South Africa this power has 
never really existed, and any semblance of Parliamentary 
control was ended when the 1932 legislation was passed. 
Accordingly, if the South African government chose to 
disregard an important conver:t.ional rule, Parliament could 
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not follow its British progenitor and wait for the armed 
forces legislation to lapse. Its only weapons are to refuse 
further authorisation of government expenditure, or to 
neglect to fix the rate of tax on incomes over a substantial 
' 
period of time. 
III JENNINGS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ENIGMA 
Jennings vigorously attacked the notion that the force of law 
safeguards obedience to convention. Although he believed that 
law and convention are obeyed for the same reason, in neither 
case could obedience be explained in terms of fear of the courts 
of law. Jennings thus became a principal opponent of Dicey's 
analysis of the relationship between legal and conventional 
rules. He proceeded to attack Dicey on three separate grounds: 
(a) Time-lapse; he noted that there may be a considerable 
delay between the breach of a conventional rule and any 
concomitant breach of the law. 
(b) Loans; he noted that the British government may 
circumvent Parliament's refusal to authorize taxation by 
resort to loans. 
(c) Conventions unsupported by law; he noted that the 
breach of certain conventions would not lead automatically 
to a breach of the law. He concluded that these 
conventions, and many others are obeyed because of the 
political difficulties which would follow if they were not. 




Jennings' remarks about time-lapse have already been 
criticized in the previous chapter. 113 Little more needs to 
be said. The relevance of his remarks in a South African 
context can be seriously doubted. The criticism of Jennings 
remains much the same, regardless of whether it emanates 
from a British or a South African perspective. 
(2) Loans 
Jennings noted that the British government enjoys certain 
loan-raising powers. 114 Similar observations may also be 
made about the South African government. A brief 
description of the loan-raising powers of the South African 
government is therefore required, if a full understanding of 
'the power of the purse' in this country is to be attainE,d. 
Originally, the loan-raising powers of the Governor-
General were somewhat restricted. He could only raise loans 
if this was authorized by Act of Parliament, and he could 
only use such loans for the purposes mentioned in any such 
Act. The statutcry previsions which first regulated these 
matters could be found in the General Loans Act of 1911. 115 
S 1 of this Act laid down: 
'As often as by any law hereafter passed authority is 
given to raise any sum of money for the purposes 
mentioned in any such law, the Governor-General may, frcm 
time to time as he may deem expedient, raise such sum 
either by stock issued in the Union •.. or by stock 
issued in the United Kingdom .•. ' 
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The first Act of Parliament which authorised the Governor-
General to use his loan-raising powers was the Public Works 
Loan and Floating Debt Consolidation Act of 1911. 116 S 1 of 
that Act declared: 
'The Governor-General may from time to time and he is 
hereby authorized to borrow in accordance with the 
provisions of the General Loans Act, 1911, a sum of money 
not exceeding in the whole the sum of four million nine 
hundred and seventy-four thousand two hundred and four 
pounds, one shilling and three pence sterling to meet the 
cost of the Public Works and services as set out in the 
First Schedule to this Act.' 
S 2 authorized the Governor-General to raise a further sum 
amounting to just over four and a half million pounds 
sterling. 117 This figure represented sums which three of 
the constituent colonies had been entitled to borrow before 
Union, but which had not been raised by the time Union took 
effect. Parliamentary control over the loans raised in 
terms of this Act was further re-inforced bys 3. This 
latter provision laid down: 
'No expenditure out of the sums authorized to be 
borrowed by the Governor-General in accordance with the 
provisions of sections one and two of this Act shall be 
incurred, unless such expenditure be authorized from loan 
funds by a law hereafter passed appropriating such 
moneys.' 
It is not entirely clear thats 3 of the Act was a 
strictly necessary provision. S 117 of the South Africa Act 
of 1909 had laid down that moneys 'raised' or 'received' by 
the Governor-General-in-Council were to be paid into the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund, or the Railway and Harbour 
118 Fund. Money could only be issued from either of these 
-200-
two funds if the necessary authority had been granted in an 
Appropriation Act. 119 Although the South Africa Act did not 
explain whether or not there was a difference between 
revenues 'raised' and revenues 'received', it is submitted 
that revenues 'raised' was a reference to moneys which had 
been borrowed. 120 It is also interesting to note that 
according to the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1911, 121 the 
term 'revenues' included the proceeds of all loans 
. d 122 Th A . raise. e ct required such revenues to be paid into 
the 'Exchequer Account', 123 which included the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of the Union. 124 Although all these statutory 
provisions seem to be a little confusing one thing was 
absolutely clear. The government was entitled to borrow 
money with parliamentary sanction, but further legislative 
approval was necessary before any of the moneys raised could 
be spent. 
The Governor-General's borrowing powers remained largely 
unchanged with the enactment of the General Loans 
Consolidation and Amendment Act of 1917. 125 The Governor-
General could only borrow money if this was authorized by 
Act of Parliament, and he could only spend the moneys raised 
in the manner sanctioned by the Act concerned. 126 A degree 
of flexibility was introduced, however. S 2 of the Act· 
entitled him to borrow sums of up to three million pounds, 
whenever he deemed it to be desirable. 127 No expenditure 
could be incurred from this sum of three million pounds, 
however, unless it was authorized by a Loan Appropriation 
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128 . 
Act. After the enactment of the 1917 statute, the 
position of the Governor-General could be likened to that of 
the British government. This can be asserted because 
although he could borrow money up to a fixed amount with 
comparative freedom, he could not spend moneys raised except 
in accordance with an Appropriation Act. 
The next Act which consolidated the law relating to loans 
was the General Loans Act of 1961. 129 The law remained 
basically unchanged. S 2 of the 1961 Act declared: 
'Whenever any loan expenditure is sanctioned by any 
Appropriation Act, the Governor-General may borrow such 
sums as may, in addition to the amount at the credit of 
or accruing to the loan account, be required to defray 
such expenditure.' 
Greater flexibility was introduced by the 1961 Act, 
however. S 3 entitled him to borrow sums of up to thirty 
million Rand, whenever he deemed it to be desirable. 130 The 
same provision also made it quite clear, nevertheless, that 
no expenditure could be incurred from this borrowed sum 
without authorization in an Appropriation Act. 131 The law 
which regulated the raising of government loans was 
subsequently contained in the Exchequer and Audit Act of 
1975. 132 This Act, as frequently amended, remains the 
principal statute controlling public finance in this 
country. 133 S 2(1) lays down that all revenues are to be 
paid into, and all expenditure is to be defrayed from, the 
State Revenue Account. 134 For the purposes of the 1975 Act, 
the term 'revenue' includes all moneys which have been 
borrowed in terms of the Act. 135 Ass 4(1) has laid down 
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that no moneys can be withdrawn from the State Revenue 
Account except in accordance with an Act of Parliament, 136 
this means that no borrowed moneys may be spent without 
Parliamentary approval. The Minister of Finance has been 
given the authority to borrow unlimited sums of money. 137 
Expenditure of these sums would still require Parliamentary 
138 approval, however. 
The conclusion may be drawn that since 1917, the South 
African government has been in a remarkably similar position 
tq the British government. The South African government has 
been able to borrow money with a limited, but ever-
increasing amount of freedom. This may be used to 
supplement any revenues raised through the tax system. One 
principle remains absolutely firm, however. No moneys 
raised through government borrowing may be spent unless this 
has been sanctioned by an Act of Parliament. All 
expenditure requires formal appropriation by the 
legislature, and this continues to remain the position in 
South Africa as much as in the United Kingdom. 139 
(3) Conventions unsupported by law 
Jennings believed that a government will obey 
constitutional convention because of the political 
difficulties which will follow if it does not. He argued 
that the crucial factor in determining the strength of a 
convention is the attitude of the House of Commons to any 
potential breach. It is doubtful whether similar arguments 
could be employed in South Africa to explain continued 
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obedience to conventions in this country. The political 
culture of South Africa cannot be compared with political 
conditions in the United Kingdom, because there is almost a 
total absence of the two-party phenomenon in this country. 
I 
Vorster has noted: 140 
'Die politieke kultuur in Suid-Afrika gee nie aanleiding ' 
tot dieselfde mate van pieeteit teenoor konvensies as in 
Brittanje nie en daarby beantwoord die huidige Suid-
Afrikaanse omstandighede duidelik nie aan die ideaal 
posisie nie: een party is reeds lank aan bewind en dit 
skyn nie asof enige ander party geredelik aan bewind kan 
kom nie. Ons vind hier egter geen neiging om terug te 
keer na die klassieke twee-party omstandighede nie sodat 
hier ook nie sprake kan wees van 'n tydelike opskorting 
van die relevante konvensies nie .•. In sodanige 
omstandighede verkry die beginsel van "strong government" 
eerder die inhoud van monopolie van beleid en die 
geleentheid van die opposisie om te opponeer word nie so 
geredelik erken nie.' 
Giliomee has argued that in South Africa, elections are not 
decided on the basis of issues, but upon the mechanics of 
th · b. 1 . t . 14 1 Th N t . 1 P t t e n1c mo 1 1za ion. e a 1ona ar y as a movemen 
representing ethnic interests, 142 has managed to monopolize 
the reins of power in this country since 1948. 143 Although 
the character of the party has been changing in recent 
years, 144 an ethnic basis still remains. As Giliomee has 
·ct 145 sa1: 
'The National Party seems likely to retain its character 
as a tough middle class party with the Afrikaner middle-
class constituting its primary political base.' 
Even in 1984 Giliomee argued that the National Party's 
concern with ethnic power still over-rode the purely class 
interests of its middle-class supporters. 146 Adam has noted 
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that in a society where an ethnic pattern of voting assures 
that electoral victory will go to the dominant ethnic 
party: 147 
'The ethnic leader is not primarily judged according to 
the goods he can deliver, as in an interest group, but 
more according to how well he represents psychological. 
group values, particularly the promise of security.' 
These ethnic factors have meant that one political party 
has remained in a dominant position since its electoral 
victory in 1948. There is no 'shadow government' or 
'opposition-in~the-waiting' within the recognized 
constitutional structures of the country. 148 Accordingly, 
political difficulties would not necessarily arise to 
confront the government if it chose to ignore existing 
conventional norms. Departures from constitutional 
convention could be justified to the electorate on the basis 
of group values and the search for security. 
Jennings' analysis of the reasons for obedience to 
convention is therefore completely inadequate from a South 
African perspective. A fresh approach to the subject is 
required, and accordingly, it is suggested that reasons for 
obedience to convention should be examined under the next 
three headings. 
' 
(a) The 'Incorporated' conventions 
Some of the legal provisions of the South Africa Act of 
1909, and the equivalent, successor provisions of the 1961 
Consitution Act, contain rules which have been built on 
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conventional origins. The rules contained in these 
provisions may be referred to as 'legalized' conventions, 
'enacted' conventions, or as conventions which have been 
'incorporated' into law. The conventions which have been 
enacted are concerned primarily with Parliament, or with the 
powers of the State President. Consequently, these 
conventional rules will be looked at under two separate 
headings. 
(i) Parliament and 'enacted' convention 
There are three rules, which are fundamentally political 
in character, which have been incorporated into law in South 
Africa. A similar process of incorporation, to a lesser 
extent, has also been taking place in the United Kingdom. 149 
These three rules are: 
1. Financial legislation is to be read the first time in 
the House of Assembly, and its provisions are not to be 
150 altered by the Senate. 
2. When there is a conflict between the two Houses of 
Parliament, the will of the House of Assembly must 
·1 151 preva1 . 
3- Ministers of State must be members of Parliament, or 
become such members within a specified time which is 
calculated from the moment of their appointment. 152 
In South Africa, there is no recorded example of the 
breach of these conventions. Although these rules were 
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incorporated into law, it is unlikely that fear of the 
courts induced unbroken obedience to them. There were 
political factors which guaranteed respect for these rules 
in the workings of South Africa's constitutional system. It 
can be argued that the fundamental characteristic of a 
Westminister form of government is its attachment to the 
principle of 'democracy'. 153 The three enacted rules 
safeguarded the presence of this democratic principle in the 
154 South African version of the Westminister system. The 
rules ensured that the will of the elected House prevailed 
in matters concerning legislation, and they ensured that 
Ministers were accountable to Parliament for the 
implementation of government policy. 155 
These rules could not have been ignored-without a taint of 
illegality affecting the reputation of the government. 
Regardless of what the attitude of the courts might have 
156 been, no government would have wanted to appear to lack 
respect for the ideal of 'democracy' . 157 It can be assumed 
that if any amendment of these rules had been desired, the 
government would have been scrupulous to uphold established 
constitutional procedures. Changes would have been promoted 
by the introduction of legislation in Parliament. In this 
way any alteration of the 'democratic' character of the 
constitution would have been implemented through the 
existing democratic procedures. 158 
(ii) Executive Powers and 'enacted convention' 
In chapter III it was explained that the Governor-General 
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of South Africa only exercised his powers on Ministerial 
advice. 159 Originally, the limitation on the Governor-
General's freedom of action was governed almost exclusively 
by convention. A variety of reasons, however, which have 
already been discussed, contributed to the enactment of this 
rule in statutory form. 160 
The convention became enacted ins 4 of the Status of the 
Union Act of 1934. 161 S 4(1) and (2) declared: 
4(1) 'The Executive Government of the Union in regard to 
any aspect of its domestic or external affairs is 
vested in the King, acting on the advice of his 
Ministers of State for the Union, and may be 
administered by His Majesty in person or by a 
Governor-General as his representative.' 
(2) 'Save where otherwise expressly stated or 
necessarily implied, any reference in the South 
Africa Act and in this Act to the King shall be 
deemed to be a reference to the King acting on the 
advice of his Ministers of State for the Union.' 
The enactment of this provision was a purely symbolic 
political act. Convention had already ensured that the 
Governor-General would act exclusively on South African 
ministerial advice, and there was nothing in the 1934 
legislation which added or detracted from this existing 
pattern of political behaviour. 162 
In practical, legal terms, the statutory rules which 
curtailed the Governor-General's freedom of action were to 
be found in the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act of 
1934. 163 The Act required the Governor-General's signature 
on public instruments to be confirmed with seals which were 
. th . f th P. M' . t 164 F th ·t in e possession o e rime inis er. ur ermore, i 
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required all such public instruments to bear the co-
signature of one of the Ministers of State for the Union. 165 
The effect of the Act was to prevent the Governor-General 
from exercising his executive powers on his own initiative. 
Any action which he chose to take would have lacked 
statutory validity in the absence of a co-signature from one 
of his Ministers. 166 Advice given by the Prime Minister was 
guaranteed to be pre-eminent, however, because the Prime 
Minister was charged with responsibility for the seals. No 
attempted breach of these statutory rules has been recorded, 
and the absence of such breach can hardly be described as 
surprising. No Governor-General would have wished to 
besmirch his reputation with accusations of illegal conduct, 
or witness instruments he has signed being declared invalid 
by the courts. The principal reason for obedience to the 
enacted rule, however, could be attributed to political 
factors. No Governor-General would have acted without 
ministerial advice, because such behaviour would have 
violated the whole spirit of the Westminster system of 
government. Independent political activity would have been 
entirely inconsistent with the Governor-General's role as a 
ceremonial Head of State. 167 Similar things could be said 
about the role of the State President under the 1961 
Constitution Act. The wording of s 4 of the Status of the 
Union Act was reflected ins 16 of the 1961 Constitution 
Act. 168 The practical, legal effect of the co-signature 
requirements under the Royal Executive Functions and Seals 
Act was repeated ins 19 of the 1961 Constitution Act. 169 
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Reasons for obedieryce to the enacted convention. remained 
much the same. The State President could not validly 
express his will unless it was accompanied by at least one 
Ministerial co-signature. 170 Any attempt to defy the 
requirements of s 19(1) would have been doomed to failure. 
More importantly, it would have undermined the integrity and 
good reputation of the State President's office. 
Accusations that he had acted illegally may have led to 
calls for his removal on grounds of 'misconduct. 1171 He 
would have stood condemmed for having violated the whole 
spirit of the Westminster constitution. The strength of 
these political factors is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
fact that BJ Vorster wielded little discernible influence 
during his tenure of the State Presidency. The purely 
ceremonial nature of his. position was perhaps all the more 
surprising because he had only recently resigned as the 
Prime Minister of the Republic. 172 
At this point it should be emphasized that the courts 
would not have enforced the enacted convention. They would 
not have concerned themselves with questions about whether 
the advice of Ministers was followed or not. All that they 
would have been concerned about would have been compliance 
with the co-signature and sealing procedures. The courts 
reluctance to enforce the convention ins 4 of the Status of 
the Union Act ands 16 of the 1961 Constitution Act would 
have been due to the overtly political character of these 
rules. The attitude of judges to the interpretation of s 13 
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of the South Africa Act showed a remarkable reluctance to 
interfere with the fluid character of Cabinet procedures. 173 
Any attempt to prescribe in legal terms the exact nature of 
the relationship between the Cabinet and the Head of State 
would have got bogged down in difficulties. In strictly 
legal terms, the Cabinet did not even exist. 174 The court 
would have needed to clarify the meaning of the words 'on 
the advice of his Ministers.' These words were ambiguous. 
It might have been argued that the State President could act 
only on the basis of Ministerial unanimity. Alternatively, 
it might have been argued that he could act on the advice of 
a majority of existing Ministers. A court may have argued 
that he could have acted simply on the basis of a majority 
vote of Ministers who happened to be present at a particular 
meeting of the Executive Council. The courts would have had 
to determine whether or not emphasis could be placed on the 
express wishes of a small clique of influential senior 
Ministers. The court might also have been called upon to 
interpret the nature of the relationship between the Prime 
Minister and the Head of State, or between the Prime 
Minister and his colleagues. This would have involved the 
court in even greater difficulties, however, because the 
existence of the Premiership was not even legally 
recognized. 175 
Some of the executive powers which were vested in the 
Governor-General or the State President were never made 
subject to the enacted conventional rule. It would be 
appropriate to look at these powers under a separate 
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heading. 
(b) Executive Powers and the unenacted conventions 
Several powers which were enjoyed by the Governor-General 
of the Union were exempted from the restrictions of the 
Status of the Union Act and th~ Royal Executive Functions 
176 and Seals Act. In strict legal theory, the Governor-
General was entitled to exercise the following powers 
without any Ministerial advice whatsoever: 
1. to appoint, summon and dismiss members of the Executive 
Council ; 177 
2 t . t d d' . M' . t 178 d . o appoin an ismiss inis ers; an 
3. to summon, prorogue or dissolve Parliament. 179 
In practice, however, the exercise of these powers was 
restricted by the operation of constitutional convention. 
This has already been clearly demonstrated in Chapter 
III. 180 No clear example can be cited of the breach of the 
conventions governing these powers. The reasons for this 
are basically political. The Governor-General had to secure 
an administration which enjoyed majority support in the 
House of Assembly. He was rather cut-off and remote from 
Parliament himself, however, and thus he had to rely on the 
Prime Minister as the lynch-pin of the system. 181 
Accordingly, these powers came to be exercised on the advice 
of the Prime Minister, and not by the Governor-General on 
· his own initiative. These political factors cannot be 
separated entirely from legal factors, however. The 
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government's political dependance on the majority in the 
lower house was reinforced by the legislature's tight grip 
on public finance. A government which attempted to ride 
rough-shod over Parliament would have found itself without 
th . t t . . t 1 · 18 2 I 19 39 S' P t . k au or1 y o appropr1a e supp 1es. n , 1r a r1c 
Duncan's refusal to accept General Hertzog's request for a 
dissolution of Parliament could have been regarded as a 
departure from the established conventional rule. It has 
already been argued in Chapter III however, that no breach 
of convention actually took place. 183 The Governor-
General's actions were entirely compatible with the basic 
184 principles of a Westminster system of government. 
Several of the powers which were enjoyed by the State 
President under the 1961 Constitution Act were similarly 
restricted by the operation of purely conventional rules. 185 
In legal theory the State President was entitled to exercise 
the following powers without Ministerial advice: 
1 • 
2. 
t . t M' . t 186 d o appo1n 1n1s ers; an 
to summon, prorogue or dissolve Parliament. 187 
In practice, however, convention ensured that these powers 
were exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. 188 It 
must be remembered that the establishment of a Republic in 
1961 did not represent a departure from the basic 
characteristics of a Westminster system of government. 189 
The constitution-makers had expected the State President to 
be a non-political figure, who would symbolize the dignity 
and pride of the nation. 190 The role of the State President 
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fallen into disuse. The 'suspended operation' of the two 
conventional rules may be attributed to the disappearance of 
the 'two party political system' in this country. Both of 
the following rules may be regarded as dormant. Whether 
they will ever come back to life or not is a subject for 
speculation. 
1. When a Ministry is defeated in the House of Assembly, 
the government must resign or seek a dissolution of 
Parliament from th~ State President. 197 
This convention has been redundant in South Africa since 
the dissolution crisis of 1939. Since that time, 
temptations by government to disregard this convention have 
simply not arisen, because circumstances have not presented 
the government with an opportunity to test the strength and 
vitality of the rule. The gradual disappearance of a strong 
parliamentary opposition party, 198 and the extraordinary 
internal discipline of the National Party, 199 has meant that 
the prospect of government defeat in the legislature has 
become the remotest possibility. 
2. When a Ministry loses an election it must resign. 200 
This convention has fallen into disuse since 1948. The 
last occasion on which it was used occurred when General 
Smuts resigned after losing the General Elections of 
1948. 201 General Smuts had not waited until he was defeated 
in Parliament before he offered his government's resignation 
to the Governor-General of the Union. 202 Whether this 
convention is ever likely to revive is open to speculation. 
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A government which sensed that it might face defeat at the 
polls could be tempted to 'temporarily suspend' the holding 
of elections. Although this could be regarded as a 
desperate measure an attempt could be made to justify the 
cancellation of elections in terms of the security needs of 
the voting population. 203 It must not be.forgotten that the 
British government resorted to such measures during the 
politically explosive transition from Stuart to Hannoverian 
rule in 1715. 204 The loyalty of the government's supporters 
in Parliament would mean that the cutting off of supply 
would be an unlikely reaction. 
(d) The vague conventions 
1. Collective Cabinet responsibility to Parliament. 205 
The nature of this conventional rule and the uncertainties 
associated with its consistent enforcement have already been 
examined in Chapter rrr. 206 The vagueness of the rule, both 
in a British and a South African context has been readily 
apparent. 207 208 Booysen and Van Wyk have commented: 
'Die leerstuk van ministeriele verantwoordelikheid is 
deel van ons Britse staatsregtelike erfenis, en soos dit 
in daardie stelsel nie presies seker is waar die grense 
van die verantwoordelikheid le nie, is dit ook in Suid-
Afrika heeltemaal duidelik nie'. 
The nature and the extent of the convention is necessarily 
vague, because its operation depends upon the level of 
support enjoyed by the Prime Minister in the lower House at 
any given moment. This could be asserted in respect of both 
the British and the South African versions of the rule. 209 
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The operation of Cabinet responsibility in South Africa 
during the disclosures associated with the Information 
Scandal is most enlightening in this context. Booysen and 
Van Wyk have said: 210 
'Daar was byvoorbeeld gedurende die inligtingskandaal van 
die sewentigejare sterk druk dat die hele kabinet van die 
eertydse eerste minister moes bedank omdat minstens een 
van hulle bewus was van onreelmatighede. Die betrokke 
minister het uiteindelik bedank, maar ook nie sander meer 
nie.' 
During the 'Information Scandal' debate at the end of 
1978, the Prime Minister, PW Botha, had re-affirmed his 
government's commitment to the convention of collective 
accountability. 211 At the same time he refused to accept 
the arguments of the parliamentary opposition that his 
government was in any way responsible for the financial 
irregularities in the funding of secret government 
projects. 21 ? He argued that the Cabinet knew nothing about 
the activities of Dr Mulder as head of the Department of 
Information, and that collective responsibility does not 
arise when the Cabinet lacks information or has had 
information withheld from it. 213 The respective leaders of 
the two opposition parties in the House of Assembly were 
totally unsatisfied with the Prime Minister's interpretation 
of the rule relating to Cabinet responsibility. 214 Both 
demanded the government's resignation. 215 The government, 
however, did not resign, and it comfortably survived the 
motion of 'No Conf.idence' . 216 The whole episode led 
Wiechers to conclude: 217 
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'In die hele debakel het dit duidelik geblyk dat 
kollektiewe verantwoordelikheid van die kabinet afhang 
van die posisie en ondersteuning van die eerste minister. 
As die eerste minister die steun van die meerderheid in 
die parlement geniet, is daar geen manier om die kabinet 
tot kollektiewe verantwoordelikheid te roep nie.' 
Accordingly, the loyalty of National Party MP's to the 
Prime Minister meant that the Cabinet was able to shift the 
blame for the Information Scandal onto individuals rather 
than allowing the government to take responsibility as a 
whole. 
Once the vagueness of collective responsibility has become 
apparent, incontrovertible proof that it was ever violated 
in South Africa becomes difficult to find. Assuming that 
the convention was indeed dependant upon the level of 
support enjoyed by the Prime Minister in Parliament, there 
remain no objective criteria against which the behaviour of 
the government could be measured. Consequently, it would be 
misleading to attempt to analyse what Parliament or the 
Cabinet 'should' have done in any particular set of 
circumstances. All that can be done is to investigate how 
Parliament or the Cabinet did in fact behave in any 
particular situation. This leads to the conclusion that a 
'descriptive' rather than a 'prescriptive' approach should be 
adopted in any examination of this vague conventional rule. 
Bearing in mind the vague, heavily political character of 
the convention of collective responsibility, reference to 
the workings of the rule in other Westminster societies can 
be regarded as somewhat limited in value. Booysen and Van 
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Wyk have observed: 218 
'Ministeriele verantwoordelikheid sou ten beste beskryf kon 
word binne die konteks van die bepaalde politieke stelsel 
waar dit opereer. In Suid-Afrika mag daar 'n ander soort 
politieke sensitiwiteit heers as in Engeland, wat maak 
dat ministers in Suid-Afrika onder ander omstandighede so 
geredelik bedank as wat ministers in Brittanje onder 
sekere omstandighede bedank.' 
This observation is especially appropriate in view of the 
marked deviation of South African political conditions from 
those in other countries with a Westminster form of 
government. 219 
2. Individual Ministerial Responsibility to Parliament. 
MacIntosh has suggested that in the United Kingdom, 
individual responsibility - like collective responsibility -
operates only when and where the Prime Minister and the 
majority of the Cabinet want it to operate. 220 Occasionally, 
even if an individual Minister has blundered in some way, 
the government may choose to protect a Cabinet colleague 
from attack, and adopt collective responsibility for the 
actions with which he is blamed. 221 Sometimes they will 
decline to support such a colleague and will not 
collectively protect him from attack, especially if they 
perceive that this may endanger parliamentary support for 
222 the government as a whole. Consequently, when an 
individual Minister has decided to remain at his post, 223 
the Cabinet is presented with a choice between asserting the 
individual responsibility of the Minister or accepting the 
collective responsibility of the entire Cabinet. The course 
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which they adopt may depend to a considerable degree upon 
the degree of loyalty which they can expect from their 
supporters in the elected House. 224 
The apparent freedom with which the Cabinet can choose to 
substitute individual for collective responsibility, and vice 
versa, 225 would suggest that there is as much vagueness about 
the true nature and extent of individual responsibility as 
there is with regard to the more general accountability of 
the government to Parliament. 
This vagueness may be said to extend to the convention of 
individual responsibility as it applies in South Africa. 
The impression which has been left by the Information 
Scandal is one of the extreme flexibility with which the 
Prime Minister of South Africa and his colleagues were able 
to apply or waive the consequences of individual 
responsibility. 
The Erasmus Commission of Inquiry exonerated the Minister 
of Finance and the Minister of Defence from any culpability 
for the irregularities which had occurred in the former 
Department of Information. 226 Although they may not have 
been directly responsible for the irregularities which had 
taken place, they were attacked in the House of Assembly for 
their apparent failure to establish what was happening to 
money ostensibly under their care. 227 Neither of the 
M .. t . d h 228 1n1s ers resigne, owever. Prime Minister Botha, who 
had been the Minister of Defence when the Information 
Scandal irregularities were taking place, 229 justified his 
refusal to accept any degree of individual responsibility in 
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the following words: 230 
'I am a responsible member of a responsible government. 
I was not prepared to break with my Prime Minister or 
with my Government over a method of budgeting. I was not 
prepared to do so, and I shall not be prepared to do so 
tomorrow either, because I break on principles, not 
methods.' 
The subtle distinction between 'principle' and 'method' is-
rather obscure, and can be regarded as even more 
extraordinary in view of the following observations in the 
Erasmus Report: 231 
'It is clear from the evidence that Mr PW Botha at no 
stage identified himself with or acquiesced in the 
arrangement by which funds from the Special Defence 
Account were transferred to the Department's secret fund. 
He was intuitively against this arrangement and continued 
to object until the arrangement was changed by 
legislation in 1978. It went against his grain to have 
to pretend to Parliament that all funds in the Special 
Defence Account were spent on defence activities while 
part of these funds went to the secret fund, even though 
a case could be made out for this since the secret funds 
were used to counter the total onslaught against South 
Africa.' 
There is evidence to suggest that if these events had 
occurred in a British political context, a Minister in PW 
Botha's position would have felt obliged to resign. 232 At 
the end of the day, individual responsibility was only 
applied to those members of the South African Cabinet who 
had been directly and explicitly attacked in the two Erasmus 
Reports. 233 
The idea was mooted in Parliament that Dr Mulder was being 
used as a 'scapegoat' to protect other members of the 
Cabinet from the consequences of collective 
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responsibility. 234 It may also be argued that Dr Mulder was 
being used as a 'scapegoat' to protect some of his 
ministerial colleagues from the consequences of their own 
individual responsibility. Parallels may be drawn with the 
abandonment of Sir Samuel Hoare by the British Cabinet in 
1935, when it refused to accept collective responsibility 
for the conclusion of the Hoare-Laval Pact. 235 The parallel 
would seem to indicate that the flexible use of individual 
responsibility in South Africa differed in no great respect 
from its manipulation in the United Kingdom. In both 
countries, the circumstances in which individual 
responsibility could be waived or applied would seem to have 
been quite fluid. It can be said that the application of 
the convention was heavily influenced by the level of 
support enjoyed by the Prime Minister and his colleagues at 
any given moment. A fear of loss of support for the Cabinet 
could always be rectified by throwing a Minister to the 
wolves. Once the vague and political character of the 
convention of individual responsibility is appreciated, a 
'descriptive' rather than a 'prescriptive' approach should 
be adopted towards its analysis. Reference to the operation 
of the convention in other Westminster societies is 
accordingly of limited usefulness. 
The idiosyncratic nature of individual responsibility in 
this country was perhaps best demonstrated by the events 
' associated with the 'Biko Affair'. S Biko was the honorary 
President of the 'Black Peoples' Convention', who, it was 
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officially announced, had died in detention at Pretoria on 
12th September 1977. 236 The Minister of Justice, Police 
and Prisons was condemned by opposition MP's in Parliament. 
He was criticized for the manner in which security 
legislation was being implemented, and for attitudes which 
\ 
had been expressed by certain members of the security forces 
in the phrase 'Ons werk nie onder statute nie 1 • 237 The 
Minister's own reaction to the death of S Biko was also 
heavily criticized by opposition MP 1 s238 , and a call was made 
for his resignation. 239 The Minister, however, did not 
resign. 240 The fact that such resignation did not occur in 
the case of the South African Minister of Justice, Police and 
Prisons does not mean that the convention of individual 
responsibility was violated. As conventions merely reflect 
the political system in which they operate, 241 the continued 
support enjoyed by the Minister in Parliament would simply 
suggest that the constitutional system of this country is 
primarily responsive to the sensibilities of one group of 
people as opposed to another. In this context Dean has 
observed: 242 
' •.• the operation of the conventions has produced 
executi~~3 which are primarily responsive to the needs of Whites. Moreover as Afrikaans speaking Whites are 
politically dominant, the conventions have ensured as 
between Whites, South African executives have been 
consistently more responsive to the needs of that group.' 
The refusal of the Minister to resign was a reflection of 
political realities in this country. Vague conventional 
rules such as those relating to individual and collective 
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responsibility must be interpreted within the framework of 
South Africa's distinctive political culture. 244 
(4) Jennings and the South African enigma: conclusions 
Jennings believed that a government will obey 
constitutional convention because of the political 
difficulties which will follow if it does not. As far as 
the application of his ideas to South Africa are concerned, 
they must be read subject to heavy qualification. Many 
conventions have been consistently obeyed in this country, 
but it is doubtful whether this has been due to government 
fear of opinion in the House of Assembly. As far as the 
period since 1948 is concerned, conventions have been obeyed 
because it has been convenient to do so. They embody the 
spirit and practice of the Westminster system, a method of 
government which South Africa's political leaders were long 
contented to leave intact. No over-riding need for change 
was necessary. There would have been little to inhibit a 
departure from convention if this could have been justified 
in the name of group security or the protection of ethnic 
interests. No such departures were readily apparent, 
however, in the first seven decades of South Africa's 
existence. 
The statutory nature of some of these rules helped to 
reinforce their obligatory character. A breach of these 
rules would have carried the taint of illegality, and no 
government would have wished to acquire a reputation for 
breaking the law. Furthermore, many of these statutory rules 
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helped to underpin the 'democratic' basis of South Africa's 
system of government. Although a departure from 'democracy' 
could always have been justified, the government would have 
been scrupulous to obey existing procedures in this process. 
Some of the conventions have been more or less suspended, 
which means that it is impossible to judge whether they 
would be obeyed or not. Others are so vague in character 
that the question of obedience becomes bogged down with 
difficulties. As far as these vague conventions are 
concerned, it can be suggested that a descriptive rather 
than a prescriptive approach should be adopted in relation 
to obedience. 
Political 'sanctions', as such, were not really present in 
South Africa's Westminster sytem. Jennings' ideas, 
therefore, were not suitable for transplant from a British 
to a South African political setting. His ideas were unable 
to take account of the unique political climate of this 
country. 
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONVENTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: CONCLUSIONS 
Conventions have been obeyed under South Africa's Westminster 
form of government, because no overwhelming need for breach of· 
these rules ever arose. They amounted to self-imposed restraints 
on the behaviour of government - voluntary restrictions which had 
become part of South Africa's political tradition. Neither Dicey 
nor Jennings have been able to provide an adequate explanation of 
reasons for obedience. Ready acceptance of Dicey's ideas can be 
traced in the legal foundations of this country's Westminster 
-225-
constitutional system. Dicey's legal sanctions have been buried 
under the weight of subsequent history, however, patiently 
waiting to be rediscovered by the 'legal archeologist'. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Until'now it has been assumed by many of South Africa's 
constitutional writers that the conventional rules of government 
in this country reflect the equivalent rules in the United 
Kingdom. This has proved to be an unjustified assumption. It is 
an error to assume that conventional rules may be 'imported' from 
one society to another in the same manner as ordinary rules of 
law. Several writers have noted that certain conventional rules 
in this country have undergone a degree of change or adaptation 
which has not been experienced by their 'parent' British 
equivalents. This type of approach, however, begs one 
fundamental question - do South Africa's conventional rules owe 
their origin to similar rules in the United Kingdom? 
This basic question can only be answered after a systematic 
analysis of convention in a strictly South African context. Such 
an approach has never been adopted in the past. Accordingly, the 
main objective of the preceding chapters has been to adopt a 
South African-based perspective to the analysis of conventions in 
this country. No assumptions have been made, which means it has 
been necessary to start at the beginning, in 1910, in order to 
investigate the content of these rules. In the first few decades 
of Union government the similarities between British and South 
African conventional rules were striking; but they were not the 
same. This has perhaps best been demonstrated by reference to 
the dissolution crisis of 1939- The differences, however, were 
not occasioned by increasing South African divergence from the 
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British conventional norm. The differences were the direct 
result of the South African character and origin of the 
conventional rules of this country. It has been shown that 
political conditions in the Union could never be an exact 
reproduction of political conditions existing in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere. As constitutional conventions are rules 
which are largely political in character and origin, the whole 
notion that they can be the same from one country to another 
therefore becomes increasingly untenable. 
Unfortunately, a study of the content of all possible 
,conventional rules in South Africa is an ambitious project which 
extends well beyond the parameters of this current work. 
Strictly speaking, however, such a study is not entirely necessary 
for the purpose of demonstrating the indigenous character of 
South Africa's own conventional rules. 
The preceding chapters have also attempted to investigate 
another long-neglected aspect of this particular subject. South 
Africa's constitutional system has never conformed in its 
entirety to all the usual hallmarks of a Westminster model of 
government. Until now, however, no one has attempted to 
investigate whether or not reasons for obedience to convention in 
this country are the same as reasons for obedience in other 
countries which have Westminster systems of government. 
Accordingly, the penultimate chapter has devoted a considerable 
amount of time to the uncovering of reasons for obedience to 
convention in South Africa. Parallels with the position in the 
United Kingdom can obviously be drawn, but this is only possible 
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as a result of painstaking investigation. Moreover, there can 
now be little dispute that reasons for obedience to convention in 
. 
South Africa are not identical to reasons which have been 
preferred by Dicey and Jennings in a strictly British 
constitutional context. The ideas of both writers - especially 
Jennings - need readjustment to take account of South African 
legal and political realities. This is something which has not 
been appreciated or fully realized in the past. 
The writer is well aware of the fact that research relating to 
South Africa's conventional rules has barely begun. Far more 
attention needs to be devoted to this particular subject by the 
constitutional writers of this country. It is to be anticipated 
that this present work has raised far more questions than it has 
attempted to resolve. The character and content of conventional 
rules under the 'tri-cameral' constitution, for example, is a 
matter which now calls for urgent attention. It is to be hoped 
that the call for further investigation in this field will be 
heeded in the not too distant future. 
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throughout the life of the Union Constitution. In 1960, 
Blacks formed 68,3% of the total population of the Union, and 
Asiatics formed 3% of the total population. 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating To 
The Coloured Population Group R.P. 38/1976. Ch I, table 1.2. 
19. Ch lop cit 2 supra. 
20. Cert.ain important powers were vested in the Governor-General 
of the Union, rather than in the Governor-General-in-Council. 
In relation to these excepted powers, the Governor-General 
was under no legal obligation to follow advice. This matter 
will shortly be examined in greater detail. Ch 2 op cit 
16-17 infra. 
21. S 13 of the 1909 Act was further reinforced by the 
Interpretation of Laws Act No 5 of 1910. S 3 thereof, in 
conjunction withs 2, defined the expression 'Governor-
General' for the purposes of existing legislation (including 
the South Africa Act) and any future legislation as follows. 
'"Governor-General" shall mean the officer for the time being 
administering the government of the Union acting by and with 
the advice of the Executive Council thereof; ' 
22. Ch 1 op cit 2 supra. 
23. Ministerial accountability to Parliament has long been 
safeguarded by other legal requirements however. Refer toss 
117 & 120 infra. 
24. Revenues could be raised by the government of the Union in 
two different ways. Firstly, taxes imposed by statute could 
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be enacted by the Union Parliament in accordance with the 
principles established by Lord Mansfield in the case of 
Campbell v Hall 1774 1 Cowper 204; 98 ER 1045 at 1048-1049 & 
1050. 
Secondly, additional revenue could be obtained by way of 
loans to the Governor-General in terms of statutes such as 
the General Loans Act No 17 of 1911; or the General Loans 
Consolidation and Amendment Act No 22 of 1917. 
25. S 117 also established a separate Railway and Harbour Fund 
into which were paid the revenues deriving from the 
administration of ports, harbours and railways. S 117 read 
withs 120 ensured that revenue could be appropriated from 
the Fund only in terms of an Act of Parliament. 
26. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 156 & 158; or Dean 'A New 
Constitution for South Africa?'(1984) Jahrbuch Des Offentlichen 
Rechts Der Gegenwart Ch D, paragraph 5(a). The annual 
nature of the Appropriation Acts can be seen clearly, for 
example, in the Appropriation (1912-1913) Act No 21 of 1912. 
The annual character of these Acts was further re-inforced 
by the Exchequer and Audit Act No 21 of 1911 s 34, which said: 
'No Appropriation Act shall be construed as authorizing 
moneys appropriated thereby to be expended in any financial 
year other than the financial year to which it is expressed 
to relate •.. ' 
27. The Union Constitution was later extensively altered by the 
Status of the Union Act No 69 of 1934, and the Royal 
Executive Functions and Seals Act No 70 of 1934. Ch 3 op cit 
91-100 infra. 
~8 .. N14 supra. · . 
29. Ch 2 op 14 and nn15 & 16 supra. 
30. South Africa Act 1909 s 12 as follows: 
'There shall be an Executive Council to advise the Governor-
General in the government of the Union, and the members of 
the council shall be chosen and summoned by the Governor-
General and sworn as executive councillors, and shall hold 
office during his pleasure.' 
31. Op cits 14. S 14 is set out in n15 supra. 
32. South Africa Act 1909 s 64 as follows: 
'When a Bill is presented to the Governor-General for the 
King's assent, he shall declare according to his discretion, 
but subject to the provisions of this Act, and to such 
instructions as may from time to time be given in that behalf 
by the King, that he assents in the King's name, or that he 
witholds assent ..•. ' -
Reservation of Bills, and the related issue of Disallowance, 
will be dealt with separately. Ch 2 op cit 17-19 infra. 
33. South Africa Act 1909 s 20 as follows: 
'The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the 
sessions of Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from 
time to time, by proclamation or otherwise, prorogue 
Parliament, and may in like manner dissolve the Senate and 
the House of Assembly simultaneously, or the House of 
Assembly alone, .•. ' 
and op cits 45 as follows: 
'Every House of Assembly shall continue for five years from 
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the first meeting thereof, and no longer, but may be sooner 
dissolved by the Governor-General.' 
See also the Governor-General's Letters Patent, paragraph 
111 • 
34. In addition to the South Africa Act 1909 ss 12;14;64;20;& 45 
(as set out in nn30;15;32;& 33 respectively), refer also to 
s 8 (as set out in Ch 2 op cit 24 infra). The constitutional 
position of the King, and the exercise of the royal 
prerogative will be referred to at a later stage. Ch 2 op cit 
24-29 infra. 
35. It is also different from the formula contained in the 
Interpretation of Laws Act No 5 of 1910 s 3, which uses the 
words: 'acting by and with the advice of the Executive 
Council.' N21 supra. 
36. N16 supra. 
37. An analogy can be drawn with the decision in RV Mbete 1954 
(4) SA 491 (E) per Reynolds J at 492-493, where the 
obligation upon the Minister to consult with the 'Natives' 
(and thereby give the latter an opportunity 'to tender 
advice') did not oblige him to follow that advice. See also 
the decision in RV Ntlemeza 1955 (1) SA 212 (A) per Van Den 
Heever J A at 217-218; & 219. 
38. This inference is supported by the established general 
principle 'generalia specialibus non derogant', which applies 
to the interpretation of statutes. Steyn Die Uitleg Van Wette 
by Tonder (ed) 193-195; and RV Gwantshu 1931 EDL 29 per 
Gutsche J at 31. 
It is clear from the wording of s 2 of the Interpretation of 
Laws Act No 5 of 1910, that the definition of the term 
'Governor-General' ins 3 of that Act, was not intended to 
apply to the South Africa Act of 1909. S 2 of the 
Interpretation Act of 1910 said: 
·'In the interpretation of every law ••. now or hereafter in 
force in the Union ••. the definitions ••• in this Act 
contained shall, unless there be something in the language or 
context of the law ••. repugnant to such definitions ••• or 
unless the contrary intention therein appear, be adopted and 
applied.' 
39. The Royal Instructions of 1910, paragraph VII used to read: 
'The Governor-General shall not assent in Our name to any 
bill which We have specially instructed him through one of 
Our Principal Secretaries of State to reserve; and he shall 
take special care that he does not assent to any bill which 
he may be required under the South Africa Act, 1909, to 
reserve .•• ' 
40. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 122 & n67; & 203. At 122 & 
n67 he says: 
'Indien 'n wetsontwerp, hetsy ingevolge instruksies, hetsy in 
ooreenstemming met wetgewing, hetsy in die uitoefening van sy 
diskressie deur die goewerneur-general vir die koning se 
welbehae voorbehou is, het die koning die advies van sy 
britse ministers in sy beslissing gevolg.' 
Coertze 'Die Wetgewende Orgaan Van Die Unie Van Suid-
Afrika' (1941) 5 THR-HR-34 at 52-53 & n2. 
The King's assent to a reserved Bill used to be given in the 
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form of an Order-in-Council. Keith The Dominions op cit 200-
201. In granting or witholding his assent, it would have 
been difficult for the King to ignore the advice of his 
Ministers in the United Kingdom. This can be asserted 
because all members of the British Cabinet become members of 
the Privy Council, and take responsibility for the content of 
its Orders-in-Council. Wade & Phillips Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 230-231. Furthermore, the official seals 
used on such documents were in the hands of Ministers of the 
United Kingdom government. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 
204. 
41. South Africa Act 1909 s 66 as follows: 
'A Bill reserved for the King's pleasure shall not have any 
force unless and until, within one year from the day on which 
it was presented to the Governor-General for the King's 
assent, the Governor-General makes known by speech or message 
to each of the Houses of Parliament or by proclamation that 
it has received the King's assent.' 
42. Op cits 64; especially the words: ' ••• he shall declare 
according to his discretion ••• that he reserves the 
Bill •.. ;' See Ch 2 op cit 18 & n40 supra. 
In South Africa, it is difficult to envisage a situation in 
which the Governor-General would have behaved in this 
fashion. Discretionary reservation was not exercised in 1914 
under circumstances in which the Governor-General may have 
been tempted to use it. Evatt The King and His Dominion 
Governors 175-176 & n4. It is probable that he would only 
have used this discretionary power if instructed to do so in 
a particular instance by the Imperial authorities in London. 
VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 203 & n77. 
cf Keith The Dominions op cit 228. 
43. South Africa Act 1909 s 64 (as set out in Ch 2 op cit 17-18 
supra); VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 122 & n66; 203 & n77; 
and the Royal Instructions of 1910 paragraph VII as follows: 
'The Governor-General shall not assent in Our name to any 
bill which We have specially instructed him through one of 
Our Principal Secretaries of State to reserve ••• and in 
particular he shall reserve any bill which disqualifies any 
person in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, who, under 
the laws existing in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope at 
the establishment of the Union, is, or may become, capable of 
being registered as a voter, from being so registered in the 
Province of the Cape of Good Hope by reason of his race or 
colour only. ' 
This method of reservation was never exercised. Hahlo & Kahn 
op cit 149. 
44. South Africa Act 1909 s 64 as follows: 
' ••• All Bills repealing or amending this section or any of 
the provisions of Chapter IV under the heading 'House of 
Assembly', and all Bills abolishing provincial councils or 
abridging the powers conferred on provincial councils under 
section eighty-five, otherwise than in accordance with the 
provisions of that section, shall be so reserved .•• ' 
and op cits 106 as follows: 
'There shall be no appeal from the Supreme Court of South 
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Africa or from any division thereof to the King-in-Council, 
but nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair any 
right which the King-in-Council may be pleased to exercise to 
grant special leave to appeal from the Appellate Division to 
the King-in-Council. Parliament may make laws limiting the 
matters in respect of which such special leave may be asked, 
but Bills containing any such limitation shall be reserved by 
the Governor-General for the signification of His Majesty's 
pleasure .•• ' 
-See also the South Africa Act 1909 Schedule, paragraph 25 as 
follows: 
'All Bills to amend or alter the provisions of this Schedule 
shall be reserved for the signification of His Majesty's 
pleasure.' 
The Schedule laid down the terms under which the South 
African government would administer the neighbouring British 
Protectorates, if and when these territories were 
transferred to the administration of the Union. Wheare The 
Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth 42. 
45. Keith The Dominions op cit 67. Examples of such Imperial 
legislation included the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 57 & 58 
Viet C 60 and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890 53 
& 54 Viet C 27. 
46. For the attitude of the British Colonial Secretary towards 
the Unions' Indemnity Bill of 1914, refer to Evatt op cit 
175-176. 
47. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 122 & n68; 203; and Coertze 
(1941) 5 THR-HR op cit 52-53 & n2. 
Disallowance of legislation was effected by the Privy Council 
in the form of Orders-in-Council. Keith The Dominions op cit 
200-201. Hence, if British Ministers advised the King to 
exercise disallowance in spite of opposition from the 
relevant Dominion ministry, the King would be obliged to 
follow British Ministerial advice. For the reasons, refer to 
n40 supra in relation to the reservation of Dominion Bills. 
48. No Canadian Act had been disallowed since 1873, no New 
Zealand Act since 1867, and no Act of the Commonwealth of 
Australia or of the Union of South Africa was ever 
disallowed. Keith The Dominions op cit 69; and VerLoren Van 
Themaat 3ed op cit 203. 
49. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 122 n68 says: 
'Die gebruik was al geriume tyd voor 1926 dat die britse 
ministers nie die koning adviseer om wette teen die advies 
van die ministers van die vrygeweste nietig te verklaar nie. 
Formeel het die britse minister die koning nbg jaarliks 
geadviseer om nie sy bevoegdheid om vrygewestelike wette 
binne 'n jaar of twee nietig te verklaar uit te oefen nie. 
Die staat-sekretaris vir vrygewestelike sake in Landen het 
nog jaarliks alle wette van die vrygeweste aan die koning 
gestuur het met die medeling dat die koning nie geadviseer 
sal word om sy bevoegdheid van nietigverklaring uit te oefen 
nie.' 
50. In other words the government of the United Kingdom. The 
Kingdom of England was declared an Empire by Parliament in 
the reign of Henry VIII. The United Kingdom succeeded to 
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this imperial rank. Keith.The Dominions op cit 3-4. For the 
'Imperial Parliament' refer to Ch 2 op cit 20-21 infra. 
51. Those provisions are the South Africa Act 1909 ss 8;12;64; & 
65; and Royal Instructions of 1910 paragraph VII. 
52. Wheare The Commonwealth op cit 21; and especially Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 93-95. 
53. Blackstone refers to the doctrine in his Institutes as early 
as 1765. See Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 93-94 & 99. For 
the applicability of English common law in South Africa, see 
n 94 infra. 
54. The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 28 & 29 Viet C 63. 
Wheare The Commonwealth op cit 22. The term 'Colony' for the 
purposes of the Act is defined ins 1 as follows: 
'The term "Colony" shall in this Act include all of Her 
Majesty's possessions abroad in which there shall exist a 
legislature •.. ' 
This definition was sufficiently wide to make the Act 
applicable to South Africa. 
55. Wheare The Commonwealth op cit 21. 
56. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 121 & 202; Keith The 
Dominions op cit 73-74; or Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 99. 
It should be noted that ss 35;137; & 152 of the South Africa 
Act 1909 were 'entrenched'. Furthermore, ss 33;34; & 85 
could not be altered for a certain period of time after 
Union. Any attempt by the Union Parliament to ignore the 
relevant entrenched procedures or to amend provisions which 
were temporarily unalterable, would have been contrary to the 
South Africa Act. It would have been an attempt by the Union 
Parliament to legislate in direct conflict with an Imperial 
Statute applying in South Africa. Hence, the entrenched and 
the unalterable terms of the South Africa Act were protected 
by the provisions of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865. 
VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 202. 
57. Keith The Dominions op cit 73-74. 
58. Op cit 63. 
59. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 204. 
60. South Africa Act 1909 ss 8 & 9. See Ch 2 op cit 24-25 infra; 
and VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 204. 
The King's failure to delegate the prerogative powers to the 
Governor-General caused difficulties for the Union Ministry. 
Ch 2 op cit 25-29 infra. 
61. Evatt op cit 175-176. In many respects therefore, the 
Governor-General was expected to act on the advice of his 
Ministers of State for the Union. This matter will be 
examined further in relation to constitutional conventions. 
Ch 3 op cit 32-45 infra. 
62. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 117-119; and VerLoren Van 
Themaat 3ed op cit 204. 
63. N60 supra. 
64. Ch 1 op cit 2-5 supra. 
65. Ibid. 
66. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 203-204 describes the 
extensive obligations of the Governor-General to the Imperial 
Government. See also Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 137. 
67. Ch 2 op cit 17-19 & nn39-46 supra. 
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68. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 124; VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed 
op cit 203 & n77. 
69. Letters Patent were used to constitute the office of 
Governor-General. Their contents were concerned with the 
nature of such office, and the powers appertaining to the 
office. These Letters Patent could be revoked, altered or 
amended at any time. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 123-124. 
See also the Letters Patent of 29th December 1909, paragraph 
VIII. 
The 'formal instructions' is a reference to the Royal 
Instructions. These Instructions were concerned with the 
duties of the Governor-General, and the manner in which they 
were to be performed. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 125. 
New Royal Instructions could be issued at any time. See 
Letters Patent of 29th December 1909 paragraph 1 as follows: 
'And We do hereby authorise and command Our said Governor-
General •.• to do and execute ... all things that shall belong 
to his said office .•• according to such Instructions as may 
from time to time be given to him, under Our Sign Manual and 
Signet .•• ' 
The Sign Manual is a reference to the signature of the 
Sovereign. The Signet is the Royal Signet, which used to be 
used in Royal Instructions to confirm the Sovereign's 
signature. May op cit 175. 
70. N68 supra. 
71. Ch 2 op cit 18 & n43 supra. An Instruction to reserve 
legislation would cause less difficulties than an Instruction 
to the Governor-General to veto legislation outright. Ch 3 op 
cit 40-42 infra. 
72. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 203 & n77; & Ch 2 op cit 
16-17 nn27-38 supra. 
73. Ch 2 op cit 16-17 supra. 
74. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 203; Kennedy & Schlosberg 
op cit 97-98. 
75. Ibid. See also MacLeod v Attorney-General of New South Wales 
[1891] AC 455 Halsbury LC at 457 & 458. 
76. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 203-204. 
77. South Africa Act 1909 s 59. 
'Parliament shall have full power to make laws for the peace, 
order, and good government of the Union.' 
78. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 204; or Kennedy & Schlosberg 
op cit 98. 
79. Ch 2 op cit 21 & n60 supra. 
80. Ibid. The words of s 8 specifically refer to the Governor-
General as the King's 'representative'. 
81. Ch 2 op cit 14 nn14 & 16 supra. See also VerLoren Van Themaat 
Staatsreg 2ed 260. 
82. Ch 2 op cit 16 & nn30-34 supra. See also VerLoren Van Themaat 
2ed op cit 261 & n44 in relation to the Supreme Command of 
the Armed Forces in South Africa. 
The Supreme Command was bestowed upon the Governor-General by 
s 17 of the South Africa Act, 1909, as follows: 
'The command-in-chief of the naval and military forces within 
the Union is vested in the King or in the Governor-General as 
his representative.' 
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See also the Letters Patent of 1909, paragraph I as follows: 
'There shall be a Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in 
and over the Union ..• And We do hereby authorise and command 
Our said Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief ••• to do 
and execute, in due manner, all things that shall belong to 
his said office .•• according to the several powers and 
authorities granted or appointed him by virtue of the South 
Africa Act 1909, and of these present Letters Patent •.• ' 
83. Royal Instructions 1909 paragraph IX. 
84. Ibid. This is summarized in Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 
125-127. See also VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 261 & n45. 
85. Coertze 'Die Posisie Van Die Koning As Hoof Van Die 
Uitvoerende Gesag Van Die Unie Van Suid-Afrika' (1939) 3 THR-
HR 249. --
86. Op cit 249-250. The Prerogative is discussed at n94 infra. 
87. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 128; or VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed 
op cit 260. Kennedy & Schlosberg appear to be uncertain 
about why the Governor-General could appoint K.C.'s. They 
say at op cit 128: 
'The appointment of King's counsel is an executive act. The 
appointment must not be regarded as one conferring an honour 
from the crown. It is an executive act concerning the 
internal government of the country, necessary for certain 
executive purposes, but what they are it is impossible to 
say.' 
88. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 261 says: 
'As hoof van die uitvoerende gesag kon die goewerneur-generaal 
namens die koning ondergeskikte wetgewing afkondig.' 
89. Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 250; VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed 
op cit 259 n35. 
90. (i) The appointment of the Governor-General was regulated by 
the South Africa Act 1909 ss 4 & 9. S 4 established: 
'··· the King may at any time after the proclamation appoint 
a Governor-General for the Union.' 
S 9 stated: 
'The Governor-General shall be appointed by the King •.. ' 
(ii) The appointment of the 'Officer Administering the 
Government' was regulated bys 11 of the Act, which laid 
down: 
'The provisions of this Act relating to the Governor-General 
extend and apply to the Governor-General for the time being 
or such person as the King may appoint to administer the 
government of the Union ••• ' 
(iii) Leave to appeal to the Privy Council was regulated by 
s 106 of the Act. See n44 supra. 
91. Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 250 & nn2-4; and VerLoren Van 
Themaat 2ed op cit 259 n35. 
92. Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 250 & n1; and VerLoren Van 
Themaat 2ed op cit 259 n35. 
93. Paragraph I of the Letters Patent of 1909 said: 
'And We do hereby authorise and command Our said Governor-
General ••• to do and execute .•• all things that shall belong 
to his said office ..• according to such Instructions as may 
from time to time be given to him, under Our Sign Manual and 
Signet, or by Our Order in Our Privy Council, or by Us 
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through one of Our Principal Secretaries of State ••• ' 
See further, Ch 2 op cit 22-23 & n69 supra, in relation to 
Instructions of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
Instructions of the King respectively. See further Wade & 
Phillips op cit 311-312 in relation to Orders-in-Council 
which give effect to the decisions of the Privy Council. 
94. English constitutional law is the major legal source of South 
African constitutional law. See VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op 
cit 52-69; Basson Verteenwoordiging in die Staatsreg 241 & 
n1; 281; and Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 74-75. 
The relationship between English and Roman-Dutch law is 
summed up by VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 68. 
See further: Ch 7 op cit 185 infra; Hahlo & Kahn op cit 170-
172; Goldblatt (1978) 5 LAWSA 22 & n4; Union Government v 
Estate Whittaker 1916 AD 194 per Innes CJ at 202-203; and 
Sachs v Donges 1950 (2) SA 265 (A) per Watermeyer CJ at 275-
276, and Schreiner J A at 306-307. · 
For the executive or prerogative powers of the Crown in the 
United Kingdom, see Dicey An Introduction to the Study of 
the Law of the Constitution op cit 422-426; 
Attorney-General v De Keysers Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508 
per Lord Dunedin at 526; and Wade & Phillips op cit 231-241. 
95. Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 250; VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed 
op cit 259 n35. Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 250 n5 
acknowledges that the list of prerogative powers which he 
refers to is not exhaustive. 
96. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 260. 
97. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 260 says in relation to 'Acts 
of State': 
'Die uitoefening van prerogatiewe soos anneksasie, sessie van 
grondgebied, erkenning van vreemde state en van vreemde 
grondgebied, word dikwels met die benaming 11 Acts of State" 
bestempel' 
98. A royal warrant would include the Commission appointing a new 
Governor-General, Letters Patent and Royal Instructions. See 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed 260. It has already been noted that 
the appointment of a Governor-General, and the issue of Royal 
Instructions, were not delegated by the King. Ch 2 op cit 
26-27 & nn90-92 supra. 
99. VerLoren,Van Themaat 2ed op cit 259 n35; or Coertze (1939) 3 
THR-HR cit 250, who says: 
'Met die totstandkoming van die Unie was al hierdie 
bevoegdhede van die Koning soveel bevoegdhede van die Unie, 
want die Unie was 'n aparte owerheidspersoon, sy dit 'n 
afhanklike persoon. Hierdie bevoegdhede van die Unie moes 
deur die Koning, as orgaan van die nuwe persoon, uitgeoefen 
word, want hulle was vir horn voorbehou.' 
100.Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 252; or VerLoren Van Themaat 
2ed op cit 258-259. The latter's comments about the King's 
signature would apply equally to the pre-1937 period of South 
African constitutional history. 
101.Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 252; VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed 
op cit 239. 
102.Coertze (1939) 3 THR-HR op cit 252. 
103.Ibid. 
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104.VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 239. 
105.Ibid. 
106.For reservation of Bills in the Union, see Ch 2 op cit 17-19 
supra. For disallowance of Acts, see op cit 19 supra. 
107.VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 202-203; & 238-239 •. 
108.Ibid. For reservation, see also Ch 2 op cit 18 & n40 supra. 
For disallowance, see also Ch 2 op cit 19 & n47 supra. 
109.N94 supra. 
110.It goes without· saying of course, that the South Africa Act 




1. Ch 2 op cit 19-29 supra. 
2. Ch 1 op cit 10-11 & nn56-62 supra. 
3. Kennedy & Schlosberg The Law and Custom of the South African 
Constitution 136-146, especially 142. 
4. Reference to the 'house' means the House of Assembly. Op 
cit 141-142. 
5. Ch 1 op cit n53 supra. 
6. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 139-141. 
7. Op cit 139-140; and VerLoren Van Themaat Staatsreg 2ed 264. 
8. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 139. The writers observed that 
membership of the Executive Council included all existing 
and all previous Ministers of State for the Union. The 
number of currently serving Ministers of State who could sit 
on the Executive Council was restricted to ten. Ch 2 op cit 
n15 supra. Noting that members of the Executive Council 
were never dismissed and that they never retired [Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 139] it would not have taken long before 
the ten existing Ministers of State were outnumbered on the 
Council. · 
9. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 139 where the writers remark: 
' .•. the practice of constitutional government does not 
require the attendance of the whole executive council to 
advise the governor-general ..• It would mean that if the 
whole executive council were summoned to advise the 
governor-general, the existing cabinet and the past 
cabinets, which must necessarily include the opposition 
leaders in parliament, would be sitting at the same table 
advising the governor-general when to dissolve parliament 
and when not to dissolve parliament •.• and to do a great 
number of acts which were, and which might become, matters 
of contention and conflict between the ministers and the 
opposition on the floor of the house of assembly.' 
Opposition leaders were necessarily members of the Executive 
Council, because there was a change of government after the 
general elections of 1924. Op cit 144. 
10. Ch 1 op cit 2-5 supra. 
11. Ch 1 op cit 5-6; 10; and Ch 2 op cit 12 supra. 
12. Ch 2 op cit 12-19 supra. 
13. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 139-140; and VerLoren Van 
Themaat 2ed op cit 264. 
14. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 139; VerLoren Van Thernaat 2ed op 
cit 264 & n57; and Keith The Dominions as Sovereign States 
241. 
15. Executive authority was vested in the King, and in the 
Governor-General as his representative. Ch 2 op cit 24 
supra. The pivotal role of the Cabinet is described in this 
chapter. Op cit 32-33 & 38-39 infra. 
16. Ch 2 op cit 13 supra. 
17. S 14 of the South Africa Act 1909 is set out in Ch 2 op cit 
n15 supra. 
18. Ch 2 op cit 16-17 & nn31; 37 & 38 supra. 
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19. The South Africa Act 1909 makes no reference to the 
'Cabinet'. None of its provisions oblige the Governor-
General to act 'with and by the advice of' his Ministers of 
State for the Union. 
20. Keith The Dominions op cit 248. He uses the word 'Ministry' 
instead of the 'Cabinet'. 
21. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 141. This convention is further 
discussed. Ch 3 op cit 46-48 infra. 
22. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 142. 
23. Ibid; and Keith The Dominions op cit 244-245. At 245 Keith 
remarks: 
'It is seldom that more than one leader of the majority 
party could succeed in forming a Government. The Governor, 
however, can offer the chance to whomever he thinks fit, 
and, if he can secure colleagues, can formally appoint him.' 
24. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 141; and Keith The Dominions op 
cit 244. 
25. In this way, convention gave force to one of the fundamental 
precepts of a Westminster Constitution ie government must be 
carried on in accordance with the will of the directly 
elected House, and ultimately with the will of the 
electorate as expressed through that House. See Dicey Law 
of the Constitution 428; 431; and Jennings Cabinet --
Government 13-19, in relation to the United Kingdom 
constitution. See Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 141 in 
relation to the constitution of the Union. See further, Ch 
5 op cit 119; and Ch 6 op cit 138 & 144 infra. 
26. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 141. 
27. Ibid; and Keith The Dominions op cit 246 in relation to the 
Dominions generally. The appointment of new Ministers of 
State meant that the previous Ministers of State had been 
relieved of office. N49 infra. 
28. N17 supra. 
29. Keith The Dominions op cit 244. In relation to the first 
three Prime Ministers of the Union, Keith observed: 
'Generals Botha, Smuts and Hertzog have been masters in 
their own home'. Op cit 247. See also Kennedy & Schlosberg 
op cit 143 & 145-146. 
30. Keith The Dominions op cit 244. 
31. South Africa Act 1909, Schedule, paragraphs 2; 4; and 6-11. 
32. As regards the Dominions generally, see Keith The Dominions 
op cit 240-241. 
33. In the United Kingdom, constitutional convention did not 
require the immediate resignation of a Prime Minister in 
circumstances where no party could muster a majority in the 
House of Commons. The Prime Minster and his colleagues 
could remain in office, and attempt to construct a new 
majority with support from other parties. Precedents for 
this course of action were clearly established in 1885 and 
again in 1892. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 30-31; 
490-492; and Wade & Phillips Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 18 & 224. This constitutional convention 
was first adopted in the Union by General Botha in 1915, and 
was clearly re-enforced by General Smuts in 1920. Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 143-144; and Worrall South Africa: 
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Government and Politics by Worrall (ed) 192-194. 
34. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 143-144. 
35. At first, General Botha wanted to resign, because he did not 
want to rely on the Unionist Party for support. He had no 
choice but to stay, however, because no other party was 
strong enough to form a government. Kruger The Making of a 
Nation 103. 
The results of the 1915 elections were as follows: South 
African Party 54 seats; Unionists 40 seats; National Party 
27 seats; Labour 4 seats, and Independents 5 seats. The 
ruling South African Party had to rely on the Unionists for 
support. Kruger A Nation op cit 103; and Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 143-44. 
36. Kruger A Nation op cit 114-116. 
37. In a House of 134 members, the National Party obtained 44 
seats, the Prime Minister's South African Party received 41 
seats; the Unionists won 25 seats; Labour was elected in 21 
seats, and the Independents took 3 seats. Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 144; or Kruger A Nation op cit 114. 
38. General Smuts could rely on the support of the three 
Independents, but he also needed the Unionists. The 
National Party and the Labour Party often voted together, 
but this total still only made 65 seats. Kruger A Nation op 
cit 114; or Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 144. To begin with, 
the South African Party government struggled on, assisted by 
the Unionists and erratic support in the Labour Party. In 
September 1920, the Prime Minister's Party attempted a 
reconciliation with the National Party, but this broke down. 
Eventually, in November 1920, a merger between the South 
African Party and the Unionists was agreed. Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 144; Worrall op cit 194; or Kruger A 
Nation op cit 114-116. -
39. In 1915 for example, General Botha had to replace one of his 
Cabinet Ministers who had lost his seat in the 1915 
elections. Three Ministers actually lost their seats. 
Kruger op cit 103. They were the Minister of Justice (NJ 
De Wet), the Minister of Railways (H Burton), and the 
Minister of Lands (HS Theron). Two of these Ministers were 
almost immediately re-elected to Parliament in by-elections, 
but Mr HS Theron was not. He ceased to be Minister of 
Lands on November 22nd 1915, and was subsequently replaced 
by Colonel H Mentz. Parliamentary Register 1910-1961 17-18 
& n9; 77; 83; and the 'Cape Times' 25th and 27th October 
1915. General Botha also made other Ministerial changes. 
Parliamentary Register 1910-1961 17-18. 
40. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 144. 
41. The combined South African Party and Unionist Party vote 
gave him 66 seats. He needed to rely on the Independents to 
give him the controlling 68 votes in a House of 134 members. 
42. Keith The Dominions op cit 245-246, and Worrall op cit 191. 
43. South Africa Act 1909 s 14. See Ch 2 op cit n15 supra. 
44. There would be circumstances under which, however, the Prime 
Minister and his colleagues would be obliged to resign. Ch 
3 op cit 46-48 infra. 
45. Keith The Dominions op cit 246. 
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46. Ibid; and n43 supra. 
47. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 156 & n32 infra. 
48. Keith The Dominions op cit 246; Worrall op cit 191; or 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 156 n32. 
49. Keith The Dominions op cit 246. At 245 Keith has asserted: 
'The Premiers' resignation ••. dissolves the ministry in the 
sense that ministers merely hold office until they are 
either relieved by the appointment of others, or are asked 
by the new Premier to remain at their posts or to accept 
other offices. ' 
50. Ibid; Worrall op cit 191; and VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op 
cit 156 n32. The former Prime Minister would again be 
commissioned to form a government, because he still 
commanded a working majority in the House of Assembly. 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 156 n32. 
51. Keith The Dominions op cit 246; Worrall op cit 191; and 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 156 n32. 
52. N51 supra. The background to the clash between Generals 
Botha and Hertzog is discussed in Worrall op cit 188-191; 
and KrUger South African Parties and Policies 1910-1960 61-
67. 
53. Keith The Dominions op cit 246. The reasons which justified 
the dismissal of Walter Madeley, are described by Kruger. 
Kruger A Nation op cit 154-155; or Parliamentary Register 
1910-1961 20-21; and the 'Cape Times' November 6th and 7th 
1928. The 'Cape Times', on 7th November 1928, reported the 
events as follows: 
'The political crisis ended with the resignation of the 
Government at noon yesterday and its immediate 
reconstruction; Mr W B Madley, Minister of Posts and 
Telegraphs, being replaced by Mr H W Sampson ••. ' 
The report went on to recite the events of the previous day 
as follows: 
'The Prime Minister waited until noon for the ex-Minister's 
resignation. Instead he got a telegram from Mr Madley 
inquiring the reasons for the urgency. General Hertzog 
immediately handed his own resignation to His Excellency Sir 
William Solomon, the Officer Administering the Government, 
and his Cabinet automatically went out of office. He was 
immediately requested to form another Administration, and at 
once submitted a list of names to His Excellency. The 
following official statement was issued in the afternoon by 
the office of the Prime Minister: 
"After a Cabinet meeting the Prime Minister gave Mr 
W B Madley, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, until 
12 noon to-day to resign. On the resignation not being 
received, General Hertzog tendered the resignation of 
his Cabinet to the Officer Administering the 
Government, Sir William Solomon. The Acting Governor-
General asked General Hertzog to form a new Ministry. 
The new Administration was sworn in at 3pm this 
afternoon. Mr H W Sampson OBE MLA replaces Mr W B 
Madley as Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Public 
Works."' 




















be mentioned at this stage, as the current section of this 
chapter is only covering the period up to 1926. It is being 
mentioned here for. convenience and clarity, although at some 
cost to structural consistency. NB The Minister's name has 
been spelt incorrectly by the 'Cape Times'. 
The resignation of the Prime Minister and his colleagues is 
examined under a separate heading. Ch 3 op cit 46-48 & n116 
supra. 
Ch 3 op cit 33 supra. 
N54 supra. 
Ibid. Reasons for obedience to convention will be examin~d 
in Ch 6 and Ch 7 infra. 
Ch 2 op cit 16-17 & nn28-38 supra. 
The importance of s 13 of the South African Act 1909 is 
explained in Ch 2 op cit 13-14 & nn14-21 supra. The 
Interpretation of Laws Act is looked in Ch 2 op cit 17; & 
nn21 & 38 supra. 
Ch 2 op cit 16-17 supra. 
Ch 3 op cit 32-34 & nn7-16 supra. The Executive 
Council was not filled with rubber-stamp nominees of the 
Governor-General. It was filled with past and present 
Ministers of State, who would have been selected by past and 
present Prime Ministers of the Union. 
Ch 3 op cit 34-39 supra. 
Ch 2 op cit 16 & n32 supra. 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 160 & n50. 
Evatt The King and His Dominion Governors 175 who quotes 
Keith as follows: 
'To intimidate the strikers he decided to deport without 
legal authority ten leaders •.• The step taken was wholly 
illegal ••• It was found that General Smuts had admitted 
that he had had recourse to the illegal deportation because 
he knew that Parliament would never give him authority in 
cold blood to expel the men in question.' 
The background to the industrial unrest of 1913-14 is 
described by Kruger. Kruger A Nation op cit 74-75. 
Evatt op cit 176. Indemnity Acts are described in Krohn V 
The Minister For Defence And Others 1915 AD 191 per Innes 
CJ at 197-198, and in Welsh 'Martial Law' (1941) 58 SALJ 
111 at 120-121. 
Keith The Dominions op cit 66. 
Evatt op cit 175. 
Prior to 1926, the analogy was inaccurate in relation to the 
Govenor-General's position concerning the dissolution of 
Parliament. Ch 3 op cit 42-45 infra. 
Ch 2 op cit 21-23 supra. The Governor-General was an 
appointee of the Imperial government, and he was bound to 
follow any instructions which it chose to give him. The 
Imperial government could have instructed the Governor-
General to veto the Indemnity Bill. 
Maitland The Constitutional History of England 423; Wade & 
Phillips op cit 17; 226-229; and VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op 
cit 160. 
Wade & Phillips op cit 17 note than when Queen Anne refused 
the assent to the Scottish Militia Bill, this was apparently 
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done with the approval of her Ministers and without 
objection from Parliament. 
72. Evatt op cit 176. 
73. Keith The Dominions op cit 225-226. 
74. Op cit 225. 
75. Ibid. 
76. This can be deduced from general remarks of Keith which were 
applicable to all the Dominions. Keith Dominion Home Rule 
in Practice 9: 
'The vast authority of the Governor is exercised, by 
constitutional law or custom, on the advice of his 
ministers, who are responsible to Parliament for the advice 
which they tender to him.' 
77. The provisions of the South Africa Act gave the Governor-
General legal authority to summon and prorogue Parliament 
without the advice of his Union Ministers. Ch 2 op cit 16 & 
n33 supra. On the other hand, under the Letters Patent of 
1909, the Governor-General could be obliged to summon or 
prorogue Parliament on instructions from the Imperial 
government in London. Ch 2 op cit 22-23 & n69 supra. Hence, 
legal provisions could oblige the Governor-General to follow 
British Ministerial advice, but not South African 
Ministerial advice. 
78. N76 supra. In relation to the pardon or reprieve of 
offenders in Capital cases, the Governor-General had 
specific authority to act 'according to his own deliberate 
judgment'. See, Royal Instructions of 1909 paragraph IX as 
follows: 
'Whenever any offender shall have been condemned to suffer 
death by the sentence of any Court, the Governor-General 
shall consult the Executive Council upon the case of such 
offender •.. The Governor-General shall not pardon or 
reprieve any such offender unless it shall appear to him 
expedient so to do, upon receiving the advice of the 
Executive Council thereon; but in all cases he is to decide 
either to extend or to withhold a pardon or reprieve, 
according to his own deliberate judgment, whether the 
members of the Executive Council concur therein or otherwise 
Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 125-126. 
79. Keith The Dominions op cit 219-220; and Wheare The Statute 
of Westminster and Dominion Status 57, who says vis-a-vis a 
Governor's discretion to refuse advice: 
'This doctrine of discretion was not always accepted by 
colonial minsters and its exercise gave rise to numerous 
controversies, chiefly upon the question of the grant of 
dissolution. It was discussed in relation to this question 
at the Colonial Conference in 1887 and a majority of the 
colonial premiers approved it'. 
80. Keith The Dominions op cit 222-223, & n86 infra. A proviso 
must be added however. Only one dissolution could be asked 
for by the same minority within a limited period; if it 
failed ~o secure a majority at a dissolution, it could not 
endeavour to secure a compliant legislature by a series of 
dissolutions. The King, in such instances, would be 
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entitled to refuse such dissolutions. VerLoren Van Themaat 
2ed op cit 157; and Keith The Dominions op cit 223. The 
King's discretionary power to act without advice is 
discussed in greater detail. Ch 3 op cit 55-58 & n193 
infra. 
81. Keith The Dominions op cit 220. 
82. Keith Dominion Home Rule op cit 9-10. 
83. Op cit 9. 
84. Op cit 9-10. 
85. In 1926, the actions of the Canadian Governor-General were 
clearly repudiated by the electorate. Keith The Dominions 
op cit 221. 
86. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 328-343; especially 335-
339. At 338 he quotes from the memorandum of Lord Esher, 
drawn up during the Home Rule crisis of 1912-1914, which 
said as follows: 
'Ministerial ,responsibility is the safeguard of the 
monarchy. Without it, the throne could not stand for long, 
amid the gusts of political conflict and the storm of 
political passion •.. 
In the last resort the King has no option. If the 
constitutional doctrines of ministerial responsibility mean 
anything at all, the King would have to sign his own death-
warrant, if it was presented to him for signature by a 
minister commanding a majority in Parliament. If there is 
any tampering with this fundamental principle, the end of 
the monarchy is in sight ..• ' 
Cf n185 infra. The King would be unwise to enter into a 
political conflict with his Ministers, even if they lacked a 
majority in the elected House of Parliament. Jennings 
Cabinet Government op cit 339; and Ch 3 op cit 56-58 infra. 
87. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 143-144. The first elections 
for the Union Parliament were held on 15th September 1910. 
The next election was held on October 20th 1915. The third 
general elections were held in March 1920. Ibid. 
The maximum five year life-span for the House of Assembly 
was set out ins 45 of the South Africa Act 1909. See Ch 2 
op cit n33 infra. 
88. General Elections were held in February 1921~ Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 144. 
89. Nn37 & 38 supra. 
90. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 144 notes that the Unionists 
were anxious to maintain the Imperial connection, while the 
Nationalists wanted an independent South Africa. Between 
1915 and 1920, the Unionists consistently supported the 
South African Party. Ibid. After the 1920 elections, the 
Unionist and South African Parties merged. Ibid. 
91. General Elections were held in June 1924. Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 144. 
92. Prior to the 1924 elections, the South African Party of 
General Smuts held 79 seats; the National Party of General 
Hertzog held 45 seats; the Labour Party held 9 seats; and 
the Independents held one seat. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 
144. 
93. Constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom and South 
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Africa may have differed from each other in one respect 
however. 
In the United Kingdom, prior to 1918, it was the convention 
that advice to dissolve Parliament was tendered to the 
Sovereign by the Prime Minister, who acted on behalf of the 
Cabinet. Due to error, this convention was disregarded 
after 1918, and it has become the subsequent practice for 
the Prime Minister to act without the assent of the Cabinet. 
Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 417-419. In the 
Dominions as late as 1940, it was still not settled whether 
the Prime Minister or the Cabinet had the final say about 
requesting a dissolution of Parliament. Keith 'The War and 
the Constitution' (1940-'41) 4 MLR 1 at 6. 
In South Africa however, it is known that General Smuts 
requested a dissolution in 1924, without reference to his 
colleagues in the Cabinet. Kruger A Nation op cit 134. 
94. Ch 2 op cit 21-23 supra. 
95. Ch 3 op cit 40-45 supra. 
96. Keith The Dominions op cit 228. 
97. Ibid. The nature of Martial Law is reviewed by Welsh. See 
Welsh (1941) SALJ op cit 111 at 111-113. The right of the 
State to use all force necessary to protect itself from 
internal or external attack is an inherent one, based on the 
law of self-defence or necessity. Ibid; Queen v Bekker and 
Naude 1900 SC 340 per Solomon J at 355-356; and Krohn v The 
Minister for Defence and others 1915 AD 191 per Innes CJ at 
197-198. Martial law may give rise to incidental 
illegalities. This was explained by De Villiers AJA in 
the Krohn case at 211: 
'As necessity, then, affords the only excuse, the powers of 
the Crown and its officials are limited both as to their 
extent and their duration by the necessity of the case. Any 
excess beyond what the necessity of the case demands is 
punishable.' 
See also Innes CJ at 198. 
98. On 12th October 1914, Martial Law was declared by the new 
Governor-General, Lord Buxton, in terms of Proclamation No 
219 of 1914. See also Krohn v The Minister of Defence and 
others 1915 AD 191 per Innes CJ at 195; and per Solomon J A 
at 205. It is clear however, that Lord Buxton acted on 
Ministerial advice, because the proclamation was 
countersigned by General Smuts below the words 'By Command 
of His Excellency the Governor-General-in-Council.' Years 
later, Lord Buxton confirmed that he had acted on the advice 
of the Cabinet. Earl Buxton General Botha 55. 
99. The 1939 dissolution crisis will be examined separately. Ch 
3 op cit 68-82 infra. On the whole, the relationship 
between the Governor-General and his Ministers were 
pleasant, almost cordial. General Botha and Lord Buxton for 
example, had numerous, almost daily, informal discussions. 
Mandelbrote in Walker (ed) The Cambridge History of the 
British Empire Vol VIII SoulliAfrica 705. On one occasion 
however, it is known that Lord Buxton deliberated with his 
Ministers at a Cabinet meeting, when peace terms with German 
South-West Africa were being discussed. Op cit 705 & n8. 
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Mandelbrote also notes that occasionally Lord Buxton would 
consult John X. Merriman and other influential private 
members, the constitutional correctness of which is to 
be doubted. Op cit 705. There is no suggestion however, 
that this led to clashes between the Governor-General and 
his Ministers. 
100. Lord De Villiers established a tradition that the Chief 
Justice of South Africa filled the position of Acting 
Governor-General. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 123. 
101. N97 supra; Ex parte Marais 1902 AC 109 per Halsbury LC at 
114-115, who at 115 says: 
'The truth is that no doubt has ever existed that where war 
actually prevails the ordinary Courts have no jurisdiction 
over the action of the military authorities.' 
See also Krohn v The Minister of Defence and others 1915 
AD 191 per De Villiers AJA at 212. 
102. This is discussed by Keith in a general context which could 
be applied to all the Dominions of that period. Keith The 
Dominions op cit 248-249. In relation to South Africa, see 
n105 infra. 
103. Keith The Dominions op cit 248-249. 
104. Nn37-38 supra; Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 144. 
105. Keith The Dominions op cit 251. With specific reference to 
this convention in South Africa, Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 
141 have said: 
'The ministers hold office during the governor-general's 
pleasure; that is, during the pleasure of.parliament: if the 
ministers cannot command the confidence of the legislature, 
the prime minister informs the governor-general of this 
fact, and either he advises the governor-general to dissolve 
parliament, or he resigns, and may advise the governor-
general to send for the leader of the opposition. If the 
latter is prepared to form a government, he in due course 
submits the names of his proposed ministers to the governor-
general •.. ' 
106. Ch 3 op cit 37 & nn33-35 supra. 
107. N35 supra. 
108. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 143-144; or KrUger A Nation op 
cit 103. 
109. Ch 3 op cit 37 and nn36-38 supra. 
110. For the results of the 1920 elections, see n37 supra. 
General Smuts had the support of the Unionists and the 
Independent members in the House of Assembly. The combined 
strength of the National Party and the Labour Party was 
insufficient to outvote General Smuts' supporters. N38 
supra. 
111. KrUger A Nation op cit 134. 
112. Op cit 133-134. 
113. Op cit 134; Worrall op cit 197; or Kennedy & Schlosberg op 
cit 144. 
114. N113 supra. 
115. Kruger A Nation op cit 134. 
116. Ibid. General Hertzog was thereby able to form an adminis-
tration by some form of coalition or working agreement with 
the Labour Party. 
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It should be remembered that when the Governor-General called 
upon General Hertzog to form a new administration, the 
General commanded only 63 seats in the House of Assembly. 
Kruger A Nation p cit 134. General Hertzog was not a'leader 
of a majority party in the lower House. The decision of the 
Governor-General was an appropriate one however, because 
General Hertzog could rely on the Labour Party to give him 
an effective majority. See generally, Keith The Dominions 
op cit 251-252. 
117. A more detailed analysis of collective responsibility is 
provided by Jennings. See Jennings Cabinet Government op 
cit 277-289; Wade & Phillips op cit 99-102; and MacIntosh 
The British Cabinet 531. 
In South Africa, it has been assumed that collective 
responsibility is a mere reflection of the equivalent con-
stitutional convention in the United Kingdom. Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 142; or VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 
159. This assumption is suspect. See Ch 7 op cit 215-218 
infra. 
118. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 277-278; Wade & Phillips· 
op cit 100; and VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 159. 
119. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 278, 282--284; Wade & 
Phillips op cit 100; and VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 
159. 
120. Wade & Phillips op cit 100; VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 
159. 
121. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 277; and VefLoren Van 
Themaat 2ed op cit 159. MacIntosh The British Cabinet op 
cit 531 has said: 
' .•. all members of a government are expected to be 
unanimous in support of its policies on all public 
occasions. This is in part because divergence among leading 
members of a government afford such wonderful openings to 
its opponents and are such evidence of disharmony that they 
cannot be tolerated. But there was and is a feeling that 
men working together to guide national affairs ought either 
to be in sufficient agreement to give genuine advocacy to 
collective decisions (despite differences at the formative 
stage) or should resign.' 
122. Kruger A Nation op cit 63. 
123. Op cit 63-64; and Worrall op cit 187-190. 
124. Kruger A Nation op cit 63-64. The South African Party was 
formally created more than a year after the elections of 
1910. Worrall op cit 190. 
125. Kruger A Nation op cit 64. 
126. Ibid. 
127. Ibid. 
128. Ibid; and MacIntosh at n121 supra. 
129. Kruger A Nation op cit 64. 
130. Since 1908, the education policy of the Orange River Colony 
(and later the Orange Free State) had provided for mother 
tongue instruction in schools, up to Standard Four. In the 
more senior Standards of the school system, the other 
official language was gradually introduced, as a medium of 
instruction in three subjects. The policy can best be· 
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described as one of mother tongue instruction with an 
element of forced bi-lingualism. Kruger A Nation op cit 58. 
The policy was enormously controversial, and the Prime 
Minister decided to refer the whole matter to a 
Parliamentary Select Committee. Worrall op cit 189 & 190; 
and Kruger A Nation op cit 57-58. The Select Committee 
rejected the education policy of the Free State. Worrall op 
cit 190. The majority report recommended that teachers 
should not be forced to qualify in both languages, that 
children should be educated on their mother tongue up to 
Standard Four, and that thereafter, parents should be 
allowed to choose the medium of instruction. Kruger A 
Nation op cit 58. -
The South African Party Caucus accepted the majority report. 
Kruger op cit 58-59. Hertzog concealed his disappointment 
and accepted the majority report for the sake of peace. 
Worrall op cit 190. The convention of Collective responsi-
bility was severely strained by the language dispute 
nonetheless. Although Hertzog signed the majority report of 
the Select Committee, he could scarcely conceal the contempt 
he felt for its views. At one stage, he contemplated 
resignation. Van Den Heever General J BM Hertzog 142-143. 
Hertzog went so far as to declare in Parliament that the 
minority report was 'far more in accordance with the 
requirements of the Union' than the majority report. Ibid. 
His resignation was only averted when the Cabinet agreed in 
writing that he would not have to oppose the minority report 
in or out of Parliament. Op cit 143. 
131. Kruger A Nation op cit 64-65; Worrall op cit 189 & 190-191. 
132. Kruger A Nation op cit 65. The Prime Minsiter privately 
agreed with much of what Hertzog said. Worrall op cit 191. 
He was afraid however, that the South African Party would 
lose support if his Cabinet colleague failed to be more 
circumspect in public. Kruger A Nation op cit 65; or 
Worrall op cit 191. 
133. Kruger A Nation op cit 65; and Worrall op cit 190-191. For 
the content of the Smithfield and D~ Wildt speeches, refer 
to Kruger South African Parties and Policies op cit 63-67. 
134. Kruger A Nation op cit 66. 
135. Ibid. 
136. Ibid. 
137. Ibid; or Worrall op cit 191. 
138. N137 supra. 
139. Kruger A Nation op cit 67-69. 
140. Ch 3 op cit 47-48 & nn111-115 supra. 
141. The Cabinet included three Ministers who were drawn from the 
Labour Party. Ch 3 op cit 48 & n116 supra. 
142. Malan The Cambridge History of the British Empire op cit 
662. 
143. Ch 3 op cit 49 & nn123-124 supra. 
144. Tielman Roos was the leader of the National Party in the 
Transvaal. Kruger A Nation op cit 137. 
145. Malan The Cambridge History of the British Empire op cit 
662. 
146. There was little resemblance between the Executive Council 
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of the Orange Free State or of the South African Republic, 
and the Westminster Cabinet system. The political influence 
of the republican Executive Councils was weak, and they were 
easily dominated by the respective Presidents of each of the 
two States. Hahlo & Kahn The Union of South Africa: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution 81; & 98-100 cf. 
Malan The Cambridge History of the British Empire op cit 
661-662. 
147. Kruger A Nation op cit 154-155. Two Cabinet Ministers, 
Creswell and Boydell, were among the Labour members of 
Parliament who were expelled from the party by the National 
Labour Council. The third Labour Cabinet Minister, Madeley, 
continued to support the National Council. Ibid. 
148. Op cit 155; or n53 supra. 
149. Kruger A Nation op cit 155. 
150. N147 supra. 
151. N53 supra. 
152. Ibid. 
153. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 21-29; and VerLoren 
Van Themaat 2ed op cit 199. 
154. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 199-200. 
155. Op cit 200 and 564. 
156. By 1926, the word 'Dominion' was the accepted term to 
describe a self-governing colony such as the Union of South 
Africa. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 21-24; and 
Ch 1 op cit n34 supra. 
157. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 34-35; and VerLoren 
Van Themaat 2ed op cit 200-201. 
158. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 201; and Ch 2 op cit 21-23 
supra. 
159. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 565; Keith The Dominions op 
cit 63; or May op cit 39. 
160. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 55-61; & 126. 
Indeed, the resolution is plagued with difficulties. N201 
infra. 
161. Wheares' views are to be found in Wheare The Statute of 
Westminster op cit 56-57. Keiths' views are to be found in 
Ch 3 op cit 42-43 supra. 
162. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 57-58; 126; and 
Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 414-417; & 539-545. 
Closely associated with the dissolution question was the 
controversy about whether or not the King could dismiss his 
Ministers. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 403-412; 413; 
415; & 416. The dissolution and dismissal issues are 
referred to in more detail. Ch 3 op cit 53-60; & nn162-165; 
n168; & nn170-195 infra. 
163. Ch 3 op cit 42-43 supra. Keith seems to have vacillated 
several times however, about whether or not the King could 
act without his Ministers' advice. Markesinis The Theory 
and Practice of Dissolution of Parliament 70-71; 85 & n2. 
164. Wheare The Statute of Westminster 57-58. 
165. Op cit 58; 61; & 126. 
166. Keith The Dominions op cit 222. 
167. Op cit 220-222. Keith viewed Lord Byng's actions as being 
entirely unconstitutional ie a breach of convention. O~ cit 
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221. Keith regarded the Governor-General's actions as 
unconstitutional, because he was unable to secure a Ministry 
which was able to carry on without a dissolution. Ibid. 
It should be noted that the views Keith expressed in 1938 
about the Canadian crisis were not the same as those he had 
expressed in 1927. The views he expressed in his book 
'Responsible Government in the Dominions' were criticized 
for being inherently contradictory. Wheare The Statute of 
Westminster op cit 58-59. Keith's later views anticipated 
criticism of the sort which was soon to be made by Wheare. 
168. Keith The Dominions op cit 222. Although Keith insisted 
that the King would have to dissolve Parliament whenever 
advised to do so by his Ministers, this was subject to a 
proviso. N80 supra. This proviso would also apply to the 
Governor-General of a Dominion after 1926. 
169. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 126. The main 
intention of the resolution however, was to end the dual 
nature of the Governor-General's functions. Adoption of the 
resolution meant that the Governor-General was no longer a 
representative or an agent of the Imperial government in 
London. Op cit 35-36; 126; and VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op 
cit 201. 
170. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 126. 
171. N162 supra. The background to the Home Rule Crisis, and all 
the constitutional issues which it involved, are well 
explained by Markesinis op cit 63-71; and Jennings Cabinet 
Government op cit 395-400. 
172. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 57. Sir William 
Anson's letter to 'The Times', dated 10th September 1913 is 
reproduced in Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 541. 
173. Sir William Anson's views were backed up by Dicey. Jennings 
Cabinet Government op cit 396 & 544. 
174. The letter, dated 10th September 1913, is reproduced in 
Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 541-543. 
175. N 173 supra. 
176. 'The Times' leading article of 8th September 1913 is 
reproduced in Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 540. 
177. Among such 'reserved rights' are: 
(a) the power to appoint the Prime Minister without advice; 
(b) 11 11 " dismiss Ministers without advice; 







reject a request for dissolution; 
11 refuse the assent to legislation; 
11 refuse a request for the creation of Peers 
to over-ride opposition in the House of 
Lords. 
Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 394-396. He refers to 
these 'reserved rights' as the 'personal prerogatives', 
while conceding that the practical extent of these powers is 
the subject of considerable dispute. Op cit 394. These 
legal powers are now superceded to a considerable extent by 
non-legal, conventional rules of the Constitution. Ch 1 op 
cit 3-5 & nn14-33 supra. The development of constitutional 
convention explains why 'The Times' article refers to the 
legal powers of the King as 'atrophied by long disuse'. At 
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the heart of the controversy about the 'reserved' legal 
rights of the King is the argument about whether they can be 
exercised without a violation of convention. 
178. Cf the letter of Lord Hugh Cecil to 'The Times', which is 
quoted in Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 542-543, and 
which counter-argued as follows: 
'In what circumstances it may be wise for the Sovereign to 
exercise his constitutional right is quite another question. 
What is constitutional is not always judicious .•• But what 
may briefly be called the 'automatic' theory [that the King 
must follow the advice of his existing Ministers] is a 
serious misrepresentation of the Constitution ••• For that 
theory mistakes the underlying principle of which the 
conventions of the Constitution are the expressions. That 
principle is that there must be no conflict between the King 
and his people, nor consequently between the King and a 
House of Commons which correctly represents his people. But 
there is nothing unconstitutional in a disagreement between 
the King and his Ministers except in so far as it implies a 
disagreement with the House of Commons and ultimately with 
the people. The constitutional rules which I have 
endeavoured to state [Ch 3 op cit 55-56 supra] do three things: 
they absolutely prevent a conflict between the King and the 
people; they prevent a conflict between the King and the 
House of Commons except in the case where both he and 
experienced advisers see reason to doubt that the House of 
Commons really represents the people; and in the event of 
such a conflict they require the King to protect the dignity 
of his office from all controversy or censure by interposing 
a ministry to bear the whole responsibility for what has 
been done.' 
These views reflect the opinions of Dicey which are quoted 
in Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 407; See further, 
Dicey op cit 432-437; & 453-454. There is a major flaw in 
Lord Hugh Cecil's ideas however. He assumes that the King 
and his most trusted advisers can accurately gauge the point 
at which the government and House of Commons have lost the 
support of the electorate. This is a sweeping assumption 
which needs to be justified. Jennings Cabinet Government op 
cit 410-411; 415-417; and Markesinis op cit 67-68; & 70-71. 
179. The letter written by J.H. Morgan to 'The Times', dated 10th 
Septemter 1913, is reproduced in Jennings Cabinet Government 
op cit 543-544. 
180. The Prime Minister's memorandum is reprinted in Jennings 
Cabinet Government op cit 408. Asquith explained his 
opposition to the exercise of the King's legal powers in the 
following terms: 
'If, on the other hand, the King were to intervene on one 
side, or in one case - which he could only do by dismissing 
ministers in de facto possession of a Parliamentary majority 
- he would be expected to do the same on another occasion, 
and perhaps for the other side. Every Act of Parliament of 
the first order of importance, and only passed after acute 
controversy, would be regarded as bearing the personal 
imprimatur of the Sovereign. He would, whether he wished it 
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or not, be dragged into the arena of party politics; and at 
a dissolution following such a dismissal of ministers as has 
just been referred to, it is no exageration to say that the 
Crown would become the football of contending factions.' 
181. Ibid. This memorandum was one of the most successful 
documents which the Prime Minister ever drafted, and in 
Professor Wilson's words contained 'the orthodox view of the 
position of a constitutional Monarch in the twentieth 
century.' Markesinis op cit 68. 
182. N180 supra. 
183. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 426, who quotes the views 
of Lord Esher approvingly. 
184. Jennings refers to Lord Esher, who has said that George V 
refused a dissolution in November 1910 and that Herbert 
Asquith and his Cabinet decided to resign. The King 
subsequently agreed to grant the dissolution. Op cit 414-
415. 
185. Jennings clearly supported Morgan's point of view. Jennings 
Cabinet Government op cit 409-411; & 416-417. Markesinis op 
cit 71 has said: 
'Forsey, Evatt, Laski, Wilson, Keith, Morgan and Jennings 
all agree that a forced dissolution would have resulted in a 
dismissal of the Liberal Government in 1913 which would have 
been extremely dangerous to the Crown.' 
For the personal views of Markesinis, see Markesinis op.cit 
55; 65-67; 69-70; & 70-71. Lord Esher, who was advising 
George V during the Horne Rule Crisis, underwent a change of 
heart however. At first, he argued that the King had no 
option but to obey Ministers commanding a majority in 
Parliament. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 337-338. 
As the crisis deepened, he changed his mind and thought that 
the King ought to dismiss his Ministers. Op cit 399; & 416-
417. He argued that it might become necessary for the King 
to dismiss his Ministers 'at the moment when armed conflict 
was recognised to be inevitable.' Op cit 416. 
186. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 408-409. 
187. Op cit 399-400; 409; and Markesinis op cit 69. The King's 
ideas were developed further by later writers. It was 
argued that the King could exercise his residuary legal 
powers if this helped to protect the 'democratic' essentials 
of the constitution. De Smith Constitutional and 
Administrative Law 122-129; and VerLoren Van Thernaat 2ed op 
cit 157. De Smith recognized of course, that the exercise 
of these powers could destroy the Monarchy, and that 
decisions had to be based on the 'lesser of two evils.' De 
Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law op cit 123-124. 
These views have not been universally accepted however. 
VerLoren Van Thernaat 2ed op cit 157 n36. · 
188. Markesinis op cit 87. Dicey and Anson did not subscribe to 
this view however. Op cit 86-87. Nor do Beloff or King, 
who argue that the Sovereign must automatically grant a 
request for the dissolution of Parliament. Op cit 91. 
189. Markesinis explores this subject, with reference to the 1924 
and 1926 dissolutions, which took place in the United 
Kingdom and Canada respectively. Markesinis op cit 86-94. 
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190. Op cit 91-92. 
191. Op cit 92. Keith elaborates upon this observation,- with 
reference to the grant of a dissolution to the minority 
Labour Government of Ramsay MacDonald in 1924: 
'If a dissolution had been refused, it is certain that the 
propriety of the King's action would not have been 
appreciated, and the idea would have been broadcast in the 
ranks of the electorate that the King had taken the earliest 
possible moment to rid himself of a Labour ministry, and had 
refused it the right to appeal to the electors •.• The Crown 
would have been bitterly assailed .•• and the unique 
opportunity would have been lost of showing to the Labour 
party that from the King it could expect absolutely fair and 
impartial treatment in all essentials.' 
Quoted in Markesinis op cit 92. Similar sentiments were 
expressed by Lord Esher. Ibid. 
192. Ibid. 
193. De Smith has inferred that it would be improper for the 
Prime Minister to request a dissolution of Parliament, if 
the country was on the verge of a major military defeat in 
wartime. In such circumstances, the Sovereign would be 
justified in refusing a dissolution, regardless of whether 
the government enjoyed majority or minority support in the 
House of Commons. De Smith Constitutional and 
Administrative Law op cit 125-126. 
Lord Simon has argued that a minority government cannot 
expect a dissolution to be automatically granted, if the 
most recent general poll was held comparatively recently. 
Markesinis op cit 91-92. VerLoren Van Themaat holds a 
similar opinion, along with Keith. N80 supra. 
194. For the personal views of Markesinis, see Markesinis op cit 
55; 65-67; 69-70; & 70-71. 
195. N185 supra. 
196. The procedure which used to be followed in the appointment 
of Governors-General is explained separately. Ch 3 op cit 
96-98 infra. For the 'rules' relating to the appointment of 
an hereditary Monarch, see De Smith Constitutional and 
Administrative Law op cit 130-131. 
197. Ch 3 op cit 43 & nn82-86 supra. 
198. Ch 3 op cit 54-55 & n170 supra. This problem is referred to 
again, in a different context. Ch 3 op cit 65~68 infra. 
199. Ch 3 op cit 55-58 supra. 
200. Ch 1 op cit 1-6; Ch 2 op cit 12; and Ch 3 op cit 32; 41; & n68 
supra. 
201. Ch 3 op cit 52-53 supra. The exact meaning of this 
intention is full of difficulty however. Firstly, it is 
inherently ambiguous. Ch 3 op cit 58-60 supra. Secondly, 
it is closely tied up with the quest for equality of status 
among all members of the Commonwealth and is thus primarily 
concerned with intra-Imperial relations. Ch 3 op cit 65-68; 
& nn225 & 234 infra. 
202. Markesinis op cit 72. 
203. A clear departure from practice occured in .1868, when 
Disraeli asked for a dissolution of Parliament without 
referring his request to the Cabinet. Markesinis op cit 73-
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74. Other, less clear examples may also be cited. Op cit 
72-73. 
204. Op cit 72. 
205. Op cit 74. 
206. Herbert Asquith had resigned the Premiership. Ibid. The 
King sent for the leader of the Opposition, in accordance 
with constitutional precedent. Ibid. 
207. Ibid. 
208. Ibid. 
209. Ibid; and MacIntosh The British Cabinet op cit 362-363; 380 
& 382. 
210. Markesinis op cit 74~75. 
211. Op cit 75. 
212. Ibid; MacIntosh The British Cabinet op cit 382; and Jennings 
Cabinet Government op cit 418-419. 
213. On the 18th October 1924 the minority Labour government of 
Ramsay MacDonald was defeated on an issue of confidence. On 
the same day, the Cabinet agreed that the Prime Minister 
should seek a dissolution from the King. Markesinis op cit 
77-78; or MacIntosh The British Cabinet op cit 454. 
214. Markesinis op cit 82. 
215. Viscount Buxton was Governor-General of South Africa from 
8th September 1914 until 3rd September 1920. Parliamentary 
Register 1910-1982 5. General Elections were held during 
his term of office, on 20th October 1915, and 10th March 
1920. Op cit 331. 
216. Buxton op cit 203-204. 
217. Kruger A Nation op cit 133-134. 
218. Crafford Jan Smuts - a biography 231-232; Van Der Poel (ed) 
Selections from the Smuts Papers Vol V 224 &n2; and Van Den 
Heever op cit 204. 
219. Crafford op cit 231-232. 
220. Ibid. 
221. It looks as though Smuts was the main force behind the 
decision to call elections in 1921. Worrall op cit 194; and 
Crafford op cit 197. The lack of an adverse reaction would 
suggest however, that the Prime Minister had consulted at 
least some of his Cabinet colleagues. It is not certain 
whether the ultimate decision rested with the Prime 
Minister, or with the Cabinet. 
222. Ch 3 op cit 53 supra. 
223. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 126. 
224. The war emphasised the special position of the British Prime 
Minister, which was clearly above the rest of the Cabinet. 
Ch 3 op cit 61-62; & nn209-211 supra. The introduction of 
universal male suffrage in 1918, with its concomitant 
strengthening of the party political system, further 
enhanced the position of the Prime Minister. MacIntosh 
The British Cabinet op cit 414-415. The rise of the Prime 
Minister had started however, long before the First World 
War, and can be traced back to developments since the 1870s. 
Op cit 308-321. The King would have to take account of such 
developments when acting on advice. 
225. Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 34. 
226. Op cit 30-32; 34; 35-36; 38; and VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op 
-34-
cit 201. According to Wheare, the attempt to equate the 
relationship between a Governor-General and his Cabinet to 
the relationship between the King and the United Kingdom 
Cabinet was misguided. The Conference had been reacting to 
events in Canada, where the Governor-General had refused a 
dissolution to one Prime Minister while granting it almost 
immediately thereafter to another. The Canadian Prime 
Minister had felt that because the Canadian Governor-General 
had not acted in relation to his Ministers in Canada as the 
King would have acted in relation to his Ministers in the 
United Kingdom, therefore Canada was unequal in status to 
the United Kingdom. Wheare disputes the Canadian Prime 
Minister's assumption. He has said: 'Provided there was no 
external control the alleged fact that Lord Byng acted 
differently in Canada from the King in the United Kingdom is 
not more relevant to the question of equality of status than 
would be the fact that Lord Byng acted differently from the 
President of France in similar circumstances. Identity of 
structure is to be distinguished from equality of status.' 
Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 25; 30; 31 & n1; 
32; & 60-61. Cf Keith The Dominions op cit 220-222. 
Accordingly, equating the position of a Govenor-General with 
the position of the King must be seen in the context of a 
misguided attempt to end a perceived inequality. The 
Conference resolution must be read, bearing this factor in 
mind. 
227. Even in the Conference's misguided attempt to restrict the 
Governor-General's 'reserve' power to refuse a dissolution, 
it was singularly unsuccessful. N231 infra. 
228. Ch 1 op cit 10 supra. 
229. Op cit 1-6; and Ch 2 op cit 12 supra. 
230. De Smith The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions 77-82. 
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the South African consti-
tution at Union was its treatment of the parliamentary 
franchise. The analysis of the subject by Kennedy & 
Schlosberg speaks volumes for the peculiar political condi-
tions in South Africa in the years after Union. Kennedy & 
Schlosberg op cit 62-64. They have remarked: 
'There is, in the first place, the pure-blooded Kaffir, or 
Bantu, or, as he is commonly called, the native. In South 
Africa the problem of the native in his relation to the 
white man is one to which there has been no parallel in the 
experience of mankind ••. The white man thinks that after 
the terrible struggles and privations which he has endured 
in order to build up a modern civilisation in Africa, he 
ought never to allow himself to be placed in such a position 
that the numerical superiority of the natives will overwhelm 
him and the civilisation which he has laboured to establish 
In South Africa problems of government are intensified 
by the clash of interests between different races. The 
simple expedient of applying the principle of equality means 
that if all adult whites possess the franchise, all adult 
natives must equally possess the franchise •.• It means 
that the centuries of culture, of traditon, of knowledge, 
and of political accomplishment will be worth one-fifth in 
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the government of the country as compared with the almost 
barbaric state, the superstitious beliefs, the crudeness and 
the childishness, of the native masses.' 
Op cit 62-63. 
231. Ch 3 op cit 58-60 supra. 
232. The conventional practices in the United Kingdom were not 
very consistent in the years immediately prior to the 1926 
Conference. In 1924 for example, the decision to advise a 
dissolution of Parliament was taken by the whole Cabinet, 
and not by the Prime Minister alone. N213 supra. Accord-
ingly, the Dominions were presented with conflicting British 
precedent; they could satisfy one but not the other. 
233. Take for example, a British precedent from 1931. The 
decision to dissolve Parliament in 1931 was taken by the 
entire British Cabinet. The 'National Government' of the 
time was a coalition government, and it has been suggested 
that the Prime Minister's decision to leave matters in the 
hands of the Cabinet was driven by a fear that the com-
promise between the parties might otherwise break down. 
Markesinis op cit 78-79. Actual political realities are 
vital for a proper understanding of the workings of a 
Constitution. Op cit 114-115. 
234. Imperial Conferences were not designed to deal with such 
issues. Their primary aim was to promote Imperial co-
operation. Accordingly, participants were drawn exclusively 
from the ranks of existing governments. VerLoren Van 
Themaat 2ed op cit 191-192; & 192 n52. Consequently, the 
participants did not encompass the broad spectrum of 
political opinion which was to be found in each of the 
respective member states. Discussing practices which were 
so closely tied up with domestic political conditions in 
each of the participating states, would therefore have been 
utterly inappropriate. 
235. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 143. 
236. Kruger A Nation op cit 195; and Prime Minister Hertzog House 
of Assembly Debates 35 (1939) 4th September Cols 19 & 
20. 
237. Kruger A Nation op cit 185. In 1933, the South African 
Party entered a coalition with the ruling National Party. 
General Hertzog was Prime Minister, with General Smuts as 
deputy-Prime Minister in the new arrangement. Op cit 165-
167. A movement towards fusion of the two coalition parties 
commenced almost immediately, and this was finally achieved 
in June 1934. Op cit 168-173. The coalition parties gained 
an overwhelming victory in the 1933 elections. Op cit 166. 
Under the colours of the 'United South African National 
Party' the fused coalition partners went on to win the sub-
sequent elections in May 1938. Op cit 185. 
238. Op cit 194-195; and Keith 'The War and the Constitution' 
(1940) 4 MLR 2. 
239. Kruger A Nation op cit 195-196. 
240. Ibid. The session had been called so that the life of the 
Senate could be extended. Ibid. 
241. Ibid. 





246. Ibid; and Prime Minister Hertzog Debates 35 (1939)op cit Col 18. 
247. Kruger A Nation op cit 196; Keith (1940) 4 MLR op cit 2; and 
Prime Minister Hertzog Debates 35 (1939) op cit Cols 18 & 20. 
248. Keith (1940) 4 MLR op cit 2; De Smith Constitutional-and 
Administrative Law op cit 126 & n23; and Markesinis op cit 
83 n3. 
249. Kruger A Nation op cit 196. 
250. Keith (1940) 4 MLR op cit 2; Kruger A Nation op cit 196; and 
Prime Minister Hertzog Debates 35 (1939) op cit Col 18. 
251. Keith (1940) 4 MLR op cit 2-3; and Kruger A Nation op cit 
196-197. The Prime Minister's views are set out in Debatesr 
35 (1939) op cit Cols 18-24. The views of General Smuts, who was 
Minister of Justice at the time [Parliamentary Register 
1910-1982 op cit 49] are set out in Debates 35 (1939) op cit 
Cols 24-31. 
252. Kruger A Nation op cit 198. 
253. Ibid; and Keith (1940) 4 MLR op cit 2-3. The 'United Party' 
had split into two factions. Prime Minister Hertzog and his 
supporters enjoyed the support of the Purified National 
Party under Dr Malan. General Smuts and his supporters 
enjoyed the support of the Dominion Party, the Labour Party, 
and the members representing Black voters in the Cape. 
Kruger A Nation op cit 196; 197; & 198. 
254. Kruger A Nation op cit 198. The Prime Minister had warned 
the House of Assembly that he would treat the vote as a 
matter of confidence in his leadership. Debates 35 (1939) 
op cit Col 23. 
255. Kruger A Nation op cit 198. 
256. Quoted in Van Den Heever op cit 282-283. 
257. Op cit 283; and Kruger A Nation op cit 198. 
258. Van Den Heever op cit 283; and Kruger A Nation op cit 198. 
259. Van Den Heever op cit 283. 
260. Ibid, quoting comments from the 'Round Table'. 
261. Van Den Heever op cit 283; and Kruger A Nation op cit 200. 
262. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 158. The 'Mandate' issue is 
discussed further. Ch 3 op cit 76-79 infra. 
263. Keith (1940) 4 MLR op cit 6. 
264. Markesinis op cit 82. 
265. Op cit 83. 
266. De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law op cit 126 & 
174. 
267. Op cit 127. Jennings would go even further, and argues that 
it would be unconstitutional (ie a breach of convention) for 
the Queen to grant a dissolution in the following circum-
stances: 
'The Queen must not intervene in party politics. She must 
not, therefore, support a Prime Minister against his 
colleagues. Accordingly, it would be unconstitutional for 
the Queen to agree with the Prime Minister for the 
dissolution of the government in order to allow the Prime 
Minister to override his colleagues.' 
Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 86. 
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268. Markesinis op cit 83-84. 
269. Op cit 83 nn2 & 3. 
270. Ibid. 
271. De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law op cit 126-
127. 
272. Sir Patrick Duncan was the Governor-General of the Union at 
the relevant time. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 158. 
273. Ch 3 op cit 53-60 supra. 
274. In the United Kingdom, Gladstone's Liberal Government of 
1892-1894 was able to use the support of the Irish 
Nationalists to sustain a parliamentary majority. Jennings 
Cabinet Government op cit 521. In January 1894, the Prime 
Minister clashed with his Cabinet colleagues over the naval 
estimates. They had all flatly rejected his proposals. 
MacIntosh The British Cabinet op cit 236; 307; 320; & 326. 
Gladstone had always enjoyed elections, and he proposed one 
to the Cabinet in February 1894 to end his 'political 
difficulties', but they rejeced the idea. Op cit 307. 
Gladstone believed that he was on the verge of being ejected 
by his colleagues. Op cit 236. Unable to pursue his notion 
of an election, he resigned on 3rd March 1894. Op cit 236; 
320; & 326. 
The parallels with General Hertzog in 1939 are not that 
close. Gladstone had been 'repudiated' by the Cabinet, but 
not by the House of Commons as well. It is interesting to 
note however, that Gladstone did not attempt to advise a 
dissolution when he was so clearly lacking the support of 
his colleagues. His decision to bow to the wishes of the 
Cabinet was in accordance with British conventional 
tradition up until 1918. Whether a similar confrontation 
between a Prime Minister and his Cabinet would have ended in 
a similar way after 1918, is open to speculation. See 
further, n267 supra. 
275. Ch 3 op cit 54 & n167 supra. 
276. According to the orthodox view in the United Kingdom, the 
King cannot refuse a dissolution to Ministers who are 
assured of Parliament's support, because no viable, 
alternative Ministry is possible. A refusal of advice would 
only be feasible when two criteria were equally satisfied. 
Firstly, an alternative Ministry would have to be available, 
which would be willing to accept responsibility for the 
King's action. Secondly, any alternative Ministry would 
have to be able and willing to govern in conjunction with 
the existing lower House. Fulfilment of both these condi-
tions would mean that elections could be avoided. It would 
only be in rare circumstances indeed, that one 'majority' 
government could be replaced by another 'majority' 
government without elections. Markesinis op cit 84-86. 
The King could refuse a dissolution to a 'minority' govern-
ment, but only if the opposition groupings in the lower 
House were able and willing to construct an alternative 
administration which enjoyed majority support in that House. 
Much would also depend however, on the particular political 
circumstances in each case. Op cit 86-92. 
277. 'In the circumstances, I cannot see on what grounds I should 
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be justified in rejecting the decision of the House and 
holding a general election if General Smuts, whose policy 
obtained the support of the House, is in a po~ition to form 
a government which will have the support of the House.' 
Ch 3 op cit 70-71 supra. 
278. Kruger A Nation op cit 201; 204; 205-208; 211-213; 215-216; 
and Van Den Heever op cit 283 & 294-296. 
279. Ch 3 op cit 57 & nn186 & 187 supra. 
280. Ibid. 
281. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 399-400; & 409. 
282. Ibid. Opponents of the Liberal government's Irish Home Rule 
Bill frequently raised the spectre of looming civil war. 
Among such people were Sir William Anson and A.V. Dicey. 
Their letters to 'The Times' are quoted in Jennings Cabinet 
Government op cit 541; & 544-545 respectively. 
283. Of course, the split in the Cabinet and the repudiation of 
the Hertzog faction by Parliament gave the Governor-General 
far more room to act independently of advice. Furthermore, 
a Governor-General may withstand accusations of political 
partisanship to a much greater extent than an hereditary 
Monarch. 
284. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 158. 
285. Ch 3 op cit 70-71 supra. 
The mandate theory has been described by Jennings as 
follows: 
'A Government exists only because it has secured a majority 
at an election, or is likely to secure such a majority when 
an election takes place; but it secures that majority by 
appealing to the electorate to support a policy. The elec-
torate expects that that policy will be carried to fruition. 
It does not expect that radical changes will be made.unless 
they were part of the party policy or are the necessary con-
sequences of that policy.' 
Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 504. Hence, there are 
certain limits which Parliament and the Cabinet would be 
expected to observe. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 160 
describes these limitations upon government in the following 
way: 
'Daar behoort geen fundamentele wysigings in die bestaande 
beleid op wetgewende of uitvoerende gebied te wees nie, 
tensy die moontlikheid van so 'n wysiging by die vorige 
algemene verkiesing voor die kiesers gel~ is.' 
286. Ch 3 op cit 70-71 supra. 
287. Kruger The Age of the Generals 188; and VerLoren Van Themaat 
2ed op cit 160. 
288. Ch 3 op cit 70-71 supra. 
289. Ch 3 op cit 69 & nn236-239; n241; & nn243-244 supra. The 
government decided to adopt a policy of neutrality with 
specific reference to the Czech crisis, but even this 
decision was taken several months after the elections in 
1938. The government's attitude towards war would depend on 
whether or not it perceived the interests of the Union to be 
at stake. Ibid. 
290. First of all, VerLoren Van Themaat argues that there was no 
mandate to proceed with the war. Accordingly, he attacks 
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'Of die goewerneur-generaal hier 'n konvensie verbreek het, 
is nie volkome duidelik nie, maar daar is iets vir die 
opvatting te s~ dat dit wel die geval was, te meer aangesien 
die vraag van deelname aan die oorlog al dan nie, nie voor 
die kiesers tydens die verkiesing van Mei 1938 get'e is nie, 
en die kiesers dus geen mandaat in hierdie verband gegee het 
nie.' 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 158. Later he qualifies the 
attack when he notes: 
'In 1939 egter, het die volksraadlede geen spesifieke 
mandaat gehad in verband met die standpunt wat hulle oor 
oorlogverklaring van die Unie moes inneem, behalwe dan dat 
genl. Hertzog voor 1939 herhaaldelik verklaar het dat die 
parlement sal besluit of die Unie oorloog sal verklaar 
indien Engeland dit doen.' 
Op cit 160. 
291. A more precise mandate from the electorate might have been 
required, if the new Smuts administration had proposed to 
send conscripts overseas to fight the war in Europe. Keith 
(1940) 4 MLR op cit 6. There had never been any suggestion 
however, that conscripts would be sent overseas to fight. 
Ibid; Kruger A Nation op cit 197; 201-202; and the Minister 
of Justice Debates 35 (1939) op cit cols 25 & 31. 
292. In the United Kingdom, Chamberlain had been forced to 
concede that friendly relations with Germany were becoming 
impossible. In South Africa, the surrender of South-West 
Africa to a new German administration was becoming an ever 
increasing possibility. Minister of Justice Debates 35 
(1939) op cit cols 27-28. 
293. VerLoren Van Themaat's reference to the mandate theory 
includes an acknowledgment of Le May's contribution to the 
subject. He fails however, to answer any of the criticisms 
of the mandate theory which Le May has offered. VerLoren 
Van Thernaat Staatsreg 3ed 184-185 & n16; and Le May 
'Parliament, The Constitution and the Doctrine of the 
Mandate' (1957) 74 SALJ 33 at 40-42. See also, n295 infra. 
294. Le May (1957) 74 SALJ op cit 40. 
295. Although Jennings regards the mandate theory as important in 
the United Kingdom, he recognises that it is necessarily 
vague, and that its operation is a matter of dispute. 
Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 504-505. He has also 
recognised a desire by government to win vague or ambiguous 
election mandates. In the 1935 elections for example, the 
government had to come to terms with the pacifist sentiments 
of the electorate, even though it did not share those 
feelings. Accordingly, the need for military rearmament was 
not stressed by the government. A mandate was requested for 
'the establishment of a settled peace', while support for 
the League of Nations was also emphasised. The need for 
rearmament was mentioned in the Conservative party 
manifesto, but it was not given the emphasis which it was 
clearly receiving in the Cabinet. Jennings has noted that 
although the election was not specifically fought on the 
issue of rearmament, the return of the government was taken 
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to have given the Baldwin administration a 'mandate' for a 
large rearmament programme. Op cit 506-509. MacIntosh has 
attributed less importance to the mandate theory. He has 
argued that even in the 1970s, British governments were 
elected to run the country as they saw fit, to be judged at 
a later stage by the electorate on the merits of their total 
performance. MacIntosh The British Cabinet op cit 16. 
VerLoren Van Themaat asserts that the mandate theory is a 
convention which has been accepted in South Africa. 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 160. Although he has 
condemned the supposed breach of mandate in 1939, he offers 
no analysis of the actual workings of the theory at that 
time. No indication is given of the real strength or 
effectiveness of the 'convention' in the Union. No evidence 
is offered to show that a more strict interpretation of the 
mandate was required in South Africa than has been the case 
with respect to the United Kingdom. 
296. Jennings Cabinet Government op cit 504. 
297. Op cit 506-509. 
298. This can be inferred from the first paragraph of the letter 
to General Hertzog. Ch 3 op cit 70-71 supra. 
299. Ch 3 op cit 59-60 supra. 
300. N267 supra. 
301. Herbert Asquith believed that the involvement of the 
Sovereign in politics would be a catastrophe which all 
statesmen would attempt to avoid. Jennings Cabinet 
Government op cit 408. In 1894 Gladstone resigned. He did 
not attempt to pursue his desire for a dissolution any 
fur~her. N274 supra. 
302. Hertzog's main concern was to put his case for neutrality 
before the electorate. This was more important than 
involving the Governor-General in politics. 
It may be possible to argue that Hertzog broke a convention 
by involving the Governor-General in politics. Consequently, 
it can be argued that the Governor-General was released from 
a concomitant convention which required him to accede to 
the Prime Minister's request. Further research is needed 
however, to establish whether or not these conventions 
existed in the Union. 
303. Ch 3 op cit 32-52 supra. 
304. Jennings The Law and the Constitution 92. 
305. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 237-240. The judicial 
authority of the Union was also subordinate to the judicial 
authority of the United Kingdom, because the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council acted as the highest court of 
appeal from South Africa. Op cit 240. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to explore the nature of the judiciary 
under the South African legal system. 
The subordination of the legislative and executive authority 
of the Union to the Imperial authorities in London has 
already been examined in Ch 2 op cit 17-29 supra. 
306. Ch 2 op cit 17-19 supra. 
307. Op cit 24-29 supra. 
308. Op cit 21-23 supra. 
309. Op cit 20-21 supra. 
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311. Kruger A Nation op cit 146. 
312. Ibid. 
313. Keith The Dominions op cit 58-60; 62-63; VerLoren Van 
Themaat 2ed op cit 199. 
314. N313 supra; and Kruger A Nation op cit 146. 
315. The problems were particularly acute in relation to the 
operation of Dominion legislation. There were four key 
difficulties: 
1. The principles embodied in or underlying the Colonial 
Laws Validity Act 1865. 
2. The legal incapacity of Dominion Parliaments to 
legislate with extra-territorial effect. 
3. The existing statutory provisions which required 
reservation of Bills. 
4. The existing statutory provisions which authorised the 
Disallowance of Acts. 
The Conference decided to refer these difficulties to a 
Committee of Experts. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 204; 
and The Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of 
1926 paragraph 3(c). The paragraph is quoted in VerLoren 
Van Themaat 2ed op cit 565-566. 
316. N315 supra. 
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Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and 
Merchant Shipping Legislation 1929. The report is 
reproduced in VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 567-570. The 
Report acknowledged that two problems associated with colo-
nial subordination could not be dealt with by convention: 
1. The territorial limitation upon the operation of 
Dominion legislation: as far as this limitation was 
concerned, the report noted that the law was full of 
conflict and obscurity. The Report argued that 
uncertainty as to the existence and extent of 
territorial limitations rendered it desirable for 
legislation to be passed by the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom. The new legislation would make it 
clear that the limitation no longer existed. There-
after, Dominion Parliaments would not have to employ 
indirect methods to get round such territorial rest-
rictions. Paragraphs 38 and 29 of the Report, quoted 
in VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 568. See also, op 
cit 206-207. 
2. The law of 'repugnancy' contained ins 2 of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865: as far as 'repugnancy' 
was concerned, the report implied that it was 
inconsistent with the principles of equality which were 
espoused at the 1926 Conference. Accordingly, the 
Report recommended that legislation be enacted 
declaring that the 1865 Act should no longer apply to 
the laws passed by any Dominion. The Report also 
argued in favour of a substantive enactment, which 
would declare the powers of the Parliament of a 
Dominion. It was felt that such an enactment would be 
necessary, because a simple repeal of the Colonial Laws 
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51 of the Report, quoted in VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op 
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Report, quoted in VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 569. 
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vrygeweste nog aan die wetgewende sowel as die uitvoerende 
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hulle bevoegdhede gebruik gemaak nie.' 
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Indemnity Bill. These suggestions were resisted by the 
British government however, on the grounds that reservation 
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Evatt The King and His Dominion Governors 175-176; and 
Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 68-70. 
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VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 201; & 564-565. 
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325. Op cit 566. 
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329. Paragraph 3(c) of the 1926 Report. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed 
op cit 565-566. 
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to explain what he means by this however. 
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335. Keith The Dominions op cit 66-67. 
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337. Paragraph 33. See VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 206; & 
568. 
338. Paragraphs 33 & 34. See VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 206 
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Wheare The Statute of Westminster op cit 249. 
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Ministers in the United Kingdom. The paragraph was even 
more obviously outdated after the enactment of the Status of 
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353. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 203; Wheare The Statute of 
Westminster op cit 72-74; and Ch 2 op cit n49 supra. From 
1898 onwards, there was a convention that disallowance would 
be exercised only in relation to legislation which affected 
Imperial affairs. 
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Governor-General of a Dominion are His Majesty the 
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3. The Ministers who tender and are responsible for such 
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402. Ibid. It is interesting to note that a South African 
Minister countersigned the Commission rather than a British 
Minister, because the Royal Executive Functions and Seals 
Act 1934 was not enacted for a further three years. 
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168. Op cit 85. The court was describing convention in a 
strictly Canadian context. It declined to pronounce any 
authority on conventions in a British context. Op cit 21. 
169. Op cit 85 (Underlining added). 
170. Ibid. 
171. Ibid. 
172. Op cit 86. 
173. Op cit 22-28; & 86. 
174. Op cit 22; 25-26; 28; & 86. At 28 the court declared: 
'As to all the cases cited, it must be said that there is 
no independent force to be found in selective quotations 
from a portion of the reasons unless regard is had to 
issues raised and the context in which the quotations are 
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found.' 
175. Op cit 22; & 86. 
176. Op cit 22; & 29. 
177. Ibid. 
178. The court distinguished the crystallization proposition of 
Duff CJC in Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney General 
for Ontario, Reference re Weekly Rest in Industrial 
Undertakings Act [1936] 3 DLR 673. The 'Labour Conventions' 
case as it is often named was distinguished by the Canadian 
Supreme Court in the following terms. Reference re 
Constitution op cit 24: 
'What the learned Chief Justice was dealing with was an 
evolution which is characteristic of customary 
international law; the attainment by the Canadian 
federal executive of full and independent power to 
enter into international agreements ... International 
Law perforce has had to develop, if it was to exist at 
all, through commonly recognised political practices of 
States, there being no governing constitution, no 
legislating authority, no executive enforcement 
authority and no generally accepted judicial organ 
through which international law could be developed. 
The situation is entirely different in domestic law, in 
the position of a State having its own governing 
legislative, executive and judicial organs and, in most 
cases, an overarching written constitution.' 
(Underlining added). 
The Canadian Supreme Court went on to cite the opinion of 
Duff CJC in Reference re Power of Disallowance and Power of 
Reservation [1938] DLR 8 at 13. See Reference re Constitution 
op cit 25. This demonstrated that Duff CJC rejected the 
crystallization theory in a domestic law setting. 
Jennings placed considerable emphasis on Duff CJC's opinion 
in the 'Labour Conventions' case. Jennings Constitution op 
cit 125-127. Jennings believed that the Labour 
Conventions case demonstrated that the Court-enforcement 
criterion was weakening, and that conventions are applied by 
the Courts. Jennings failed to mention Duff CJC's opinion 
in the subsequent 'Power of Reservation and Disallowance' 
case. It is respectfully submitted that Jennings' support 
for the crystallization theory must now be seriously 
questioned. VerLoren Van Themaat has asserted that binding 
conventional rules are 'law'. He has argued that a 
definition of law in terms of those legal rules which can be 
enforced by the courts is influenced by an untenable 
Positivist view of the legal system. VerLoren Van Themaat 
Staatsreg 3ed 173-176. He asserts that binding conventions 
~hould be classified as Customary law in the following 
terms. Op cit 175: 
'Die verkieslikste opvatting is om konvensies wat 
bindende krag besit wel as reg, en dan as gewoontereg, 
te beskou. Ander konvensies kon beskou word as 
toekomstige gewoontereg, wat nog in 'n stadium van 
ontwikkeling is. Slegs daardie konvensies behoort as 
regsreels erken te word, wat al werklik seker en 
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bindend is.' 
In the light of the Canadian Court's reconsideration of the 
opinions of Duff CJC, it is respectfully submitted that\ 
VerLoren Van Themaat's description of conventions as 
'gewoontereg' is incorrect. 
179. Reference re Constitution op cit 22. 
180. The Supreme Court stressed that conventions are the product 
neither of judicial precedent nor statute law. Reference re 
Constitution op cit 84-85. Conventions, thus, fall beyond 
the scope of the legal system as determined by the rule of 
Recognition. Ch 6 op cit 156-158 supra. The Supreme Court 
noted that conventions are political in inception and are 
based on precedents established by the institutions of 
government themselves. Reference re Constition op cit 22; 
84-85; & 86. The courts, therefore, have no role to play as 
far as the introduction, amendment and repeal of conventions 
is concerned. Conventions fall outwith the ambit of the 
rule of Change which regulates these matters in a legal 
system. Ch 6 op cit 158-159 supra. The Supreme Court noted 
that it is unable to enforce constitutional conventions, 
because these are generally in conflict with established 
legal rules. It also noted that the sanctions for breach of 
convention are political in character rather than legal. 
Reference re Constitution op cit 84-86. Conventions, 
therefore, fall outwith the terms of the rule of 
Adjudication in a legal system. Ch 6 op cit 159-160 supra. 
181. N 180 supra. 
182. Jennings Constitution op cit 127. 
183. The incorporation of constitutional conventions into law 
will be examined in Ch 7 op cit 204-211 infra. 
184. Reference re Constitution op cit 87. This is a modern 
reformulation of the equation which Dicey had once 
propounded. Dicey op cit 24. 
CHAPTER VII 
Footnote Authorities 
1. The basic characteristics of the 'Westminster' system were 
described elsewhere. Ch 1 op cit 1-2 supra. A more 
complete description of the Westminster system has been 
provided by Van Der Vyver. Basson and Viljoen Suid-
Afrikaanse Staatsreg 214. 
2. None of South Africa's Constitutions have ever complied with 
all the basic requirements of a Westminster system of 
government. The lack of universal suffrage has been the 
most obvious South African deviation from 'Westminster' 
model norms. The procedural testing rights of the courts in 
relation to entrenched clauses is another deviation which is 
significant. Basson and Viljoen op cit 214-215; and Ch 1 op 
cit 10-11 & nn 55-63 supra. 
3. Ch 5 op cit 119-120 & n26 supra. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Op cit 119-120 & n30 supra. 
6. South Africa Act 1909 9 Edw VII C 9. 
7. Kennedy and Schlosberg The Law and Custom of the South 
African Constitution 156 & 158. The first example of such 
an Act in the Union of South Africa was the Appropriation 
(1910-1911) Act No 7 of 1910. Another example was the 
Railways and Harbours Appropriation (Part) Act No 7 of 1911. 
8. Kennedy and Schlosberg op cit 156 & 158. The limited 
duration of an Appropriation Act was apparent even in the 
very earliest example of such an Act in the Union. The 
Appropriation (1910-1911) Act No 7 of 1910 S 1 declared: 
'The Consolidated Revenue Fund is hereby charged 
towards the service of the Union for the period from 
the thirty-first day of May 1910, to the thirty-first 
day of March 1911, both days inclusive, with a sum 
Of •••I 
It is interesting to note, however, thats 1 of the Railways 
and Harbours Capital and Betterment Works Appropriation 
(1910-1912) Act No 31 of 1911 authorized an appropriation 
for the period covering 31st May 1910 to 31st March 1912. 
Withdrawals which were not authorized in terms of an 
existing Appropriation Act were permitted in strictly 
limited circumstances bys 26 of the Exchequer and Audit Act 
No 21 of 1911. This section permitted withdrawals of up to 
three hundred thousand pounds under special warrant of the 
Governor-General to meet unforseen and necessary 
expenditure, or expenditure which had been in excess of 
amounts so provided. All sums of money withdrawn under s 26 
had to be submitted for appropriation to Parliament by the 
next ensuing session. Kennedy and Schlosberg op cit 156. 
The provisions ins 26 were eventually superceded by new 
legislation in 1958. See n12 infra. 
9. Exchequer and Audit Act No 21 of 1911. Note, the Exchequer 
Account contained the revenues of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund. See Exchequer and Audit Act No 21 of 1911 s 3: 
' "Exchequer Account" shall mean the account of the 
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Exchequer of the Union of South Africa as prescribed in 
this Act, and shall include the account of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund ... ' 
10. Exchequer and Audit Act No 23 of 1956 s 33: 
'No Appropriation Act shall be construed as authorizing 
moneys appropriated thereby to be expended in any 
financial year other than the financial year to which 
it is expressed to relate, and any moneys so 
appropriated which may be unexpended at the close of 
any financial year shall be surrendered to the 
Exchequer Account'. 
This provision was eventually superceded by new 
legislation in 1975. See n16 infra. The definition of the 
term 'Exchequer Account' ins 3 of the Exchequer and Audit 
Act No 21 of 1911 was retained ins 1 of the Exchequer and 
Audit Act No 23 of 1956. 
11. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961. 
Hereafter, this Act will be referred to in the text as the 
'1961 Constitution Act', or 'the 1961 Act' as the occasion 
requires. 
12. S 24 of the Exchequer and Audit Act No 23 of 1956 permitted 
withdrawals which were not authorized by an existing 
Appropriation Act. It did so in terms which were 
reminiscent of s 26 of the previous Exchequer and Audit Act 
No 21 of 1911. See n8 supra. The wording ins 24 of the 
1956 Act, however, increased the amount which could be 
withdrawn to three million Pounds. s 24 of the 1956 Act was 
itself superceded by new legislation in 1975. See n16 
infra. 
13. Exchequer and Audit Act No 66 of 1975 s 52(1). 
14. Exchequer and Audit Act No 66 of 1975 s 1 declared: 
' "revenue" means all moneys received by way of taxes, 
imposts or rates and all casual and other receipts of 
the State, whatever the source, which may be 
appropriated by Parliament, and includes moneys 
borrowed in terms ... of this Act, but does not include 
... revenue accruing to the Railways and Harbours Fund, 
the Post Office Fund, and a provincial revenue 
account.' 
15. A Post Office Fund was established in 1968 by the Post 
Office Re-adjustment Act No 67 of 1968. S 3(1) laid down: 
'There is hereby established a fund, to be known as the 
Post Office Fund, into which shall be paid all revenues 
which are or have been raised from the affairs of the 
department on or after 1st April 1968, and the said 
fund shall be appropriated by Parliament for the 
purposes of the department in the manner prescribed by 
this Act.' 
S 4(1) declared: 
'Subject to the provisions of the Exchequer and 
Audit Act, 1956 (Act No 23 of 1956) no money shall be 
withdrawn from the fund, except under appropriation 
made by law' • 
The term 'department' was defined ins 1(ii) as the 
Department of Posts and Telegraphs. This Act was repealed 
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bys 52 (1) of the Post Office Amendment Act No 113 'of 1976. 
The 1976 Act inserted ss 12 D(i); 12E; 12F; & 12G into 
the Post Office Act No 44 of 1958. These sections now 
regulate the Post Office Fund. They require Department of 
Posts and Telecommunications expenditure to be defrayed from 
the fund in accordance with annual Post Office Appropriation 
Acts. The legal requirement of parliamentary authorization 
of expenditure has therefore been maintained. Provincial 
Revenue Funds for each of the four provinces have existed 
from the establishment of Union in 1910. South Africa Act 
1909 s 89; and Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 
32 of 1961 s 88. Appropriation of provincial revenues was 
authorized by the Provincial Council concerned. See South 
Africa Act 1909 ss 89-90; and Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 s 88(1). This position was 
altered by the Provincial Finance and Audit Act No 18 of 
1972 s 34. The effect of s 34 was to amends 88(1) & (2) of 
the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961. 
The amended s 88(2) declared: 
'No moneys shall be withdrawn from a provincial revenue 
fund except in accordance with an Act of Parliament.' 
16. The annual nature of Appropriation Acts remained unchanged. 
S 33 of the Exchequer and Audit Act No 23 of 1956 was 
basically re-enacted ins 5(1) of the Exchequer and Audit 
Act No 66 of 1975 as follows: 
'An appropriation Act shall not be construed as 
authorizing the utilization of moneys appropriated 
thereby in a financial year other than the financial 
year to which it expressly relates.' 
It should be noted thats 7(1) of the Exchequer and Audit 
Act permits withdrawals which are not authorized by an 
existing Appropriation Act. The new provision is 
reminiscent of s 24 of the previous Exchequer and Audit Act 
No 23 of 1956. The new provision allows for greater 
flexibility in the amounts which can be withdrawn, however. 
Moneys can be withdrawn up to an amount equal to two percent 
of the total amount appropriated by the then current 
Appropriation Act or part Appropriation Act. S 7(2) of the 
1975 Act still requires these sums to be appropriated by 
Parliament before the end of the ensuing parliamentary 
session. 
17. Railways and Harbours Acts.Amendment Act No 67 of 1980. By 
the time it was excised in 1980, s 99 of the 1961 Act had 
already been amended. Changes had been introduced by the 
Railways and Harbours Finances and Accounts Act No 48 of 
1977 s 25. At the time of its abolition in 1980, therefore, 
s 99 of the 1961 Constitution Act (as amended bys 25 of Act 
No 48 of 1977) read as follows: 
99(1) 'There shall be a Railway and Harbour Fund into whicn 
shall be paid all revenue as defined in section 1 of 
the Railways and Harbours Finances and Accounts Act, 
1977, and all moneys obtained as loans in terms of 
section 15 and 16 of that Act.' 
(2) 'No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Railway and 
Harbour Fund except in accordance with an Act of 
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Parliament. 
18. Railways and Harbours Finances and Accounts Act No 48 of 
1977 s 2(1) & (2). 
19. Railways and Harbours Acts Amendment Act No 67 of 1980 
s 21(1). 
20. S 2(1) & (2) of Act No 48 of 1977 (as amended bys 21(1) of 
Act No 67 of 1980) laid down: 
2(1) 'There shall be a Railway and Harbour Fund into which 
shall be paid all revenue as defined in section 1 and 
all moneys obtained as loans in terms of section 15 
and 16. 
(2) 'No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Railway and 
Harbour Fund except in accordance with an Act of 
Parliament'. 
21. South African Transport Services Finances and Accounts Act 
No 17 of 1983. 
22. N21 supra. 
23. Act No 17 of 1983 s 18: 
'Any reference to the Railway and Harbour Fund in any 
other law contained, shall be deemeed to refer to the 
moneys of the South African Transport Services.' 
24. Act No 17 of 1983 s 4(1): 
'Money shall be appropriated by Parliament by an 
Appropriation Act for the expenditure requirements of 
the South African Transport Services: Provided that 
until such time as provision has been made in respect 
of a financial year for such requirements in an 
Appropriation Act, Parliament may by a Part 
Appropriation Act appropriate a portion of the money 
necessary for such requirements: Provided further that 
such a part Appropriation Act shall cease to have 
effect on the coming into operation of the 
Appropriation Act for that financial year and 
disbursements made under such a Part Appropriation Act 
shall be deemed to be disbursements under that 
Appropriation Act.' 
25. Act No 17 of 1983 s 5(1) re-enforces the annual cycle of 
parliamentary control. S 5(1) says: 
'Subject to the provisions of section 7(2), an 
Appropriation Act shall not be construed as authorizing 
the utilization of money appropriated thereby in 
respect of a financial year other than that to which it 
expressly relates.' 
S 7(1) of the Act empowers the Minister to grant authority 
for money to be made available to defray expenditure of an 
exceptional nature for which provision has not been made in 
an Appropriation Act, or to cover expenditure which has been 
in excess of amounts so provided. S 7(2) requires that 
these sums be submitted for parliamentary appropriation in 
the following terms; 
'Particulars of amounts spent under authority in terms 
of subsection (1) shall be submitted to Parliament by 
the Minister •.• for the financial year immediately 
following the financial year in respect of which the 
said amounts have been spent, for appropriation of the 
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amounts in question.' 
Note: the amounts which the Minister has authority to make 
available under s 7(1) cannot exceed a sum equal to two per 
cent of the total amount appropriated by the Appropriation 
Act or Part Appropriation Act then in force. 
S 13 of the 1983 Act is somewhat disturbing, however. It 
says that any unauthorised expenditure which is not covered 
by a current Appropriation Act, or Ministerial authorization 
(under s 7), is to be submitted to Parliament for sanction 
as soon as possible. The tone of s 13 suggests, however, 
that parliamentary approval is automatic. This assumption 
may be said to underlies 13(2) which declares: 
'Any expenditure that is inconsistent with a provision 
of an Act shall, as soon as is practicable, be 
submitted to Parliament for validation' 
26. Case of Ship Money (R v Hampden) (1637) Tr 825. 
27. Wade and Bradley's Constitutional and Administrative Law op 
cit 61-62. 
28. VerLoren Van Themaat Staatsreg 2ed 98-101. Ship Money tax 
was abolished by the Ship Money Act 1640 16 Car 1, C.14. 
29. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 100-104. 
30. Bill of Rights 1689 1 Will and Mary, sess 2, C.2 
31. A previous, ultimately unsuccessful attempt to prohibit the 
levying of taxes without parliamentary assent had been 
contained in the Petition of Right 1629 3 Car 1 C.1. Wade 
and Bradley's Constitutional and Administrative Law op cit 
14; and VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 96-98. 
32. Calvin's Case 7 Cokes Reports 1; 2 St Tr 559. 
33. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 49, and Keith Constitutional 
History of the First British Empire 9-10. 
34. Campbell v Hall 98 ER 1045. 
35. Campbell v Hall 98 ER 1045 per Lord Mansfield at 1048. 
36. Op cit 1048-1049 
37. Ibid. 
38. Op cit 1047. 
39. One of the oldest legal principles of Colonial law was that 
English settlers carried with them the right to English Law. 
Keith The First British Empire op cit 182-186. The extent 
of an Englishman's liberty in a conquered territory, 
however, became of pressing importance after the conquest of 
Jamaica in 1655. A crisis developed in 1675 when the 
Jamaican legislature pressed its legal claims to the full. 
In 1680 their claims were vindicated as a matter of 
political expendiency. Keith has noted: 
'The doctrine thus undoubtedly emerged that the right 
of the Crown to legislate for a conquered colony 
disappeared if a representative legislature were 
conceded. But it was not yet absolutely free from 
doubt.' 
Op cit 13. See also op cit 1; 11-13; & 129-131. 
VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 51-52 observes: 
'Nou is daar sekere Engelse waarborge van persoonlike 
vryheid en die onskendbaarheid van liggam, lewe en 
goed, wat o.a vervat is in die Magna Carta, Petition of 
Right, Bill of Rights, en die Habeas Corpus wette. 
-79-
Hierdie waarborge is deel van die Engelse staatsreg en 
die vraag is of hulle ook deel van die staatsreg van 
die verowerde land word sodra die inwoners van die 
gebied onder die Koning se beskerming geplaas word. 
Aangesien die Engelse in presies dieselfde posisie as 
die inwoners kom, wil dit voorkom dat dit wel die geval 
is, aangesien ons nie kon aanneem nie, dat die 
Engelsman, deur na 'n verowerde gebied te verhuis, 
daardie beskerming verloor'. 
(Underling added). 
The extent to which South African constitutional law owes 
its origins to English law, as opposed to Roman-Dutch law, 
is the subject of much discussion and inconsistent court 
judgments. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit- 48-62. See also 
n46 infra. 
40. Campbell v Hall 98ER 1045 per Lord Mansfield at 1049-1050. 
At 1050 Lord Mansfield said: 
'We therefore think, that by the two proclamations and 
the commission •.. the King had immediately and 
irrevocably granted to ..• all whom it might concern, 
that the subordinate legislation over the island should 
be exercised by an assembly with the consent of the 
governor and council ••. ' 
41. Op cit 1050. Lord Mansfield said with respect to the 
imposition of taxes: 
'··· to use the words of Sir Philip Yorke and Sir 
Clement Wearge, "It can only now be done, by the 
assembly of the island, or by an Act of the Parliament 
of Great Britain." ' 
42. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 49. VerLoren Van Themaat 
views the annexation as a conquest. He notes that the Crown 
was not even bound by the Articles of Capitulation, although 
he argues that they may have some potential value if the 
legal system is drastically changed. Op cit 52-53; & 59-61. 
The courts do not appear to make any legal distinctions 
between a conquered or a ceded territory. Sammut v 
Strickland [1938] AC 678. 
43. For the reasons cited above and in n39 supra. 
44. Representative government was introduced at the Cape in 1850 
by Letters Patent. Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa 
- the development of its Laws and Constitution 53-55. 
Representative government was established in Natal in 1856 
by Letters Patent. Hahlo and Kahn op cit 65-66. The Orange 
River Colony and the Transvaal received both 
'representative' and 'responsible' government 
simultaneously. The Transvaal obtained 'responsible' status 
by Letters Patent in 1906, and the Orange River Colony 
obtained the same in 1907. Hahlo and Kahn op cit 110-113. 
45. Ch 2 op cit 12 & nn1-6 supra. 
46. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 51-52; & 59. At 52 he says: 
'Na toekenning van 'n wetgewende vergadering bestaan 
daar nog meer gronde vir die opvatting wat die 
waarborge soos vervat in die Magna Carta, Bill of 
Rights ens. deel van die staatsreg van die verowerde 
gebied word. ' 
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At 59 he declares: 
'Die meeste bevoegdhede wat gesaguitoefening inhou, is 
egter gebaseer op die ou gevolgsverhouding 
(allegiance), of op die Koning se bevoegdhede as deel 
van die Parlement. Hierdie bevoegdhede word volgens 
die Engelse reg beoordeel. Eweneens geld die 
Engelsregtelike beperkings van die gesag van die Koning 
kragtens Magna Carta, die Petition of Right en die Bill 
of Rights, binne die Republiek.' 
(Underlining added). A recent report of the Human 
Sciences Research Council has assumed that the Bill of 
Rights of 1689 is a part of South African law. RGN -
sportondersoek 'Statutere bepalings wat sport 
belnvloed' (deel 1) Verslag van die Werkkommittee: 
sportwetgewing (No 3) (1982) 60-61. 
47. De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law 286-287. At 
286, De Smith notes that some taxes, such as Stamp Duties 
and Capital Transfer Tax, remain in force until the relevant 
statute is repealed or amended. The rate of income tax, 
however, requires annual renewal in the Finance Act. See 
also Wade and Bradley's Constitutional and Administrative 
Law 201-202. 
48. Income Tax Act No 28 of 1914. 
49. Income Tax Act No 22 of 1915 s 1(1): 
'From and after the first day of July 1915, there shall 
be charged, levied, and collected for the benefit of 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund, for the service of the 
year ending the thirty-first day of March 1916 •.. an 
income tax at the rates and calculated in the manner 
specified hereunder, in respect of any taxable income'. 
50. Income Tax Act No 35 of 1916. Sees 1(2). 
51. Income Tax (Consolidation) Act No 41 of 1917. 
52. Income Tax Act No 40 of 1925. 
53. (Underlining added) 
54. De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law 287-288; and 
Wade and Bradley's Constitutional and Administrative Law op 
cit 202. 
55. Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962. 
56. Act No 58 of 1962 s 5(1). The Consolidated Revenue Fund was 
converted into the State Revenue Fund in 1975. Ch 7 op cit 
174 supra. 
57. N58 infra. 
58. Act No 58 of 1982 s 5(2): 
' .•• the rates of tax chargeable in respect of taxable 
income shall be fixed annually by Parliament, but the 
rates fixed by Parliament in respect of any year 
of assessment or financial year .•• shall be deemed to 
continue in force until the next such determination or 
variation of rates and shall be applied for the 
purposes of calculating the tax payable in respect of 
any such taxable income received by or accrued to or in 
favour of any person during the next succeeding year of 
assessment or financial year, as the case may be, if in 
the opinion of the Commissioner the calculation and 
collection of the tax chargeable in respect of such 
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taxable income cannot without risk of loss of revenue 
be postponed until after the rates for that year have 
been determined.' 
59. N58 supra. Note, in terms of s 5(3) & (6) of Act No 58 of 
1962, the Minister of Finance has a limited authority to 
vary the rates of tax with regard to particular years of 
assessment by notice in the Gazette. 
60. See for example: Income Tax Act No 72 of 1963, and each 
succeeding Income Tax Act up to and including the Income Tax 
Act No 94 of 1983. The Income Tax Act of 1963, for example, 
came into effect on 3rd July 1963. It fixed the rate of tax 
for any financial years which fell within the dates 1st 
January 1963 and 31st December 1963. 
61. Ch 5 op cit 120 & n30 supra. 
62. Keith Dominion Home Rule in Practice 41. 
63. Keith Responsible Government in the Dominions [Vol III] 
1248-12 9. 
64. Op cit 1249. 
65. Op cit 1258-1261, and Hahlo and Kahn op cit 56-57. 
66. Ibid. 
67. The Army Act 1881 44 & 45 Victo C 58, s 177: 
'Where any force of volunteers, or of militia, or any 
other force, is raised ••• in a colony, any law of .•. the 
colony may extend to the officers, non-commissioned 
officers and men belonging to such force, whether 
within or without the limits of •.. the colony ... ' 
Keith The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions 423. 
68. The Army Act of 1881 was made directly applicable to all 
British colonies by virtue or's 191(1). It read: 
'This Act shall come into force in every place on the 
day fixed for the commencement in that place of the 
Regulation of the Forces Act, 1881, and shall continue 
in force as if a reference to this Act were substituted 
for the reference to the Army Discipline and Regulation 
Act, 1879, in the Army Discipline and Regulation 
(Annual) Act 1881, and that Act shall be construed 
accordingly. ' 
Thus, the Army Act of 1881 applied to the colonies by virtue 
of the annual Act passed each year by the Imperial 
Parliament. See further, Army Discipline and Regulation 
(Annual) Act 1881 44 Victo C 9 s 2(3). In order to ascertain 
the colonies in which the Army Act of 1881 applied, 
reference was necessary to the commencement provisions of 
the Regulation of the Forces Act 1881 44 & 45 Victo c 57. 
The relevant provision was s 52, which stated: 
'This Act shall come into operation as follows; that is 
to say 
(a) In the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, and 
the Isle of Man .•• 
(b) Elsewhere in Europe, inclusive of Malta, also in 
the West Indies and America ..• 
(c) Elsewhere, whether within or without Her Majesty's 
dominions, at the expiration of six months after 
the passing of this Act.' 
See further, n69 infra. 
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69. After Union in 1910, South Africa was still, technically, a 
colony. Ch 2 op cit 17-29; and Ch 3 op cit 82-83 & nn304-310 
supra. Accordingly, existing Imperial legislation like the 
Army Act of 1881 would have continued to apply to South 
Africa after Union. It should be noted that in terms of s 1 
of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 28 & 29 Victo C 63 it 
was not necessary for Imperial legislation to refer 
expressly to particular colonies - as long as the intention 
of Parliament could be inferred. S 1 said: 
'An Act of Parliament or any provision thereof, shall, 
in construing this Act, be said to extend to any Colony 
when it is made applicable to such Colony by the 
express words or necessary intendment of any Act of 
Parliament.' 
See further, Wheare The Constitutional Structure of the 
Commonwealth 22. That the Army Act of 1881 was universally 
applicable to all British colonies can be seen from the 
wording of the definitions clause ins 190 of the 1881 Act. 
S 190 defined the word 'colony' in all-embracing terms to 
include: 
' .•. for the purposes of this Act Cyprus and any part of 
Her Majesty's dominions, exclusive of the United 
Kingdom, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man, and 
India ..• ' 
70. Ch 7 op cit 179 & n46 supra. VerLoren Van Themaat's opinion 
was confirmed by a recent Human Science Research Council 
Report. See n46 supra. 
71. Keith The First British Empire op cit 183; and n 39 supra. 
72. Ibid; and Sammut v Strickland [1938] AC 678 per Lord Maugham 
LC at 701. Statutes would apply to the extent that they 
were of general application and not limited to English 
conditions. Keith The First British Empire op cit 183-184; 
& 186. 
73. Keith The First British Empire op cit 183-184; & 186. This 
was the Common Law position, prior to the enactment of the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 28 & 29 Victo C 63. 
74. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 49; 59-62. 
75. Op cit 54-59. 
76. Op cit 62. 
77. Ch 7 op cit 177-179 supra. 
78. Campbell v Hall 98 ER 1045 per Lord Mansfield at 1048. 
79. Keith The First British Empire op cit 17. 
80. Where a representative colonial legislature was already in 
existence, the subsequent incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights would mean that control of locally raised armed 
forces would vest in the local legislature. It was fear of 
this eventuality which led the Imperial authorities to 
resist incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the North 
American colonies. Keith The_First British Empire op cit 
184-185. The North American colonies did not enjoy the 
benefits of the Bill of Rights because they were settled 
prior to its enactment. 
81. Ch 7 op cit 178 & nn40-41 supra. 
82. Campbell v Hall 98 ER 1045 per Lord Mansfield at 1050: 
'We therefore think, that by the two proclamations and 
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the commission .•. the King had immediately and 
irrevocable granted to all ••. whom it might concern, 
that the subordinate legislation over the island should 
be exercised by an assembly ... in like manner as the 
other islands belonging to the King'. 
(Underlining added). See further Keith The First British 
Empire op cit 14-17. cf Sammut v Strickland [1938] AC 678 
per Lord Maugham LC at 704; & 706-707. At 704 Lord Maugham 
LC said: 
'It seems to their Lordships that this case in no way 
tends to support the respondent's present contention; 
and, with all respect to the Court of Appeal, they are 
unable to agree with their statement that it is an 
established constitutional principle based on Campbell 
v Hall that the grant of representative institutions 
once made, the Crown is immediately and irrevocably 
deprived of its right to legislate by Letters-Patent 
or Orders in Council, unless there is an express 
reservation to that effect. The true proposition is 
that, as a general rule, such a grant without the 
reservation of a power of concurrent legislation 
precludes the exercise of the prerogative while the 
legislative institutions continue to exist.' 
(Underlining added). In both Campbell v Hall, and in Sammut 
v Strickland, the grant of representative institutions had 
involved the exercise of prerogative powers. The Parliament 
of the Union of South Africa, however, was created by 
statute. What difference, if any, this made, needs further 
investigation. 
83. N80 supra. The Imperial Parliament still had unfettered 
legislative power to apply any statute to any colony in 
relation to any subject-matter. Ch 2 op cit 20-21 & nn53-54 
supra. 
84. The prerogative was carried as it stood when the colonies 
first received English law. Keith The First British Empire 
op cit 185. Accordingly, a colony which was settled after 
1688 would obtain the Royal Prerogative in its truncated, 
post-1688 form. See further Ch 7 op cit 184-186 & nn71-72 
supra. 
85. Keith The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions 414-
415. At 415 he said: 
'The keeping of a standing army of any kind in the 
Dominions is no doubt illegal unless approved by 
statute, and the present forces are all so regulated.' 
Keith has therefore retracted an earlier assertion that the 
Royal Prerogative could be used to raise troops in the 
Dominions. Keith Responsible Government in the Dominions 
[Vol III] 1248 n1. The Imperial Parliament could enact the 
necessary legislation. N83 supra. This would have defeated 
the whole purpose of colonial self-government, however. 
86. Ch 2 op cit 17-21; & 23-24 supra. 
87. Ch 2 op cit 23-24 supra. 
88. Hahlo and Kahn op cit 150-151. 
89. The Report of the Conference on the operation of Dominion 
Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation 1929, 
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paragraphs 37 & 38, quoted in VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op 
cit 568. The conflicting court opinions have been noted by 
VerLoren Van Themaat. Op cit 206-207. 
90. N67 supra. 
91. Defence Act No 13 of 1912. 
92. (Underlining added). See further, Keith Dominion Home Rule 
in Practice 41-42. 
93. Dicey op cit 295 n1; and Keith The Dominion as Sovereign 
States 628. 
94. A mere amendment of s 59 of the South Africa Act of 1909 
would not have settled the question whether or not the 
limitation was an inherent, constitutional one. 
95. Ch 7 op cit 184 & n67 supra. 
96. Ch 7 op cit 184 & n68 supra. 
97. (Underlining added). 
98. When South African legislation extended the application of 
an Imperial statute to the Union, this did not necessarily 
mean that the statute became incorporated into South African 
law. As far as the Army Act of 1881 is concerned, it is 
submitted that it was extended to South Africa to operate as 
an Imperial Act and not as a South African one. For the 
reasons, see n101 infra. 
99. The full provision of the Army Act of 1881 s 177 was as 
follows: 
'Where any force of volunteers, or of militia, or any 
other force is raised ..• in a colony ..• any law of 
... the colony may extend to the officers, non-
commissioned officers and men belonging to such force, 
whether within or without the limits of •.. the colony; 
and where any such force is serving with part of Her 
Majesty's regular forces, then so far as the law of ••• 
the colony has not provided for the government and 
discipline of such force, this Act and any other Act 
for the time being amending the same shall, subject to 
such exceptions and modifications as may be specified 
in the general orders of the general officer commanding 
Her Majesty's forces with which such force is serving, 
apply to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and 
men of such force, in like manner as they apply to the 
officers, non-commissioned officers, and men 
respectively mentioned in the two preceding sections of 
this Act.' 
(Underlining added). See further, Keith Dominion Hpme Rule 
in Practice 41-42. 
100. N68 supra. 
101. It is clear that the Code would have lost the capacity to 
have extra-territorial effect. There was also the 
possibility, however, that the Code would have lost its 
validity within the borders of South Africa as well. This 
can be asserted, because the Union Military Discipline Code 
was derived from an Imperial Statute, and not a South 
African one. See further, Copyright Owners Reproduction 
Society Ltd v EMI (Australia) (Pty) Ltd 100 CLR 597 per 
Dixon CJ at 603-604. 
102. The Statute of Westminster, 1931 22 Geo V C 4 s 3: 
-85-
'It is hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament 
of a Dominion has full power to make laws having extra-
territorial operation.' 
103. Defence Act (Amendment) and Dominion Forces Act No 32 of 
1932. 
104. The Defence Act No 13 of 1912 s 123 was thus amended bys 4 
of the 1932 Act to read as follows: 
'This Act shall extend to all members of the Defence 
Forces of the Union whether serving within or outside 
the Union'. 
See further, Ch 7 op cit 189-190 supra. 
105. S 5 of the Defence Act (Amendment) Act and Dominion Forces 
Act No 32 of 1932 deleted the definition of the term 'Army 
Act' in the Defence Act of 1912. S 5 of the 1932 Act 
declared: 
'Section one hundred and twenty-four of the principal 
Act is hereby amended by the deletion of the definition 
of the expression "Army Act".' 
See further, Ch 7 op cit 190 supra. 
106. Ch 3 op cit 49-50 & 82-83 supra. 
107. Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo V C 4 s 4: 
'No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed 
after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be 
deemed to ~xtend, to a Dominion as part of the law of 
the Dominion unless it is expressly declared in that 
Act that the Dominion has requested and consented to, 
the enactment thereof.' 
Keith The Dominions as Sovereign States 91. It should be 
remembered, however, thats 4 of the Statute of Westminster 
conflicts withs 2 of the Status of the Union Act No 69 of 
1934. See Ch 3 op cit supra. In 1955 the British 
Parliament repealed the Army Act of 1881, and replaced it 
with the Army Act of 1955. Ch 5 op cit 120 & n30 supra. The 
new Act was careful not to prejudice the legal position of 
armed forces in any of the Dominions. The Army Act 1955 3 & 
4 Eliz 2.C 18 s 206 declared: 
'Members of a naval, military or air force being a 
Commonwealth force are subject to military law to such 
extent and subject to such adaptions and modifications, 
as may be provided by or under any enactment relating 
to the attachment of members of such forces.' 
Ins 225 of the Act, the term 'Commonwealth force' was 
defined as follows: 
' ••. any of the naval, military or air forces of 
Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the 
Union of South Africa, India, Pakistan or Ceylon.' 
From a British perspective, ss 206 & 225 of the 1955 Act 
preserved the enabling provision ins 177 of the Army Act of 
1881. From the perspective of the Commonwealth countries 
concerned, however, the 'saving' clauses were unnecessary. 
See Copyright Owners Reproduction Society Ltd v EMI 
(Australia) Ltd (1958) 100 CLR 597 per Dixon CJ at 604. 
108. Defence Act No 44 of 1957. 
109; Swift MacNeil The Constitutional and Parliamentary History 
of Ireland Til17fnion 170. In 1780, as the movement towards 
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Irish legislative independence gained momentum, moves were 
made to enact a Mutiny Bill - on the grounds that the Mutiny 
Bill of the British Parliament did not extend to Ireland. A 
Mutiny Bill was eventually approved, but alterations were 
made to it by the Privy Council. These alterations were 
accepted by the Irish Parliament, and thus the Perpetual 
Mutiny Act was created. The government of the Army in 
Ireland was thus placed beyond Parliamentary control. 
Eventually, the King; it was announced, was prepared to 
accept the limitation of the Mutiny Act to two years. 
Swift MacNeil op cit 166-167; 168-170, 173-174; & 183. 
Ireland had been carefully excluded from the chief benefits 
of the 1688 Revolution. An Irish Bill of Rights was sent to 
England in the first Irish Parliament after the Revolution -
but never returned. In fact, Ireland never had a Bill of 
Rights. Op cit 68-69. 
110. Keith The First British Empire op cit 184-185. 
111. Op cit 216-220. 
112. Op cit 216. 
113. Ch 6 op cit 145-146 supra. 
114. Op cit 146-147 supra. 
115. General Loans Act No 17 of 1911. 
116. Public Works Loan and Floating Debt Consolidation Act No 29 
of 1911. 
117. Act No 29 of 1911 s 2: 
'The Governor-General is hereby authorized to exercise 
the powers to raise moneys on loans which were granted 
by the late legislatures of the Cape of Good Hope, 
Natal, and the Orange River Colony, and which were not 
exercised at the thirtieth day of May 1910, amounting 
to four million five hundred and thirty thousand seven 
hundred and forty-nine pounds, five shillings and seven 
pence sterling as set out in the Second Schedule to 
this Act. The Governor-General shall exercise such 
borrowing powers in accordance with the provisions of 
the General Loans Act, 1911.' 
Note: s 8 of the Act entitled the Governor-General to borrow 
two million pounds in anticipation of any loans authorized 
in terms of the Act. Such temporary borrowings, however, 
had to be repaid out of the principal sums raised under the 
Act. 
118. Ch 7 op cit 172 supra. 
119. Ibid. 
120. S 117 of the South Africa Act does not explain the 
difference between revenues 'raised' and revenues 
'received'. It is submitted, however, that to 'raise' money 
meant 'to borrow' money. In the subsequent General Loans 
Act of 1911, authority to borrow money was granted ins 1 in 
terms of authority 'to raise' money. Ch 7 op cit 198 supra. 
Note, the South Africa Act had anticipated that the 
government might wish to borrow money. S 124 of the 1909 
Act authorized the Union to 'renew' loans which had been 
raised, originally, by the four constituent colonies of 
South Africa. S 124 declared: 
'The Union shall assume all debts and liabilities of 
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the Colonies existing as its establisment ••. and 
may ... convert, renew or consolidate such debts.' 
It must be remembered that although the two 1911 Acts gave 
authority to the 'Governor-General' to borrow money, the 
term 'Governor-General' meant the 'Governor-General acting 
by and with the advice of the Executive Council'. See the 
Interpretation Act No 5 of 1910 s 3. In practice, 
therefore, no distinction·existed between revenues 'raised' 
by the Governor-General, and revenues 'raised' by the 
Governor-General-in-Council. 
121. Exchequer and Audit Act No 21 of 1911. 
122. Act No 21 of 1911 s 3: 
' "revenues" shall mean all taxes .•• and other receipts 
of the Crown in its Government of the Union, from 
whatever source arising ... "revenues" shall further 
include the proceeds of all loans raised.' 
123. Act No 21 of 1911 s 23(1) 
'The Commissioner for Customs and Excise, the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue, and the Postmaster-. 
General shall each •.. cause the gross revenues of his 
department to be paid daily into the Exchequer Account. 
All other revenues shall be paid into the Exchequer 
Account.' 
124. Act No 21 of 1911 s 3: 
' "Exchequer Account" shall mean the account of the 
Exchequer of the Union of South Africa ••• and shall 
include the account of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund ••. ' 
Presumably, the proceeds from loans which had been raised 
went straight into the loan account of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund. Kennedy & Schlosberg op cit 156. 
125. General Loans Consolidation and Amendment Act No 22 of 1917. 
126. Act No 22 of 1917 s 1: 
'Whenever any Loan Appropriation Act or Appropriation 
(Part) Act has been passed by Parliament, the Governor-
General is hereby authorized to borrow such sums as 
may, in addition to the amount at the credit of or 
accruing to the loan account, be required to defray the 
loan expenditure sanctioned by such Appropriation Act 
or Appropriation (Part) Act.' 
127. Act No 22 of 1917 s 2: 
128. Ibid. 
'In addition to any sum which the Governor-General may 
be authorized to borrow under section one, the 
Governor-General is also hereby authoriz.ed to borrow 
from time to time such sums as he may deem desirable 
Provided that the amount borrowed under this section 
shall not exceed three million pounds at any one time. 
No expenditure out of any sum borrowed under this 
section shall be incurred unless such expenditure is 
authorized by a Loan Appropriation Act.' 
129. General Loans Act No 16 of 1961. 
130. Act No 16 of 1961 s 3(1). 
'The Governor-General may, in addition to any sum·. which 
may be borrowed under section two, from time to time 
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borrow such sums, not exceeding at any one time thirty 
million rand, as he may deem desirable.' 
131. Act No 16 of 1961 s 3 (2): 
'No expenditure out of any sum borrowed under 
subsection (1) shall be incurred unless such 
expenditure is authorized by an Appropriation Act.' 
132. Exchequer and Audit Act No 66 of 1975. 
133. The Act has been amended seventeen times between 1976 and 
1986. It should be remembered that no account is taken in 
this chapter of legislative changes which have occurred 
since 1983. 
134. Act No 66 of 1975 s 2(1): 
'The Treasury shall, in respect of the State Revenue 
Fund, keep in its books a State Revenue Account which 
shall .•• be credited with all revenue •.• and from which 
shall be defrayed all expenditure ..• ' 
This was the wording of the provision just prior to its 
amendment by the Exchequer and Audit Amendment Act No 100 of 
1984. Note, Revenue'accruing to the Railway and Harbour 
Fund, the Post Office Fund, or a Provincial Revenue Fund was 
not included in the Act's definition of the term 'revenue'. 
135. Act No 66 of 1975 s 1(1). This aspect of the definition of 
'revenue' has not been altered by amending legislation. 
136. Act No 66 of 1975 s 4(1): 
'The moneys in the State Revenue Fund shall be 
appropriated by Parliament by an Appropriation or other 
Act for the requirements of the State ••• ' 
This was the provision prior to its amendment by the 
Exchequer and Audit Amendment Act No 100 of 1984. 
137. Act No 66 of 1975 s 16(1): 
'The Minister may at any time borrow money to 
(a) finance anticipated deficits in the Exchequer Account; 
(b) obtain foreign currency 
(c) maintain such credit balance in the Exchequer Account 
as he may deem necessary in the public interest.' 
No financial limits or ceiling appear in this or any related 
prov1s1on. The 'Minister' being referred to was the 
Minister of Finance. Sees 1 of the 1975 Act. S 16(1) was 
subsequently amended in 1984. S 17 of the 1975 Act also 
gave the Minister a power to borrow unlimited sums, in the 
following terms: 
'The Minister may, in addition to any sums which he may 
borrow under section 16, borrow such further amounts as 
he, after consultation with the bank, may deem to be 
necessary for the proper regulation of internal 
monetary conditions'. 
This provision was subsequently amended in 1984. 
138. Expenditure defrayed from moneys raised in terms of s 16 
would ultimately have to come out of the State Revenue 
Account. Money's raised in terms of s 17 are placed in a 
separate stabilization account. Sees 18(1). Any 
expenditure or losses incurred on the Stabilization Account, 
however, would have to be appropriated by Parliament from 
the State Revenue Account. Sees 18(4)(a) which sa~d: 
'Any expenditure incurred, loss suffered or profit 
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earned •.. in the management of the Stabilization 
Account, shall be on account of the State Revenue 
Account: Provided that any such loss or expenditure 
shall be defrayed from moneys appropriated by 
Parliament for the purpose'. 
139. It should be noted that in terms of s 12(1) of the South 
African Transport Services Finances and Accounts Act No 17 
of 1983, the General Manager of South African Transport 
Services is entitled to borrow money with Ministerial 
approval. S 12(3) declares that the repayment of such loans 
does not require appropriation by Act of Parliament. 
140. Vorster in Jacobs (ed) 'n Nuwe Grondwetlike Bedeling vir 
Suid-Afrika 180. See further, op cit 182. 
141 Giliomee The Parting of the Ways 99-100. 
142. Giliomee in The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power 196-197; 
216 & 255. 
143. In the period between 1948 and 1977, the National Party 
steadily increased its parliamentary representation. 
Giliomee in Afrikaner Power op cit 206. The 1981 election 
results, however, indicated that a shift away from support 
for the government had taken place in the electorate. 
Giliomee The Parting op cit XVI-XVII; & 113. Boulle has 
said that the absence of the alteration-in-power phenomenon 
has meant that South Africa has become noticeably deviant 
from the norm of Westminster political practice. South 
Africa and the Consociational Option - a constitutional 
analysis 148. 
144. Giliomee The Parting op cit XIII; 21-22; 35; 37; 38-39; 52-
53; & 159. Giliomee has said that by the end of 1979, the 
National Party was shedding its image as a coalition of 
class elements within the Afrikaner community. It began to 
rid itself of its working-class constituency, and align more 
clearly with sections of the business community. The trend 
has been towards the creation of a Bourgeois party and 
government. Given that the great majority of Afrikaner 
people have acquired Bourgeois or petty Bourgeois status and 
values, this transformation has been possible. 
145. Giliomee 'Adopted Stategies for the maintenance of White 
rule' Conference on Economic Development and Racial 
Domination (University of the Western Cape) (Paper No 36) 
(October 1984) 6. 
146. Op cit 29. 
147. Adam in Afrikaner Power op cit 69-70. 
148. The absence of the 'alternation-in-power' phenomenon 
precedes the electoral victory of the National Party in 
1948. The only other occasion on which the ruling party 
decisively lost an election was in 1924. See Ch 3 op cit 
47-48 supra. 
149. Some of the conventions which governed the relationship 
between the House of Commons and the House of Lords were 
superceded by statute. The conventions were defined more 
sharply, and 'enacted' in the Parliament Act of 1911. Wade 
and Bradley's Constitutional and Administrative Law op cit 
190-191. 
150. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 185. The South Africa Act 
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of 1909 s 60 declared: 
60(1) 'Bills appropriating revenue or moneys or imposing 
taxation shall originate only in the House of 
Assembly ... ' 
(2) 'The Senate may not amend any Bills so far as they 
impose taxation or appropriate revenue or moneys for 
the services of the Government.' 
(3) 'The Senate may not amend any Bills so as to increase 
any proposed charges or burden on the people.' 
The wording of s 60 of the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 was almost identical. It 
should be remembered that the Senate was abolished in 1980 
by the Republic of South Africa Constitution Fifth Amendment 
Act No 101 of 1980. 
151. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 185. In terms of s 63 of 
the South Africa Act of 1909, if there was legislative 
deadlock between the two Houses of Parliament over a Bill in 
two successive sessions, the Governor-General could convene 
a joint sitting of both Houses where the deadlock would be 
resolved by majority vote of members present. Whenever the 
Senate rejected an Appropriation Bill, however, the 
convening of a joint session of both Houses could take place 
immediately. S 63 was repealed and replaced with a 
substantially different provision in terms of s 7 of the 
Senate Act No 53 of 1955. The new provision was 
subsequently re-enacted ass 63 of the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961. The new deadlock 
provision established that if the Senate rejected a Bill 
which imposed taxation or a Bill which appropriated 
revenues, the version which had been passed by the House of 
Assembly could be presented at once to the Governor-General 
or the State President for his assent. As far as other 
Bills were concerned, if there was deadlock between the two 
Houses over two successive sessions, the Bill as passed by 
the House of Assembly would be presented to the Governor-
General or State President for his assent. Note; the Senate 
was abolished in 1980. N150 supra. 
152. South Africa Act of 1909 s14: 
' ... After the first general election of members of the 
House of Assembly ... no minister shall hold office for a 
longer period than three months unless he is or becomes 
a member of either House of Parliament'. 
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 
s 20(3) declared much to the same effect: 
'No Minister shall hold office for a longer period than 
three months unless he is or becomes a member of the 
Senate or the House of Assembly.' 
The period of grace was extended from three months to twelve 
months by the Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Amendment Act No 70 of 1980 s 1. Reference to the Senate 
was deleted when the Senate was abolished soon afterwards. 
N150 supra. VerLoren van Themaat does not mention this 
particular rule when he examines the important South African 
conventions. Its conventional origin, however, may be 
traced in the equivalent British Constitutional rule. Ch 1 
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op cit 3 & n20 supra. 
153. Jennings Cabinet Government 13-19; and Dicey op cit 429-432; 
454-455; & 457. 
154. Note, the 'democratic' character of the South African 
constitution has always been undermined by the absence of 
universal adult suffrage. Ch 1 op cit 10 & n58 supra. This 
has meant that the South African constitution has never 
properly conformed to the fourth characteristic of a 
Westminster system, namely, that Ministers are responsible 
to 'a freely elected and representative' legislature. Ch 1 
op cit 2 & n9 supra. 
155. Complete control of financial legislation and the final say 
over all other legislative matters had to be given to the 
House of Assembly if the will of the electorate's directly 
elected representatives was to prevail in South Africa's 
constitutional system. The requirement that Ministers 
become members of the legislature rests at the foundation of 
the convention of collective and individual ministerial 
responsibility. It is upon this basis that the whole notion 
of responsible government has been built. Ch 2 op cit 12 & 
n6; and Ch 3 op cit 46-48 & n118 supra. 
156. It cannot be assumed that the courts would be willing to 
enforce obedience to such rules. See the discussion on leges 
imperfectae. Ch 7 op cit 207-210 infra. See also VerLoren 
Van Themaat 3ed op cit 175 & n77; and VerLoren Van Themaat 
'Konvensie En Reg' 1942 (6) THR-HR 94-95. 
157. Dean 'A New Constitution for South Africa?' (1984) Jahrbuch 
Des Offentlichen Rechts Der Gegenwart 460 at 477 says: 
' ..• part of political reality is the White electorate's 
familiarity with and belief in the democratic character 
of the existing conventions. Flouting these conventions 
will expose the President to the risk of losing 
political support amongst those on whom he will depend 
for his continuation in office.' 
The term 'South African Prime Minister' could be substituted 
for Dean's reference to 'the President'. In South Africa, 
the term 'White'is legally defined. N243 infra. 
158. In terms of clause 26(3) of the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Bill (B.91-'83) as read a first and second time, 
the parliamentary basis of government was to be watered down. 
The clause did not require Ministers to become members of the 
legislature within a specified time of their appointment to 
Ministerial office. An attempt to reinstate the full rigours 
of the rule which required Ministers to become members of the 
legislature was defeated in Select Committee. Second Report 
of the Select Committee on the Constitution (on the Republic 
of South Africa Constitution Bill) (SC 8B-'83) Part I 130 & 
134. All the Ministers who sat on the Select Committee 
supported the watering-down of the principle of a 
parliamentary executive. These Ministers were the Ministers 
of Constitutional Development and Planning, of Co-operation 
and Development, of Internal Affairs, of National Education, 
and of Justice. The Bill was finally enacted as the Republic 
of South Africa Constitution Act No 110 of 1983. The rule 
requiring a parliamentary-based executive had been 
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reinstated, however. The rule was stated clearly in ss 
24(3)(a) and 27(2)(a) of the 1983 Act. The apparent 'volte-
face' by the government has not been explained. Perhaps the 
resistance to the watering-down of parliamentary government 
was too strong among National Party members of Parliament. 
This matter requires further investigation. 
159. Ch 3 op cit 32-52 supra. 
160. Ch 3 op cit 99-100 supra. 
161 Status of the Union Act No 69 of 1934. 
162. Ch 3 infra. Certain powers of the Governor-General were 
excepted from the operation of s 4(1) & (2) of the Status of 
the Union Act No 69 of 1934. Ch 7 op cit 211-213 infra. 
163. Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act No 70 of 1934. 
164. Ch 3 op cit 93-94 & nn382-382 supra. 
165. Ch 3 op cit 93-94 & nn378-381 supra. 
166. There is no known example of an instrument signed by the 
Governor-General which has failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements for co-signature. The provisions of the 1961 
Constitution Act which used to regulate co-signature 
requirements, however, have been the subject of much 
academic debate. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 269-270. 
There is now clear authority for the proposition that a 
proclamation issued by the State President can be declared 
null and void if it fails to comply with statutory 
procedural requirements. Government of South Africa and 
another v Government of KwaZulu and another 1983 (1) SA 164 
SA (AD) per Rabie CJ at 198; 199; & 200-201. A court of law 
might well have adopted similar reasoning with respect to a 
proclamation by the Governor-General. 
167. Ch 1 op cit 2-6 & n9; Ch 2 op cit 12 & n6; & Ch 3 op cit 
32-52 supra. 
168. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 
s 16(1) & (2): 
16(1) 'The executive government of the Republic in 
regard to any aspect of its domestic or foreign affairs 
is vested in the State President, acting on the advice 
of the Executive Council'. 
(2) 'Save where otherwise expressly stated or 
necessarily implied, any reference in this Act to the 
State President shall be deemed to be a reference to 
the State President acting on the advice of the 
Executive Council.' 
169. Act No 32 of 1961 s 19(1).: 
'The will and pleasure of the State President as head of 
the executive government of the Republic shall be 
expressed in writing under his signature, and every 
instrument signed by him shall be countersigned by a 
Minister.' 
Note, the provisions governing custody of the Seals were 
different under the 1961 Constitution Act. The Prime 
Minister of the Union had enjoyed possession of the Seals 
under s 3 of the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act No 
70 of 1934. See Ch 3 op cit 93 & n 379 supra. In terms of s 
18(2) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 
of 1961, the seal of the Republic was placed in the custody 
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of the State President. The State President was thus able to 
confirm his own signature with the seal which was in his 
possession. 
170. VerLoren Van Themaat 2ed op cit 269-270. At 270 he says: 
'Feit is egter dat as die Minister weier om te 
onderteken (of as daar geen Minister is om·te 
onderteken nie), kan die Staatspresident nie besluit nie 
omdat hy nie sy besluit te kenne kan gee nie.' 
See further Ch 7 op cit 212-213 & n196 infra. 
171 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 
s 1O(1)(b): 
'He shall cease to hold office on a resolution passed by 
the Senate and by the House of Assembly during the same 
session declaring him to be removed from office on the 
ground of misconduct or inability to perform efficiently 
the duties of his office.' 
See further, VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 227; & 230-231. 
The Senate was abolished in 1980. N150 supra. 
172. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 180 n97; & 227. At 180 n97 
he says: 
'In Suid-Afrika is daar met die ampsaanvaarding van mnr 
Vorster as staatpresident in 1978 nogal gespekuleer dat 
hy 'n aktiewer rol sal speel as sy voorgangers dog het 
dit gou geblyk dat net soos die britse monarg, hy buite 
die politieke arena gestaan het.' 
173. See, for example, Schierhout v Union Government 1927 AD 94 
per De Villiers JA at 100; & Gardiner AJA at 107. See also 
Deitch v Smuts NO and Others 1939 TPD 58 per Greenberg JP at 
62-64. At 63 he said: 
'In the present case the Minute shows that an undefined 
number of Ministers, whose number however was sufficient 
to warrant the signature of the Minute by the Prime 
Minister, recommended the Governor-General to approve of 
the appointment. In my opinion this language is clearly 
patient of the meaning that a number of Ministers, 
including the Prime Minister, were advising the 
Governor-General to make the appointment. These 
Ministers may well constitute the Executive Council and 
if they do, then their recommendation, approved by the 
Governor-General, would amount to an appointment by the 
Governor-General-in-Council in terms of sec. 100.' 
This passage is remarkable for the vague terms in which it 
describes the decision-making process of the Governor-
General-in-Council. The court took no account of the 
individual views of each Minister who was present at the 
meeting. The court took no account of the number of 
Ministers who were in favour of or against the ultimate 
decision which was reached at the meeting. The presence or 
absence of a systematic voting procedure when decisions were 
being made by Ministers of State did not seem to concern the 
court at all. 
174. Ch 3 op cit 32-34 supra. 
175. Ch 3 op cit 36 & nn29 & 31 supra. 
176. The wording of s4(1) and (2) of the Status of the Union Act 
No 69 of 1934, whereby the King and the Governor-General were 
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obliged to act on the advice of the Ministers of State for 
the Union was subject to a proviso ins 4(3). S 4(3) 
declared: 
'The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not be 
taken to affect the provisions of sections twelve, 
fourteen, twenty and forty-five of the South Africa Act 
and the constitutional conventions relating to the 
exercise of his functions by the Governor-General under 
the said sections'. 
The wording of s 4(1) and (2) of the Royal Executive 
Functions and Seals Act No 70 of 1934, whereby the King's sign 
manual had to be confirmed by one of the Seals of the Union, 
and accompanied by a Ministeral co-signature, was subject to 
a proviso ins 4(4). S 4(4) said: 
'The provisions of this section shall not affect the 
exercise of the powers under sections twelve, fourteen, 
twenty and forty-five of the South Africa Act, 1909, by 
the King or the Governor-General.' 
It is clear, therefore, that the provisos in the two 1934 
Acts corresponded with each other. Ss 12; 14; 20; and 45 of 
the South Africa Act of 1909 are set out in nn 177-179 infra. 
177. South Africa Act of 1909 s12: 
'There shall be an Executive Council ..• and the members 
of the council shall be chosen and summoned by the 
Governor-General .•. and shall hold office during his 
pleasure.' 
178. South Africa Act of 1909 s 14: 
'The Governor-General may appoint officers ••• to 
administer such departments of State of the Union as the 
Governor-General-in-Council may establish; such officers 
shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-
General. They shall be members of the Executive Council 
and shall be the Kings' Ministers of State for the 
Union.' 
179. South Africa Act of 1909 s 20: 
'The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding 
the sessions of Parliament as he thinks fit, and may 
also from time to time, by proclamation or otherwise, 
prorogue Parliament, and may in like manner dissolve the 
Senate and the House of Assembly simultaneously, or the 
House of Assembly alone ... ' 
S 45 declared: 
'Every House of Assembly shall continue for five years 
from the first meeting thereof, and no longer, but may 
be sooner dissolved by the Governor-General.' 
180. Ch 3 op cit 32-40; 42-45; & 53-82 supra. 
181. Ch 3 op cit 34-39 supra. 
182. Ch 7 op cit 172-176 supra. 
183. Ch 3 op cit 64-82 supra. 
184. Under the Westminster system, the effective head of 
government is the Prime Minister. Ch 1 op cit 2 & n9 supra. 
The Prime Minister must be the Premier in substance as well 
as form, however. Ch 3 op cit 72-73 & 80-81 supra. 
185. The wording of s 16(1) and (2) of the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act No 32 of 1961, whereby the State President 
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was obliged to act on the advice of the Executive Council, 
was subject to a proviso ins 16(3). S 16(3) declared: 
'The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of this 
section shall not be construed to affect the exercise by 
the State President of his powers under section twenty, 
in so far as it relates to the appointment of Ministers, 
or section twenty-five, paragraph (a) of sub-section (1) 
of section thirty-three or section forty-seven, or the 
constitutional conventions relating to the exercise of 
his functions by the State President.' 
It is interesting to note that the dismissal of Ministers was 
not subject to the proviso. Accordingly, the State President 
could only dismiss Ministers if he was advised to do so by 
his existing Ministers of State. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op 
cit 179-180 & n95. Note, however, it has been argued by 
VerLoren Van Themaat that a 'reserve power' to dismiss 
Ministers without advice has remained intact. N195 infra. 
S 16(3) of the 1961 Constitution Act was thus remarkably 
similar to s 4(3) of the Status of the Union Act No 69 of 
1934. See n176 supra. The one difference was that s16(3) of 
the 1961 Act did not permit the State President to dismiss 
Ministers without advice. Note, ss20; 25; 33(1)(a); and 47 
of the 1961 Act are set out in nn186-187 infra. 
186. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 
s 20(1) declared: 
'The State President may appoint persons ... to administer 
such departments of State of the Republic as the State 
President may establish.' 
187. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act No 32 of 1961 s 25 
declared: 
(1) 'The State President may appoint such times for holding 
the sessions of Parliament as he thinks fit, and may 
also from time to time, by proclamation in the Gazette 
or otherwise, prorogue Parliament.' 
S 33(1) declared: 
'Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any 
other law the State President may: 
(a) at any time by proclamation in the Gazette dissolve 
the Senate simultaneously with the House of 
Assembly; •.. ' 
S 47(1) declared: 
'Every House of Assembly shall continue for five years 
from the first meeting thereof, and no longer, but may 
at any time be dissolved by the State President by 
proclamation in the Gazette.' 
188. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 179-182. Whether or not the 
Prime Minister could advise a dissolution without first 
consulting his colleagues is rather unclear. 
189. Kahn (1961) Annual Survey of South African Law 1~2; and 
Basson Verteenwoordiging in die Staatsreg 309-311. 
190. Kahn (1961) Annual Survey op cit 5-6; and Kahn The New 
Constitution 20-21. See further, Prime Minister Verwoerd, 
House of Assembly Debates 103 (1960) 20th January Cols 101-
103. 
191. Kahn (1961) Annual Survey op cit 1; and Kahn The New 
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Constitution 1 & 23. 
192. Olivier in De Crespigny and Schire (eds) The Government and 
Politics of South Africa 20. 
193. Ibid; and Roux in Worral (ed) South Africa: Government and 
Politics 46-47. 
194. South African Prime Ministers have ruled in the tradition of 
'Volksleiers'. Olivier in De Crespigny and Schire (eds) The 
Government and Politics of South Africa 26. This placed the 
South African Prime Minister and his colleagues in an 
exceptionally strong position. Controversial policies, such 
as a departure from existing cosntitutional norms could be 
justified in the name of group security. Adam Afrikaner 
Power op cit 22; 67-70; & 133. Accordingly, when the South 
African Prime Minister proposed to abandon the traditional 
form of Westminster government in 1982, he justified the need 
for change in terms of 'anti-communism', the defence of 
'civilized standards', and the promotion of greater 
'security' for Whites. Address by the Hon.PW Botha, the 
Prime Minister, to the National Party Federal Congress at 
Bloemfontein (30th-31st July 1982). The address is 
reproduced in The Second Report of the Constitutional 
Committee of the President's Council (PC.4/1982) 105-107; 
110-111; & 113-114. The strength of the traditional 
political leadership was unable to prevent a limited split in 
the National Party, however. Giliomee The Parting op cit 
XVI-XVIII. 
195. The possible exercise of a 'reserve power' by the Sovereign 
has been acknowledged in the United Kingdom. Ch 3 op cit 
55-58 supra. Sir Patrick Duncan's refusal to grant a 
dissolution to General Hertzog may be regarded as an example 
of the use of 'reserve powers' in South Africa. Ch 3 op cit 
72-82 supra. VerLoren Van Themaat has argued that there may 
have been circumstances in which the State President would 
have been entitled to use 'reserve powers' to dismiss 
Ministers, and appoint new ones, or dissolve Parliament. 
VerLoren Van Thernaat 3ed op cit 180-181; 233-234; & 235. 
196. Although s 16(3) of the Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Act No 32 of 1961 had permitted the State President to 
exercise certain powers without Ministerial advice, the 
exercise of these powers did not appear to have been excluded 
from the Ministerial co-signature requirements of s 19(1). 
S 19(1) declared: 
'The will and pleasure of the State President as head of 
the executive government of the Republic shall be 
expressed in writing under his signature, and every 
instrument signed by him shall be countersigned by a 
Minister.' 
S 19(1) of the 1961 Act did not, therefore, reflect the 
proviso which.had been contained ins 4(4) of the Royal 
Executive Functions and Seals Act No 70 of 1934. Seen 176 
supra. VerLoren Van Themaat has reviewed the problem in 
detail. VerLoren Van Thernaat 3ed op cit 235-236. He argued 
that Ministerial co-signature was not necessary for powers 
exercised under s 16(3) of the 1961 Constitution·Act. At 
235, one of his arguments went as follows: 
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'Die voor-die-hand-liggende is dat artikel 19 'n leemte 
het en dat die uitsonderings van artikel 16(3) ook in 
die artikel vervat moes gewees het'. 
At 236 he has argued: 
'Indien aanvaar word dat die mede-ondertekening deur--'n 
minister impliseer dat die staatspresident deur die 
uitvoerende raad geadviseer is, is dit 'n noodwendige 
gevolgtrekking dat die staatspresident se uitvoerende 
handelinge wat hy op sy eie, kragtens artikel 16(3) 
verrig, nie mede-onderteken hoef te word nie. So 'n 
oplossing sou ook in ooreenstemming met die voorafgaande 
staatsregtelike reeling wees.' 
Kahn has argued that the draftsmen of the 1961 Constitution 
Act made an ill-advised effort to restrict the powers of the 
Head of State. Kahn (1961) Annual Survey op cit 7. Schmidt 
has argued, however, that the co-signature requirements could 
not be overlooked. Nonetheless, he believed that the co-
signature requirements did not prejudice the State 
President's right to exercise powers without advice under 
s 16(3) of the 1961 Act. He said: 
'Artikel 16 bepaal naamlik wie die besluit moet neem, 
d.w.s. of die uitvoerende raad of die Staatspresident, 
terwyl artikel 19 net bepaal hoe so 'n besluit te kenne 
gegee moet word. Artikel 19 dwing dus sowel die 
Staatspresident as die betrokke minister om 'n stuk te 
onderteken wat uitvoering gee aan 'n besluit geneem of 
deur die Staatspresident of deur die Uitvoerende Raad. 
Neg die een nog die ander kon weier om te onderteken, 
sonder om die reg van die land te skend'. 
Schmidt 'Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, Wet 
No 32 van 1961' (1962) 25-26 THR-HR 40-41. 
VerLoren Van Themaat, Kahn and Schmidt thus had quite 
different perspectives on the effect of s 19(1). The courts 
were never presented with the opportunity to settle the 
controversy. 
197. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 180-182. 
198. Ch 7 op cit 202-204 supra. 
199. Giliomee Afrikaner Power op cit 197-201; & 205-206. 
200. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 182-183. 
201. Op cit 183. 
202. Ibid. 
203. It has been noted that the White population is attached to 
the traditions of 'democratic' government. N157 supra. The 
ethnic basis of parliamentary politics, however, has meant 
that controversial decisions can be justified on the basis of 
group security. N194 supra. 
204. Dicey op cit 44-48. 
205. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 183. 
206. Ch 3 op cit 48-52 supra. 
207. A modern description of collective responsibility in the 
United Kingdom may be found in Wade and Bradley's 
Constitutional and Administrative Law op cit 107-111. At 
111 Wade and Bradley say: 
'It is evident that collective responsibility is 
invoked to control the behaviour of ministers while 
-98-
they are in office and that this control is exercised 
by the Prime Minister. To this extent, the consequences 
of collective responsibility appear to be what the 
Prime Minister of the day chooses to make them.' 
See also MacIntosh The British Cabinet 531-536; and Johnson 
In Search o~ the Constitution: reflections on State and 
Society in Britain 83-85. 
The vagueness of the rule in a South African context will 
become apparent in the text infra. 
208. Booysen and Van Wyk Die 1 83 Grondwet 119. 
209. For the British position, see n207 supra. The workings of 
collective responsibility in South Africa will become 
apparent in the text infra. 
210. Booysen and Van Wyk op cit 119. 
211. Prirne Minister Botha House of Assembly Debates 78 (1978) 7th 
December Col 8. The 'Information Scandal' was investigated. 
in two official reports. See the Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry in Alleged Irregularities in the former 
Department of Information RP 113/1978; and the 
Supplementary Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Alleged Irregularities in the former Department of 
Information RP 63/1979. 
212. Debates 78 (1978) op cit col 24. 
213. Ibid. 
214. CW Eglin the leader of the Progressive Federal Party, 
Debates 78 (1978) op cit cols 66-67; and WV Raw, the 
leader of the New Republic Party, Debates 78 (1978) op cit 
cols 87; & 95-96. V W Raw said at col 87: 
'I totally reject the Hon. the Prime Minister's claim 
that lack of knowledge and ignorance of what has 
happened absolves him or his Government from collective 
responsibility. It shows, moreover, that the 
Government failed to carry out its duty when it failed 
to establish the facts. It is therefore not a 
mitigating factor, but an aggravating factor in their 
responsibility and their culpability for what went on. 
It is an aggravating factor that they failed to obtain 
the information - knowledge - which it was the duty of 
the Cabinet, and particularly that of the Cabinet 
subcommitttee of three, to obtain.' 
215. N214 supra. 
216. Debates 78 (1978) op cit cols 533-534. 
217. VerLoren Van Themaat 3ed op cit 183. 
218. Booysen and Van Wyk op cit 119. 
219. Ch 1 op cit 10-11; and Ch 7 op cit 202-204 supra. 
220. MacIntosh The British Cabinet 529; & 533. In 1935 the 
British Cabinet ultimately decided to abandon its Foreign 
Secretary because of the unpopularity of the Hoare-Laval Pact 
which he had helped to negotiate. At first the Prime 
Minister and his colleagues had tried to protect Sir Samuel 
Hoare by sheltering him behind the cloak of collective 
responsibility. The pact, however, was being heavily 
criticized in Parliament. Collective responsibility was 
therefore withdrawn when it became obvious that continued 
Cabinet support for the actions of the Minister might lead 
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to parliamentary defeat for the entire government. The 
abandoned Foreign Secretary accepted individual 
responsibility for the unpopular pact and resigned from, 
office. See further, Jennings Cabinet Government 476-478. 
221. MacIntosh op cit 529-531; & 533. 
222. N220 supra. 
223. A Minister may voluntarily choose to resign, because he 
might feel in some way morally culpable for a decision which 
has had unfortunate consequences. The resignation may be 
related to a personal decision which he took while holding 
ministerial office, or it may be related to an error or 
blunder committed by an official in his department. 
MacIntosh op cit 529-530. A clear example of such a 
resignation in recent years was that of Lord Carrington as 
British Foreign Secretary during the Falkland Island crisis 
of 1982. Wade and Bradley's Constitutional and 
Administrative Law op cit 116-117. 
224. N220 supra. 
225. Ibid. The ultimate fate of Sir Samuel Hoare may be 
contrasted with full Cabinet support for the British 
Colonial Secretary in 1958. MacIntosh op cit 530-531. 
226. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged 
Irregularities in the former Department of Information RP 
113/1978 74-75. 
227. The Ministers were criticized by the leader of the 
Opposition, CW Eglin. Debates 78 (1978) op cit cols 41-42; 
54; & 59-65. They were both equally condemned by the leader 
of the New Republic Party, WV Raw. Debates 78 (1978) op 
cit cols 93-95. 
228. Ch 7 op cit 216-217 & n210 supra. 
229. Geldenhuys and Kotze 'Man of Action' (1985) 4 (No 2) Leadership 
33; and Giliomee Afrikaner Power op cit 202-205. 
230. Debates 78 (1978) op cit cols 505-506 (underlining added). 
See also op cit cols 508-509; & 516. 
231. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged 
Irregularities in the former Department of Information RP 
113/1978 paragraph 10.339. (Underlining added). 
232. There are certain parallels with the 'Profumo Scandal'of 
1963. Wade and Phillips op cit 106-107. There is evidence 
to suggest, however, that the British Cabinet has 
deliberately chosen to withhold information from Parliament 
without any adverse political reaction. See 'Old Bailey 
Clears Ponting' Cape Times 12th February 1985; or 'Jury 
acquits Ponting of secrets Act breach' The Times 12th 
February 1985. For an analysis of the 'Ponting Affair', see 
Drewry, 'The Ponting Case - Leaking in the Public 
Interest' (1985) Public Law 203-212. 
233. Dr C Mulder was attacked by the Erasmus Commission for the 
manner in which he had discharged his ministerial 
obligations as head of the Department of Information. 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged 
Irregularities in the former Department of Information RP 
113/1978 76-85. BJ Vorster, who had been Prime Minister 
of South Africa while the irregularities were taking place, 
and who was State President at the time of the Erasmus 
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Reports was condemned in the second, supplementary report. 
Supplementary Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Alleged Irregularities in the former Department of 
Information (RP 53/1979) Ch 3. See especially op cit 6-11. 
Both men thereafter retired from public office. Booysen and 
Van Wyk op cit 119. Dr Mulder resigned from the Cabinet on 
8th November 1978 - one month before the Information Scandal 
debate in Parliament. Parliamentary Register 1910-1982 76. 
BJ Vorster resigned as State President on 3rd June 1979, 
shortly after the completion of the Erasmus Commission's 
Supplementary Report. Parliamentary Register 1910-1982 8. 
234. CW Eglin, leader of the Progressive Federal Party, Debates 
78 (1978) op cit Cols 54-55; and WV Raw, leader of the New 
Republic Party Debates 78 (1978) op cit col 87. 
235. N220 supra. 
236. House of Assembly Debates 72 (1978) 31st January cols 116 & 
118. Mrs H Suzman argued that S Biko died on 7th September 
1977. Op cit col 116-117. 
237. Mrs H Suzman Debates 72 (1978) op cit cols 117-118. 
238. Mrs H Suzman Debates 72 (1978) op cit cols 118-121; CW 
Eglin op cit cols 25-27; and WM Sutton op cit col 141. 
239. WM Sutton Debates 72 (1978) op cit 141: 
'I believe that if there is a case to be made out for 
the Hon. the Minister to resign, it is on the basis of 
the remarks that he made, not on the basis of the 
action he took .•. ' 
See also Mrs H Suzman op cit col 121. 
240. The Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons finally resigned 
on 19th June 1979. Parliamentary Register 1910-1982 77. 
241. Dean A New Constitution? op cit 475; and Ch 1 op cit 10 & 
n53 supra. 
242. Dean A New Constitution? op cit 475. 
243. The term 'White person' is defined in the Population 
Registration Act No 30 of 1950 s 1. S 1, as currently 
amended reads: 
1 (1) ' "White person" means a person who-
(a) in appearance obviously is a white person and who 
is not generally accepted as a coloured person; or 
(b) is generally accepted as a white person and is not 
in appearance obviously not a white person, but 
does not include any person who for the purposes 
of his classification under this Act, freely and 
voluntarily admits that he is by descent a Black 
or a coloured person unless it is proved that the 
admission is not based on fact.' 
S 1(1) also defines a 'coloured person' as follows: 
' "Coloured person" means a person who is not a white 
person or a Black person' 
A 'Black person' is defined ins 1(1) as follows: 
' "Black'; means a person who is, or is generally 
accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe 
of Africa.' 
Note, the parliamentary franchise in South Africa was 
ultimately restricted exclusively to Whites. Dean A New 
Constitution? op cit 461 & n7. 
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244. For the non-Westminster tradition of South Africa's 
constitutional heritage, see Boulle op cit 152-199. 
